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Indian Relations With CIS States Examined

PM1511105593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Nikolay Paklin: "Russian Diplomats in India Envy Ukrainian Diplomats"]

[Text] Delhi—To the envy of Russian diplomats, staffers at the Ukrainian Embassy in Delhi receive higher wages. The staff at the Ukrainian Embassy is small, but Kiev takes into account India's great interest in Ukraine.

India pays its main attention to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. But in contrast to Kiev, Almaty, and Tashkent are not yet represented by embassies in Delhi, although a few days ago a Kazakhstan ambassador arrived here with two diplomats and an accountant. They have taken up temporary residence in a hotel. Tashkent is represented by a consular agent. "In this case, the Uzbek side is acting counter to the norms of diplomatic protocol," an Indian diplomat says. "We have an embassy in Tashkent, and Uzbekistan cannot be represented in Delhi by a consular agent."

Nor is there a representative of Turkmenistan in Delhi. After the Turkmenistan Foreign Ministry stopped financing its representative, who used to work at the Russian Embassy, he returned home. And Kyrgyzstan has so far limited itself to a charge d'affaires ad interim. But he lives in a private house, and his automobile does not have diplomatic plates.

But India is only thinking of opening an embassy in Bishkek, as indeed, it is in Dushanbe. The Foreign Ministry is already selecting cadres for these embassies. India attaches importance to Central Asia. It considers the region's geographical proximity to India, the historical traditions in relations between the peoples, and the economic potential. But another circumstance is also important: India fears that Islamic fundamentalists, with whom it is at odds, may gain a foothold in the young Central Asian states.

If for India the Central Asian republics are a field of confrontation with Muslim fundamentalists, Russia remains an Indian priority in the field of political, economic, and military cooperation. The newspaper ECONOMIC TIMES writes: "He who dreams of the past, whether in the political or economic field, is wasting his time. The changes in Russia are irreversible. Authoritarian rule will not return. There will no longer be an economy based on edicts. But the market economy presents broad opportunities for those who live by present-day realities." The newspaper notes that India is "doomed" to cooperate with Russia in the military sphere even in the 21st Century. According to its calculations, 80 percent of the air force, 70 percent of the navy, and 45 percent of the ground forces depend on deliveries of spare parts from Russia.

The Caucasus republics remain outside India's purview. The recent visit by a high-ranking Moldovan delegation to India went unnoticed.

A visit by the Estonian foreign minister to Delhi was virtually without results. "The Baltic countries are low on India's list of foreign policy priorities," the influential newspaper THE PIONEER writes. If they can be useful to India in any way then it is only with their ports, which could be used as shipping points for Indian goods sent by sea to the CIS.

Latvia, Lithuania Refuse To Join UNESCO East Europe Group

WS1511154693 Tallinn BNS in English 1109 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Paris, Nov 15, BNS—Latvian and Lithuanian representatives to the 27th UNESCO Assembly turned down an invitation to join the group's East European section, said Latvian Culture and Science Minister Janis Vaivads.

Vaivads said the group would be culturally dominated by Russia, and his country refuses to accept that.

Latvia has joined the East European group of the United Nations.

CIS Coordination Committee Meets in Moscow

Mashchits Previews Session

MK1311125093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 13 Nov p 3

[Konstantin Smirnov report: "News Conference by Vladimir Mashchits. Russia Proposes To Alter Route to Economic Union"]

[Excerpt] Vladimir Mashchits, chairman of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Commonwealth Members, held a news conference yesterday on preparations for a session of the CIS Coordination-Consultative Committee in Moscow on 15 November. Vladimir Mashchits thinks that decisions that are supposed to be made in the committee's first meeting after the treaty establishing an Economic Union has been signed will enable the government to focus the Commonwealth governments' attention on the formation of the CIS Economic Union, whose idea has been recently overshadowed by the failure to establish a ruble zone.

The drafters incorporated the following idea in the document establishing an Economic Union of the Commonwealth countries: In order to create a common market, members of the union will have to take a number of consistent steps—first, to form a free-trade zone, then to establish a customs union, and only then to put on the agenda the formation of the economic union of the treaty participants. The creation of a zone for the Russian ruble emerged as a top priority during the fall of 1993. Judging from their prime ministers' joint statement, Russia and Kazakhstan actually closed the ruble zone the other day. Vladimir Mashchits, however, stressed at the news conference that this does not bury at all the idea of merging the monetary systems of Russia and the five other states that signed on 7 November 1993 the agreement on practical measures to establish a new-type ruble zone. At any rate, an option is not ruled out where each republic would have its own national currency while the Russian ruble will be used as a supranational reserve currency. [passage omitted]

Shokhin Rejects Donor Role for Russia

LD1511182193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1448 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow November 15 TASS—A civilized way towards a joint economic space on the territory of the ex-USSR "rules out (soviet-type) 'fraternal relations' in which Russia is expected to act as the donor without any hope of seeing any returns on the invested capital", Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin told ITAR-TASS on Monday [15 November].

"And we have succeeded in embarking on exactly this way", he said.

Delegations from all member-countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia gathered behind closed doors in Moscow today to discuss problems of forming a new economic union.

The meeting of the so-called Coordination and Consultative Council, chaired by Shokhin, is expected to draft agreements on prices and taxes, investment policy, cooperation and direct links, anti-monopolist policy, and elaborate procedure of joining the economic union by those wishing to be associate members.

It is planned to discuss the setting up of a special fund to aid Tajikistan which has suffered from a civil war, and the founding of a new periodical "CIS - a common market".

Special attention will be devoted to the prospect of creating an inter-state bank of the Commonwealth which, according to Shokhin, "should be tied up with the prospects of unification of the monetary systems (of the CIS member-states) or the introduction of national currencies".

Shokhin expressed hope that the problems of overdue debts between enterprises of the Commonwealth member-states will be settled soon. "In a year or two, we would like to concentrate on resolving specific problems, such as establishing transnational corporations", he said.

Further Shokhin Comments

LD1511190493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1826 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Pavel Bogdanov and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Nov—"The creation of a payments union is a vitally important problem for all the states of the CIS," Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin stated today on completion of a meeting of the CIS Coordination and Consultative Committee.

This issue and four draft agreements—on cooperation in the field of investment activity, on general conditions and a mechanism for supporting the development of production cooperation and direct ties, on a coordinated antimonopoly policy, and on conditions for joining the economic union as an associate member—were approved in principle, the Russian deputy prime minister said.

Central Asian States To Pool Passport, Crime Data

LD1211204293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0730 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By Yelena Poluyanova, KAZTAG-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Almaty, 12 November—Practical implementation of a project to set up a unified Ministry of Internal

Affairs information center has begun in the countries of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The project will take between two and three years to be completed.

A news conference devoted to this took place in the Kazakhstan Ministry of Internal Affairs attended by representatives of the Internal Affairs Ministries of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, Berlin Police chief Hagen Saberzhinski [name as transliterated], and representatives of Siemens-Nixdorf, which produces the equipment and electronic data processing programs for the operational work. The Siemens-Nixdorf equipment has made a name for itself in Britain, Germany, and many other countries. An agreement on cooperation with the firm was signed last year. Hagen Saberzhinski thinks that it is now simply impossible to wage an effective campaign against crime without electronic data processing. The setting up of a data bank—in which passport information, fingerprints, and other data will be stored—and the virtually instantaneous communication between the remotest of localities within the unified system will make it possible to obtain quickly full information concerning the identity of those who break the law.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 13 Nov

LD1311074093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0631 GMT 13 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 13 (ITAR-TASS)—Russian newspapers focus today on the discussion of the draft constitution, the election campaign for a new parliament and the 40 days since the tragic October events in Moscow.

Commenting on the draft fundamental law, the ROSSIISKIE VESTI newspaper writes the following: "It is clear that there are no possibilities or time for the draft's broad discussion as well as for competition on who suggests more addenda and amendments, as was the case with the Brezhnev constitution.

"However, if it turns out before the referendum that there will be broad-enough negative public opinion on a certain item of the constitution, there is a legal chance to make amendments: since the text of the draft was offered for public discussion by a presidential decree, the president can issue another decree with appropriate amendments."

Writing on the same topic, the PRAVDA newspaper suggests that chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Nikolay Ryabov should offer for the referendum another, Soviet, draft constitution, "in favour of which one million signatures have been collected".

Turning to the election campaign for a new parliament, the newspaper writes: "Opposition parties and movements tread on thin ice, marching towards the elections. There are several reasons for this. The first and the main one is as follows: nearly all of them declared that they were forced to play according to the president's scenario.

"The constitution has been downtrodden, the Soviets disbanded, the elections to the supreme body of representative power and this body in the form of a federal assembly were imposed by presidential decrees."

Quoting data from the central electoral commission on reasons which prevented eight parties and election blocs from participating in the election campaign, the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper stressed that election associations and parties can appeal against all outstanding issues popping up during the election race at the Russian Supreme Court. However, while these issues are examined, the elections will be over, the newspaper adds.

Forty days have passed since the tragic events in Moscow near the parliament building. The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper carries an address by prominent Russian politicians on this issue, noting that "we could have avoided the civil strife if we had respected different views and convictions, if we had overcome mutual bitterness and intolerance, refraining from the temptation to defend our own position by any means, even at the price of our own life and that of other people".

The KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper devotes an entire page to this topic. Under the headline "They Were Alive 40 Days Ago", the newspaper runs materials on people who fell on those tragic October days. "Nobody now can or want to name the exact number of the fallen. Therefore, the dead are a mute reproach to all of us living and to those who conceal this figure," the newspaper notes.

PRAVDA writes the following on this issue. "Both former legislators and emerging Russian democracy are smeared with blood, yielding place to the authoritarian regime."

"The real events of early October are much more intricate than they appear at the first glance. They were a mixture of deliberate, spontaneous and even provocative actions."

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are to give official replies to a new initiative by the Minsk Group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on a peaceful settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict.

In this connection, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA publishes an interview with Vyaf Gulizade, Azeri state adviser on foreign affairs, who heads the republican delegation at the Vienna CSCE talks.

"The schedule of a peaceful settlement may be rejected if it contains an item on the need for pulling out Azeri troops from the Geranboyskiy and part of the Agderyenskiy districts of Nagorno-Karabakh," Gulizade holds.

"The Armenian side's allegation that Azerbaijan occupied these territories does not hold water. A sovereign state cannot occupy its own territory."

Under the headline "Civil War Over, But it's Too Early To Speak About Stability", KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reports the situation in western Georgia, rescribing it as calm on the whole.

Turning to the defence of trunk railways and highways in the area by Russian troops, the newspaper quotes Tedo Dzhaparidze, Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze's assistant on national security: "Transcaucasia is a focal component of Russia's military and political doctrine, and instability in that area is a threat to that country's strategic interests".

Press Review for 16 Nov

LD1611074593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0604 GMT 16 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—Today's Moscow-based press covers a broad spectrum of topics ranging from the registration of candidates to run for the State duma (council) to the White Brotherhood religious sect.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER) on the registration of candidates:

"Judging by everything, the only persons who may not be registered as candidates are all those kept in the Lefortovo prison on charges of involvement in the October 3-4 events".

PRAVDA on the same subject:

"About three million signatures collected in support of party tickets were checked in the central electoral commission in two stages. At first the commission judged whether a list contains 100,000 signatures and then whether the 15,000-signature quota for one region was not exceeded.

"It turned out that many electoral associations were most active recruiting supporters in Moscow, Moscow region, and St. Petersburg. The quotas were exceeded by the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms headed by Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg, by the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, as well as by a number of parties that got eliminated from the election race."

PRAVDA runs an article strongly criticising Vice-Premier Yegor Gaydar, leader of the Russia's Choice bloc.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) on the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris on November 19, 1990:

"The importance of the CFE treaty is diffuclut to overestimate. Parties to the treaty have ceased to regard one another as enemies. The ideology of their military policies and the orientation of military doctrines and armed forces development have radically changed.

"Nowadays the CFE treaty is viewed by all European countries, including those which are not parties to it, as the cornerstone of European security".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the military school:

"The orientation, formulated at one time by the president of Russia and now included in the recently adopted military doctrine, towards qualitative improvement of the armed forces calls for a new, more realistic comprehension of 'the prestige of military school' notion, from the positions of a sober-minded, reasonable harmonisation of the interests of the individual, not from the positions of a mindless military-patriotic romanticism..." KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries an interview with Lieutenant-General Anatoly Trofimov, head of the Russian Security Ministry's department for action against smuggling and corruption.

"Integration is under way between criminal groups in Russia and foreign organised crime. The domestic mafia, having amassed considerable material values and infiltrated state bodies, public organisations, and mass media, virtually seeks to set up parallel power-wielding structures to manage affairs as it deems fit. Organised crime becomes a political factor in the Russian Federation", General Trofimov said.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the White Brotherhood religious sect:

"Problems connected with the instability of teenager mentality and under-developed value orientations have been exacerbated by problems connected with economic, social and ethical crisis of Russian society. Idols have been toppled. Norms are questioned. Traditions are semi-paralysed.

"An unemployed farther or the one sliding into poverty is unable to demand obedience from the son accoridng to the old edifying scheme: 'I studied well, and you see the results'. The son sees that his father has been thrown to the wayside of life. Newspapers, radio and television every day report corruption among old and new leaders.

"Maria Davy (one of the leaders of the sect—note by ITAR-TASS), has had society prepared for her and her ilk. She acted confidently because she is flesh and blood of this world, of this society."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the same subject:

"It has been decided not to bring charges against sect leaders Yuri Krivonogov and Marina Tsvigun so far. If Krivonogov is pronounced sane and sound, he will be charged apparently on two counts—for performing religious rites that are detrimental to human health and for fraud.

"As far as Tsvigun is concerned, it is not ruled out that she will be pronoucned irresponsible for her actions as a person who is under the powerful hypnotic influence of Krivonogov".

DPRK Diplomat Expelled After Efforts To Recruit Experts

LD1511134093 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian Ministry of Security is in possession of data that certain foreign firms and joint enterprises operating in the country have been set up on the initiative of special services for carrying out intelligence activities against Russia in the economic sphere.

This was reported today by First Deputy Security Minister Sergey Stepashin. According to him, ministry staff recently came across a large-scale operation by the special services of North Korea. This operation consisted of an attempt to dispatch to Pyongyang a large group of Russian experts in the missile and space industry. The organizer of the operation, a counsellor at the DPRK Embassy, has been expelled from Russia, Sergey Stepashin said.

U.S. Reportedly Rejects Air Strikes Against DPRK

PM1611114393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[ITAR-TASS report: "United States Studied Possibility of Air Strikes on DPRK"]

[Text] The Clinton administration considered and finally rejected the possibility of air strikes on the DPRK's nuclear installations, TIME magazine has reported.

U.S. intelligence is well aware of the location of North Korea's nuclear reactors. However, calculations showed that any attempt to destroy them would definitely result in the discharge of a considerable quantity of radioactive material into the atmosphere.

Grachev Avoids Discussing Arms Sales During PRC Trip

PM1511171193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 3

[Andrey Kabannikov commentary under the "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Commentary" rubric: "Why Grachev Flew to Beijing"]

[Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has ended a visit to China. He had talks with his Chinese colleagues, was received by PRC State Council Premier Li Peng, visited an elite division of the the Beijing garrison and the once Russian, now Chinese, naval base at Port Arthur, where for decades Russia has had no presence. On the last day of his visit, Grachev and PRC National Defense Minister Chi Haotian signed an agreement on cooperation between the two military departments for the next five years, which provides for an exchange of expertise, a broadening of contacts "right down to the level of ordinary soldiers and seamen," and the establishment of ties between military districts. It was decided to enlarge the military attache's staff in Moscow and Beijing by three persons.

Some seven Chinese military delegations will visit Russia next year—from the defense minister to a song and dance ensemble.

Pavel Grachev's visit provoked a mass of worried commentaries in the world press. A number of newspapers reported on China's new purchases of Russian tanks, missiles, ships, and radar installations. The Japanese paper YOMIURI SHIMBUN reported on Grachev's alleged signing of a deal on joint production of new fighters, the first of which will take to the air as early as 1996. Unfortunately, these rumors were engendered not only by journalists' imaginations and by the West's fear about broadening Russian-Chinese military cooperation, but also to a large degree by our military's stereotyped manner of communicating with the press. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, C. Freeman, who visited the Chinese capital a couple of days ago, considered it necessary to invite journalists accredited in Beijing irrespective of their nationality for a cup of coffee and explained them in a manner leaving no room for misinterpretation why and within what limits the United States is reestablishing its military contacts with Beijing after a four-year break.

Pavel Grachev only met with Russian journalists, and several people from the minister's entourage expressed from the outset sincere doubts about the necessity of "giving" the press "anything." Having inquired of Grachev whether the "brain drain" to China from our defense industry bothers him, your correspondent received a body blow of a reply: "Don't ask provocative questions!" It was all the more annoying to hear from the horse's mouth, albeit with a delay, that our minister had not talked at all with the Chinese about arms sale. According to Grachev, military and technical cooperation does not constitute a part of the Russian Defense Ministry's activities; this is the business of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Committee for the Defense Sectors. Therefore, our Chinese partners removed all questions from the agenda concerning arms acquisition following a request by Grachev to do so. Timely information about this situation would have been able to stop the great many speculations by our foreign colleagues.

As far as new Russian arms deliveries to China are directly concerned, Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin will be making a special trip to Beijing in connection with this matter in several days' time. A working group consisting of several dozen people is already getting up the future contracts here. Among the subjects of the negotiations will be China's possible acquisition of the technology to produce the SU-27 aircraft.

Further Grachev Remarks

PM1611111993 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 2

[Igor Chernyak and Aleksandr Khokhlov "Military Review" article: "Beijing Smiles, Kiev Frowns"]

[Text] **From China With Hope**

Army General Pavel Grachev, Russia's defense minister, spent last week traveling. The main event was a visit to China, during which Grachev met with virtually all Beijing's state and military "beau monde." The minister spent the end of the week at a school from which he himself graduated—the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School.

The school, which has raised 29 Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation, was celebrating its 75th anniversary. During the celebrations all the Russian airborne troops' capabilities were demonstrated. The minister was able to give journalists 15 minutes and this is what he said.

About the Visit to China

"An official agreement has been signed on bilateral relations in the military sphere. We were received well and in a sincere manner [otkryto]. During our conversation Li Peng said very rightly that, whatever the domestic political situations in our countries might be, we simply must live as good neighbors. We have a common border 4,300km long. We are linked by longstanding friendship. Russia and China are great powers, which the whole world watches.

"Questions of military-technical cooperation were not discussed during the meeting. They do not fall within the competence of the defense minister. In the near future Russian Vice Premier A. Shokhin will be going to Beijing and will tackle questions of arms sales directly."

On Privileges for the Military

"After the events of October the army does not expect more privileges from the Russian president. The troops did not save Boris Yeltsin outside the White House—they saved Russia from civil war. We do not expect money and medals for this either. It necessary only to set for the Army a normal military budget for 1994, a normal state order for equipment, and social guarantees for servicemen." [Grachev ends]

Officers Are Millionaires, but the Army Is Poor

A colonel in the Ukrainian Army currently earns over 500,000 karbovantsi a month. If you convert that "half a million" into Russian money, that would be 20,000 rubles or so. While prices... It was said during the "Congress of Ukrainian Servicemen and Business Circles" in Kiev that the poor level of material provision has put the servicemen's survival in the balance. Polls conducted in the Ukrainian Army showed that 93 percent of officers are unhappy with their material position, many feel that they lack protection, and 71 in 100 officers and warrant officers are not satisfied with their housing conditions.

Encountering all these problems, the republic's new defense minister, Vitaliy Radetskyy, said that he intends to steadily enhance the army's prestige and role in society. To this end the colonel general first intends to restore to the troops the competent specialists who were discharged during the first few years of "independence." (But the question is: Will these people return knowing that the Ukrainian Army will continue to be cut back? By 1995 there will be 100,000 fewer soldiers in its ranks).

Second, V. Radetskyy has decided to boost the troops' prestige with a top-secret directive prohibiting servicemen from having dealings with representatives of the press. Kiev journalists learned of this "secret" the following day and are still "poking fun" in their own way...

Will There Be More Explosions on Novaya Zemlya?

Last week Russian Federation Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov and a group of military specialists and high-ranking military from the Russian General Staff visited the "Ostrova Novaya Zemlya" state nuclear testing ground.

After losing the main testing ground near Semipalatinsk, which has transferred to Kazakhstan, the Novaya Zemlya ground is the only one in Russia where military nuclear specialists can test state-of-the-art weapons. According to confidential sources, leaders of the Russian nuclear "defense industry" have asked the Russia president on several occasions to allow tests of new third-generation atomic weapons ("directed" weapons). Military atomic specialists think that the unilateral Russian moratorium has dragged on too long. Especially since not all members of the "nuclear club" are reciprocating. The recent Chinese explosion near Lop Nor is confirmation of that.

Whereas by 1985 (according to a number of assessments) the United States was 10-12 years behind the USSR in this field, real "parity" is now being achieved: Russia's military science is regressing and its rivals ("friends" or "foes"—it is not that important) are still increasing funding in their nuclear sectors.

According to cautious, but not improbable assessments, the "atomic" minister V. Mikhaylov carried out a reconnaissance on Novaya Zemlya ahead of possible nuclear weapons tests in the near future.

Order Given: Westward and Southward

Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of Russia's Black Sea Fleet, and Georgian Prime Minister Otari Patsatsiya signed what can be described as an unprecedented agreement 9 November. The document has been described by

Baltin and Patsatsiya as "fundamental for both sides during Black Sea Fleet seamen's operations on Georgian territory." According to this document, Russia's military seamen are being enlisted to "provide the Republic of Georgia with effective aid in fighting terrorism, drugs, and smuggling, and also to detect, disarm, and wipe out illegal armed bandit formations."

A number of issues arise in connection with the signing of the document. First, why do the actions of a Russian naval troop contingent fall outside the previous agreement between Tbilisi and Moscow on military aid for Georgia? Second, why was the "fundamental document" signed not by Russia's defense minister, but by a fleet commander? Does this mean that Baltin is being given legal rights that have not been authorized by either the Russian president, government, or defense minister? On this premise, do the commanders of branches of Russia's Armed Forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Force, or the Air Defense Forces, for instance—now have the right to autonomously conclude military aid treaties or agreements with the governments of other countries? Third, on what legal basis are Russian servicemen assuming police functions in a foreign sovereign state? And how does this fit in with Russia's new military doctrine? Fourth, won't Russia be helping Gamsakhurdia once the established Georgian authorities feel strong enough to "ask" its seamen to vacate the naval bases?

A decision was also recently adopted to increase the numerical strength of the Russian troop contingent in the former Yugoslavia. Russia's peacekeeping forces there will also receive extra arms and military hardware. Russian Defense Ministry sources report that until recently, despite considerable pressure from the Russian Foreign Ministry, most members of the Defense Ministry Collegium were against this decision since they opposed Russian troops' being embroiled in combat operations on foreign soil. However, after the events of 3-4 October the opposition from the Russian top brass was overcome.

Official Comments on Security Council Expansion

LD1511172493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1608 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitry Vosboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Contrary to reports from New York, Moscow has not endorsed the idea that Germany and Japan should become permanent members of the UN Security Council, a senior official from the International Organizations Department of Russia's Foreign Ministry told INTERFAX.

According to him, Russia is prepared to discuss different plans for reorganizing the UN and the Security Council, including the possibility of increasing the number of its permanent members. "It is evident that the entire UN system needs to be modernized. Nevertheless, Moscow proceeds from the assumption that this must be a gradual process," the diplomat pointed out.

He noted that in the 50 years that have passed since the UN was founded, international realities have changed. "The world has ceased to be bipolar. Germany and Japan are no longer viewed as enemies in Russia, not even on a public consciousness level. Berlin's and Tokyo's support for democratic changes and free-market reforms in Russia is also well-known. Nevertheless, the issue of increasing the number of permanent members in the Security Council is too complicated to be resolved overnight," the ministry official told INTERFAX.

In elaborating, he asked, "What happens if Germany and Japan become permanent members of the UN Security Council? It's quite possible that then India, Nigeria, Argentina, and other third-world countries will call for being granted the same status. This might trigger a chain reaction. That is why Moscow suggests that every argument for and against this should be considered, and only after that should the world community make a decision that would be beneficial to it," he concluded.

Adamishin Views NATO Expansion, Cooperation

BR1511161393 Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian
14 Nov 93 p12

[Interview with First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin by Luigi Offeddu in Moscow; date not given: "Don't Abandon Russia"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[passage omitted] [Offeddu] Let us turn to your own problems. You are standing as a candidate in the December elections, with the bloc headed by the economist, Yavlinskiy. Why did you decide to enter politics now?

[Adamishin] I could answer you not altogether seriously by saying that politics is now the most interesting thing there is in Russia. But, speaking seriously, I think that the most important thing now is to do our utmost to ensure that we have a responsible, fair, and good parliament. This, because we have seen the results of conflict between the legislative and executive authorities. Furthermore, it is absolutely unacceptable for the executive to have exceptional powers for a long period: There is a major risk of degeneration, especially under our conditions, and with all our traditions of authoritarianism...

[Offeddu] So is it only a risk, not yet a reality?

[Adamishin] Well, there are some tendencies that I do not like even now. Be that as it may, we are still in a system in which everyone can say whatever he wants. But we must have a parliament that can serve as a counterbalance to the executive authority. But in order to understand Russian society it is best not to forget this: We are in a transitional phase, in everything.

[Offeddu] And it seems like a very difficult transition.

[Adamishin] Yes. In politics, we are changing from a totalitarian system, with a single party and tremendous discipline, to a democratic, multiparty system. In the economy, we are moving from state ownership and very rigid planning to the free market, the equality of all kinds of ownership, including land ownership. In any other nation each of these transitions would have taken some decades. However, with our Russian pride, we wanted to do everything at once.

[Offeddu] Russia and Europe: Do you or do you not agree to Poland's and Hungary's joining NATO?

[Adamishin] We say: These countries have the right to join NATO, but it would be better if they did not exercise it. We do not want there to be yet another division of Europe. What we need, instead, is a homogeneous area with regard to security. The Berlin Wall collapsed mainly thanks to an impetus from the East; we must not erect any new walls. Above all, we must not leave Russia in an isolated position, because in our country the democratic state is still very fragile. And if people see that we are still in an isolated position, that NATO—albeit no longer the enemy—is approaching our borders by eating up Poland, Ukraine, and so forth, it will be difficult for a democratic government to say: Do not be afraid; these are good people. So it is better to create a more homogenous security area—without excluding Russia.

[Offeddu] What about Russia joining NATO? Can we envisage that?

[Adamishin] Why not? If NATO has changed... Be that as it may, at present the American idea of cooperation as presented by Clinton is fairly close to our own ideas—cooperation, yes, but no official fixing of the new members of the alliance. This, because we think that a quantitative increase will not resolve the problems of the new Europe.

West 'Unhappy' With Karabakh Peace Effort

PM1511150993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Leonid Mlechin report: "Russian and U.S. Diplomacy's Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh"]

[Text] Russia is making a new attempt to stop the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has spoken over the telephone with Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev; Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan; and leader of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Robert Kocharyan. Ambassador at Large Vladimir Kazimirov has flown to Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert.

The Russian diplomatic service's activeness in the Transcaucasus is clearly making the Americans and the Europeans unhappy, since they too have expressed a desire to reconcile the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis. Some Russian diplomats are beginning to say that the Americans are mainly concerned not with stopping the bloodshed in Nagorno-Karabakh, but with how to reduce Russia's role and influence in the Transcaucasus.

Russian diplomacy above all wants to stop the hostilities immediately and secure a binding cease-fire agreement for both sides: As long as the shooting goes on there can be no agreement on refugees or on ending the blockade.

The United States and European states are coldly and academically formulating an all-embracing document on which work could drag on for years. Sessions of the so-called Minsk Group are being held in Rome, Paris, and Vienna, from where the picture of the war does not look that tragic. The foreign diplomats are refusing to meet in Baku or Yerevan.

The CSCE tackled Nagorno-Karabakh after the failure of the Iranian, Yeltsin, and Nazarbayev mediation missions. In June 1992 it was decided to convene an international conference in Minsk with the participation of the warring parties.

But in May the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians began a powerful offensive, capturing Shusha and Lachin. Azerbaijan refused to take part in the conference until the occupied territories were returned.

Then the CSCE formed the Minsk Group. It was to resolve the problems standing in the way of the conference itself. Russia, the United States, and Turkey, which have real interests in the Transcaucasus, play an active role in the Minsk Group.

Moscow suggested joint action to Washington. But the U.S. representative on the Minsk Group would not agree to a joint trip to Baku and Yerevan, and the Russian diplomats therefore concluded that the Americans did not want an equal partnership.

The Americans imposed on Moscow the formation of an informal tripartite group comprising the United States, Russia, and Turkey. The Americans whispered to Russian diplomats that this made it easier to restrain Turkey from making any abrupt moves. The Americans intended to be the arbiter, the supreme judge in this group.

Moscow agreed—this was the moment it flirted with Turkey, when Gennadiy Burbulis went to Ankara in his role as state secretary and preparations for Yeltsin's visit were under way.

The threesome did not continue these meetings for long owing to Turkey's stance. Russia is trying to be objective in its approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis. The pro-Armenian lobby cannot seriously influence Moscow's position. Turkey invariably rejects Armenian proposals. It even happens that Azerbaijan itself is prepared to accept some of the Armenians' proposals, but the Turkish representative on the Minsk group says "no."

The military are leaving the diplomats behind in the Transcaucasus. The Minsk Group has spent an entire year studying the geography of Azerbaijan from reports about the Armenian troops' advance. The Armenians have long since gone beyond the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic that they proclaimed.

One Russian diplomat angrily told Transcaucasian military leaders: "Even Hitler did not cause people to flee the way you do!" When Armenian troops approach, the Azerbaijani population totally disappears, and vice versa.

Cease-fire agreements are drawn up in Moscow by Russian diplomats because the Armenians and Azerbaijanis refuse to meet one another. Russian diplomats consult with Baku and Stepanakert, coordinate terms, fax them to both sides, and then receive signed copies back by fax. The Armenians and Azerbaijanis sign only their own copy; they receive the copy with the other side's signatures via Moscow.

There is no unity within Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has wrecked the careers of many of Baku's politicians, and they are now afraid not only of losing battles, but also of making it up with the Armenians. Aliyev is obviously inclined to compromise. His foreign minister, Gasan Gasanov, who was once head of the [CPSU] Central Committee Ideological Department, takes a tough line not characteristic of the diplomats. Rebel corps commander Surat Guseynov, who has become head of government, also distrusts the diplomatic service.

Aliyev is in a difficult position. He is already starting to say: I brought Azerbaijan into the CIS, I have turned the country to face Russia, but nothing has changed—the Armenians are continuing the offensive and capturing more and more territory.

The Azerbaijani Army, despite its obvious superior manpower and equipment, may be defeated in the foreseeable future in clashes with the Armenians.

Azerbaijan's army is poorly trained and disorganized. It is being manned by means of the forcible mobilization of boys, who are being herded right away into combat, but the destruction of the Azerbaijani Army is only filling Baku with a desire for revenge.

The military victories are doing the Karabakh Armenians a disservice. The more territory they capture, the stronger the voices opposing a peaceful settlement based on compromise.

People in Baku claim for propaganda reasons that it is not the people of Karabakh that are fighting, but an expeditionary corps from Armenia. According to Russian Foreign Ministry reports there is no expeditionary corps, although there are individual functionaries and instructors from Yerevan. Nor are there any Russian tank personnel in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Army is notable for its high morale and good organization. Every Karabakh Armenian sees this as a war for his home.

The Karabakh Army is short of arms, fuel, and especially ammunition, so Napoleon's tactics of living off the enemy are being employed.

Despite the heavy bombardment a large workshop has survived in Stepanakert, capable of repairing over a dozen tanks at once—mainly captured from the Azerbaijanis.

The Karabakh Army has now attained ideal positions. It has the shortest frontline of the entire war, enabling it to free up forces for a renewed offensive. The euphoria of victory is tightening up the Armenians' positions at the talks.

People in Stepanakert have already begun to say that they are willing to return all the occupied territories to Azerbaijan, but only in exchange for recognition of Karabakh's full independence, even though the Armenians agreed last year that the status of Karabakh would be decided at the Minsk conference.

There is a view that all attempts to secure a truce are pointless until the final formula of an agreement has been decided. But if the formula is decided and hostilities are [illegible] stopped, the military will start trying to change [illegible] formula in their favor with redoubled vigor.

The extreme options—total independence for Karabakh or, on the contrary, ingestion by Azerbaijan—have been virtually ruled out.

Nagorno-Karabakh may be given some kind of special status with international guarantees that preclude the possibility of Baku's trying to alter that status. Nothing seems impossible since the Palestinians and the Israelis have reached agreement.

But delay brings new dangers. Turkey or Iran have not to date run the risk of bringing in their troops. But they could authorize intervention by various types of volunteers, idle mojahedin, Iranian fanatics, or religious fighters, who would be into Azerbaijan like a shot.

West's Response to Military Doctrine Examined

PM1511155193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 2

[Aleksandr Golts article under the "Topic of the Week" rubric: "Was Our Military Doctrine the 'Moment of Truth' for the West?"]

[Text] The main event of the week was undoubtedly the publication of the draft Russian Federation Constitution, accompanied by the disputes that flared up over this draft, which in turn merge with the ongoing election campaign. If truth is to come out of these disputes, it will not be obvious today. However, last week did nonetheless see a kind of "moment of truth." Admittedly, it concerned not domestic but foreign policy problems. It is no secret that today we are wondering how Russia is perceived abroad. Is it really considered an important partner, as many officials say? Or do they still perceive Russia as a threat, albeit somewhat weakened?

To a certain extent world reaction, primarily Western reaction, to the adoption of Russia's military doctrine provided the answer to these questions. The reaction to our country's clear definition, perhaps for the first time, both of the aims that it pursues in the security sphere and of the means of attaining them. The reaction was disparate and contradictory. And that is precisely the attitude to Russia at the moment—contradictory and disparate.

I must point out that the reaction from Western official circles was rather well disposed. During hearings in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, after noting that the Russian military machine has been considerably cut back over the last few years, stressed that the doctrine was an attempt to keep abreast of the new realities. FRG Defense Minister Volker Ruehe spoke in approximately the same vein. According to France's LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, the Russian doctrine was greeted with understanding by NATO strategists.

This is by no means attributable to particular goodwill toward Russia. The point is that Western military men and politicians, for all the differences between their situation and Russia's, are today seeking answers to the same global challenges. And, being reasonable people, they are bound to notice that their conclusions are similar to those drawn by their Russian counterparts. That is why they have seen progress in precisely those areas where nonspecialists have rushed to point to a return to the past. As we know, Russia has renounced its avowed promise of the Brezhnev era not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. It now sees these weapons as a political means of deterrence. But this shift, which came as a surprise to certain Russian analysts too, did not alarm the West.

The whole point is that people there never seriously believed the previous declarations, considering them to be just propaganda. It is no coincidence that during the early eighties, amid the talk about the nonuse of these weapons, the USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals grew particularly rapidly. The West has also seen something else. The fact that this statement, while remaining a propaganda trick, nonetheless affected the organizational development of the Soviet Army. Such statements, THE FINANCIAL TIMES writes now, were a kind of luxury that a state with indisputable supremacy in the field of conventional arms could well afford.

But the time for such luxuries is past. And the shift of emphasis to nuclear forces is in keeping with the Russian state's current potential. After all, people in the West also realize that with the end of the USSR-U.S. confrontation some threats have given way to others. Several states are now striving to acquire nuclear status. That is why Russia is forced to use the nuclear factor in its practical policy. It states, for instance, that it will not use nuclear weapons against states that accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nuclear-free states. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL concludes that this is a clear warning to those who refuse to sign this treaty.

In a word, the West saw the change of Russia's nuclear strategy as drawing closer to its own attitudes. But it is all the more strange that the provisions of the doctrine allowing Russian troops to be stationed outside the country caused serious misgivings abroad. Concern is also being voiced about the fact that Russia has stated its intention of implementing peacekeeping operations in nearby foreign countries.

The states of East Europe have clearly distorted things in commenting on the doctrine. Thus, the Polish army newspaper POLSKA ZBROJNA has for some reason decided that Russia's military doctrine considers the region to be its own sphere of influence. Without finding confirmation of this in the provisions of the actual doctrine, the newspaper talks about "covert aims" and recalls "Soviet expansionism." The chairman of the Hungarian parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission talks in approximately the same vein. The aim of such discussion is fairly obvious. People who very much want to join NATO need to prove by any means that their security is under threat—needless to say, from the East.

But it is quite incomprehensible why the head of the U.S. diplomatic department also considers it necessary to talk of concern at the "possibility of Russian expansion." What expansion can there be when the most real of wars are being waged on Russia's borders, and "transparent" borders at that? However, as the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE rightly points out, neither the Americans nor their European NATO allies have the slightest desire to be embroiled in local conflicts in the Caucasus or Tajikistan. So Russia has to take part in settling these conflicts—and by no means from imperial aspirations. And the fact that this approach was corroborated in the military doctrine attests to a readiness to openly defend our vital interests. But Moscow is thus acting in the interests of the entire world community. And there must be no room for suspicion here.

Last, I cannot help but mention another fairly strange opinion that has been circulating over the last few days. It has nothing to do with the doctrine itself. The authors of many articles have seen the fact it was adopted as evidence of a growth in the military's role in the country's political life. The most staggering point is that this conclusion is totally unfounded. The fact that the Armed Forces have received clear guidelines regarding their development is extremely important for them. But if it comes to that, their duties and responsibility have also increased, and privileges have by no means appeared.

The assumption that their influence has suddenly increased can be put down to rudimentary "cold war" fears. When everything associated with the army of a potential adversary was automatically regarded as manifestations of militarist tendencies. As we can see, some of these fears are still around. However, the main result of an analysis of our military doctrine abroad should be a realization of the real aims and tasks of the Russian Armed Forces, and, consequently, the elimination of the far-fetched fears.

Arbatov Sees 'Gross Interference' by U.S.

AU1311170193 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 12 Nov 93 p 17

[Article by Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute: "The Gaydar Reform Does Not Help"]

[Text] Moscow—The crushing of the old communist uprising at the beginning of October was indeed a victory, but it might also result in a setback for democracy in Russia. The authoritarian trends in the country's political life have become obvious. Their reasons lie not only in Russian tradition and history, but also in serious mistakes committed by our political leadership, which claims that it has been steering the country for two years (since the failure of the putsch in August 1991). However, part of the blame must also go to the United States and to other countries.

The leaders of the mutiny against Yeltsin would never have dared an armed uprising with a few hundred lightly armed and badly organized men, had they not been inspired by the hope of mass support from the population. Pushed to the fringes of bitter poverty, the people have been subjected to unending humiliations and have suffered in the everyday struggle for survival over the past years. Our economic difficulties did not develop just recently. But the situation deteriorated radically as soon as the Gaydar reform began. It followed an economic model that was borrowed from the IMF and goes back to U.S. Professor Jeffrey Sachs and his colleagues. They had developed the model for the Third World and now applied it to the former Soviet Union—without any success, in my view. The therapy did not bring us closer to the market economy.

The negative consequences of Gaydar's reform are now also seen in the West and give rise to serious concern there. This year's report of the UN Committee for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recently confirmed the failure of the "shock therapy." At the same time, U.S. Senator Robert Dole appealed to Americans to remember the fundamental principles of their relations with Russia. The reform that was recommended to Russia "proved to be absolutely wrong." When we analyze all the reasons for the events in Moscow in October, the failed reform will doubtlessly be one of them. I fear that the arrogance of the United States in wanting to simply impose the IMF reforms on Russia has given rise to an unnecessary setback. However, I am not sure whether this is understood by our leaders, in particular by Gaydar, who used the euphoria of the victory to escalate the "shock therapy" even more.

Moscow is currently overflowing with Americans, who are occupying various government offices "to help us cope with the reform." I have my doubts whether all their recommendations seem altruistic and sensible to our people. However, even worse in political terms: Many Russians think that the mistakes in the reform have been committed deliberately. They think they are part of a conspiracy, which aims at putting an end to Russia as a superpower once and for all, at pushing it down to the level of a backward developing country, which will not be able to stand on its own in the foreseeable future.

A new style in our relations with the United States seems to be developing, when the Americans simply and sometimes carelessly (and not only privately) show their preferences for a certain policy and for certain politicians. They ignore the fact that this is a gross interference in the internal affairs of another state. All this leads to additional tension. Washington also declares what is compatible with "true democracy" in Russia and what is not. I think that this is not Washington's business—probably even less than the progress of our economy.

Political support cannot be unlimited. It refers to a certain policy, not to personalities, and it is valid only as long as the people in question are committed to this policy. Recently, I had a chat with a foreign friend. After he had listened to my worries, he responded with some strong arguments. "Of course," he said, "many, even though not all, in the West welcome successful economic reforms in Russia. The West would also welcome the successful development of democracy in Russia. However, we are most interested in your country's stability, because it means our security. And this is even more important for the West than the future of Russian democracy."

I understand this concern for stability, but it cannot be separated from the economic or political situation. If the economic chaos in my country does not end soon, and if we do not develop the basic democratic institutions and reliable guarantees against a new dictatorship, we are threatened with even more dangerous destabilization. After all, the country is still armed to the teeth, also with nuclear weapons.

However, Moscow seems rather quiet now. Politically, it is not facing any dangerous turning point. May things will depend on the lessons that our rulers have learned from the recent crises and on the policy that they will decide afterwards. If they decide in favor of continuing Gaydar's reform, do not formulate a sensible industrial policy, and do not create an agricultural revolution and a social network so as to make the live of millions at least bearable, danger is imminent. Then new political explosions will be unavoidable.

Analyst Views U.S. Reaction to October Events

WS1511131193 Kaliningrad STRAZH BALTIKI in Russian 28 Oct 93 p 3

[Interview with political scientist Nikolay Neyland by A. Borisov; place and date not given: "Looking at Russia, the West Is Still Trembling"]

[Text] I interviewed political scientist Nikolay Neiland, who is well known in Latvia, immediately after his visit to Sweden. Thus, it is no accident that the first question concerned the reaction of the West to the events in Russia.

[Neyland] In principle, Sweden remains within the framework of the general assessment of the Russian conflict. Perhaps, it is observing the developments more closely. This Scandinavian country has always had good Sovietologists. It also has a sufficient number of journalists in Moscow. All of them, as well as their colleagues in America and England, believe that Yeltsin was in a situation of extreme necessity, which allows laws to be violated in the name of higher goals.

True, the West is now showing more concern for Russia's future. Many politicians think that the Army's role will increase considerably, because Yeltsin has found himself indebted to the Army, and the latter will be able to dictate its own conditions, to put it straight. However, while the U.S. Senate was debating this problem, (Strobe Talbot), special envoy of the U.S. President for the former USSR (he is also Clinton's close friend and a translator and editor of Khrushchev's memoirs) rejected such an option in his address.

The indisputable general opinion is that Russia is still very far from democracy. It will have to cover a long distance in that direction. While the reform "launchpad" is clear and there is no legislature to block reform, the only thing that remains is action. By the way, the West is not excited over censorship and the closure of certain publications. If the DEN newspaper enjoys the reputation of a pro-fascist and antisemitic publication in the West, and the latter is so sensitive to such issues, the closure of PRAVDA and other newspapers that may be disliked in the West evokes negative emotions.

[Borisov] What does the West think about the Russian president?

[Neyland] Many people wonder what Yeltsin is going to be like. They wonder whether he will become a dictator. Certainly, the weak point of the West is that it often applies its own measuring stick to political events. It is also typical of the Swedes, who imbibe the principles of democracy with their mothers' milk. They are trembling when thinking of Russia today.

[Borisov] Are their fears founded?

[Neyland] I do not think so. I have never been an ardent supporter of Yeltsin, whom I know personally a little, although I appreciate his courage. I must have underrated him, for I never presumed, even once, that he would play such a great role in the life of this state. I think, however, that Russia needs a younger generation of politicians—between 40 and 50, and I see such people. These are Gaydar, Fedorov, Shokhin, Kozyrev, and others. These people are very competent and educated, and they will manage to gradually turn Russia into a truly democratic state. They should have no claims for Russia's special mission, because it makes me sick when I read quotations from Tyutchev [19th century Russian poet] saying that "Russia cannot be perceived...." In this way we could justify Russia's backwardness and anything else. The people I have mentioned have modern thinking, so let someone call them "Westerners" [zapadniks]. By the way, I have always admired such thinkers—from Chaadayev to Gertsen.

[Borisov] Does it not mean that the West's unconditional support for Yeltsin has shown him a white card for further illegal and undemocratic actions, and not only inside the country?

[Neyland] Political circles in the United States are still debating the issue of "who lost China?" Clinton would not like to be guilty of losing Russia. Therefore, his bet on Yeltsin was instant. Clinton's fate depends on that of Yeltsin, to some extent. It is extremely important for the United States who sits in Moscow. Certainly, there are certain doubts, and U.S. interest in the actions of the Russian president will be heightened. As for Russia's foreign policy, Yeltsin simply has broader possibilities for making it healthier—the legislature is no longer an obstacle. Regarding Yeltsin's domestic actions, he must realize that driving the opposition underground is hardly favorable, although there will be an opposition in the new legislature.... Travkin, Zhirinovskiy....

[Borisov] Do you consider them an opposition?

[Neyland] I must say that I used to be quite cynical about Zhirinovskiy, who would wander around the parliament and give numerous interviews right and left. All this was like buffoonery. However, millions of people voted for him. So....

[Borisov] Today, many people are apt to draw parallels with 1991....

[Neyland] Including the West, and particularly concerning the Soviet Union's collapse as the outcome of the August coup. It is no accident that the same man, Talbot, who is Clinton's left hand at the least, stated that the United States was interested in a powerful and integrated Russia. Only naive people can think differently. Control over nuclear weapons is not just a slogan, the more as so many hands are reaching toward them today. The West would like to be confident that it can rely on Russia. This country is continuing to play the leading role in world politics.

[Borisov] Thank you for the interview.

Role of Enterprise Fund With U.S. Outlined

PM1611114593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Valeriy Andrianov report: "Enterprise Fund: $340 Million for Small- and Medium-Sized Russian Enterprises"]

[Text] During their talks in Vancouver and at the Tokyo summit the Russian and U.S. presidents discussed the idea of setting up a Russo-American Enterprise Fund. This international organization was registered 27 September and acquired the status of a noncommercial corporation. The U.S. Government is allocating $340 million to it through the Agency for International Development. The money will be used to support small- and medium-sized enterprises in our country.

The Fund's tasks include making loans, investing, and providing technical assistance. The organization will be headquartered in New York. Initially two branches will be opened in Russia—one in Moscow, the other in a Far Eastern city. Other branches may subsequently be opened in other parts of the country.

"We will be focusing above all on the production sphere," Fund Chairman Gerald Corrigan stated. "From talking with statesmen, business representatives, and ordinary people I have realized that the most important thing for your country is investment in the production sphere. After all, Russia is currently moving ahead very fast, but down a very difficult road. And we are not ruling out the possibility of supporting other spheres of the economy too. I hope that we will start analyzing specific proposals from enterprises by the end of the year. Russian experts will be working on this too. We plan to start financing projects by early next year. I think there will be lot of firms in your country which can hope to get help from us. The Fund will be bringing to Russia not just money but management experience—in the financial sphere, for instance.

"I have had the honor of working in your country for the past few years. And I would like to stress that I find this cooperation project particularly inspiring. I am under no illusions that we can solve all or many of the problems in the Russian economy. But I am confident that we can make a contribution to reform."

The Fund will emphasize work with small- and medium-sized firms which employ no more than 2,000-2,500 people. It aims to attract other private lenders to finance them as well. The Fund may set up joint ventures with Russian and U.S. firms and with non-Russian investors, but only if the United States is represented by at least one investor.

All the profits earned by the Fund will be reinvested in the Russian economy. In order to ensure that the U.S. Government's money is not frittered away in the boundless expanses of Russia the Fund will concentrate on measures which can produce graphic and specific results. It will also emphasize a high degree of diversification in its investments both by industrial sector and by geographical region.

Investments will be made on a nonstate basis. Thus, while supporting Russian industry, they will not lead to any increase in state debt and will not be a heavy burden for the country's budget.

Belgian Premier Views Cooperation With European Union

LD1411213293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1450 GMT 14 Nov 93

[By Marina Toptygina, including recorded remarks by Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene; Dehaene speaks in French, fading into Russian translation; from the "Panorama" program]

[Excerpts] [Toptygina] The autumn frost in Moscow did not prevent a high-ranking delegation from the European Union [EU] from arriving in the Russian capital last Thursday. The flying visit, over in just a few hours, produced results. During the meetings among Jacques Delors, chairman of the EU Commission; Jean-Luc Dehaene, the acting chairman of the European Council and prime minister of Belgium; Russian President Boris Yeltsin; and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, it was stated that the EU firmly supports the democratization process in Russia. Moreover, by means of direct contacts at the highest level, the time and place for the initialling of the agreement on partnership and cooperation between the EU and Russia were agreed at long last. This will very likely take place in Brussels on 9 December and President Yeltsin has been invited there for the meeting with the 12 EU heads of state. [passage omitted]

It looks as though Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene's six-month chairmanship of the European Council will culminate not just in the changing of the name of the European Community to the European Union, with a unified economy and foreign policy, but—in the first major foreign policy success of the newly made union—in a significant step forward in relations with Russia. Up till now, strong links with Russia have been viewed as the trump card of the current U.S. Administration, although in real terms the U.S. contribution to stabilizing the Russian economy is comparatively small. This was pointed out by the Belgian prime minister in an exclusive interview with "Panorama":

[Dehaene] I would like to stress that appearances are often deceptive and that if we're not making much noise, this does not mean that we are doing less than others. In actual fact, it is precisely the EU which is Russia's main economic partner: it accounts for 65 percent of all aid being granted to Russia and its imports from Russia are 27 times higher than U.S. imports from Russia.

[Toptygina] Answering a question on the prospects which the agreement offers us, the Belgian guest noted that the agreement had brought the political dialogue to life and had given the EC the opportunity to aid economic reforms in Russia in a more coherent fashion.

[Dehaene] I believe that in a while we will see a Russia which is flourishing economically, and this will be entirely in Europe's interest since Europe will thus have two strong markets which will rely on each other.

[Toptygina] No one in the EU hides the fact that the agreement with Russia will be almost the same as those concluded with many East European countries. However, unlike them, it does not make provision for the prospect of Russia's joining the EU. The Belgian prime minister said this about it:

[Dehaene] We view Russia as a European country, but at the same time, also as our very important partner, similar in importance to the United States and Japan. We thus intend to recognize Russia as one of the world's great powers, with whom the EU will build relations on the basis of a substantial treaty.

More on Delors, Dehaene Visit

PM1611131193 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 3

[Leonid Timofeyev report under the "Visits" rubric: "Russia, the European Union, and the Belgian Air Force"]

[Text] There are no combat operations in progress involving the 12 members of the EU [European Union] and Russia, although Jean-Luc Dehaene, EU Council chairman and prime minister of Belgium, and EU Commission Chairman Jacques Delors arrived in Moscow aboard a Belgian Air Force airplane last Thursday [11 November]. The purpose of their one-day visit was to build on the "breakthrough" which has occurred in the negotiations about the agreement on partnership and cooperation between Russia and the EU.

This breakthrough is due to the fact that the 12 have stopped considering us as a country with a state regulated economy and regard it now as a transitional economy. In principle this attitude should dilute the measures taken by West Europe against the dumping of Russian goods and bring forward the day when Russia and the EU will "coalesce" as one free trade zone.

The Moscow meeting was the first to be held according to the "one plus two" formula, whereby the Russian Federation president on the one hand and the EU Commission chairman and the prime minister of the country holding the presidency of EU organs on the other hand took part in the negotiations. Until very recently the EU used this formula for meetings only in relations with its main economic partners and competitors—the United States and Japan.

With regard to the agreement on partnership and cooperation, people at the top of the Russian leadership would like to sign it before the end of this year. However, experts in Moscow consider that the document will be ready in two to three months. In the opinion of Russian diplomats involved in this matter, in the upcoming period it will be necessary to find a solution to several problematic points in the section of the agreement concerning the economy, work out their wording, and "get this down on paper."

In an interview with a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent, Jean-Luc Dehaene, the current EU Council chairman and prime minister of Belgium, also expressed the hope that the final negotiations will take place at the beginning of December. In any case, he has invited Boris Yeltsin to Brussels 10-11 December to a meeting of EU leaders in order to sign a political declaration on Russia's and the EU's willingness to conclude the agreement.

Churkin in Italy To Discuss Yugoslav Crisis, CSCE

LD1511171693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1635 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Bukalov]

[Text] Rome November 15 TASS—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin arrived in Italy on Monday [15 November] for talks with Italian Foreign Minister Beniamino Andreatta and Italian Foreign Ministry General Secretary Ferdinando Salleo.

The sides discussed prospects for peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and development of bilateral relations between Russia and Italy, including contacts at high level, the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe scheduled for November 1-December 1.

Churkin pointed out to the coincidence of positions and points of view of the Russian and Italian Foreign Ministries on all issued discussed. He stressed the importance and usefulness of such contacts.

On Tuesday, Churkin is expected to hold talks in the Vatican.

Italian Observers Arrive in Moscow, Meet Former Deputies

LD1511190593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1722 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] The first thing Italian MPs did following their arrival in Russia for observing the election campaign, was to meet with representatives of the opposition. On Monday [15 November], they gathered in the editorial office of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, banned after the armed clashes in Moscow last October, to meet with ex-deputies Sergey Baburin, Gennadiy Sayenko, Ivan Fedoseyev and other members of former parliamentary opposition.

Leader of the Italian delegation, Luigi Vinci, told INTERFAX that the purpose of their visit was to check if the rules of the election campaign, established by the president, reflected democratic norms and if the rights of those arrested after the assault on the White House were observed. They will also examine their living conditions in prison. The Italian deputies will then pass this information over to a large delegation of Italian MPs which is to arrive in Moscow at the beginning of December to observe the elections.

Most of the questions asked by the Italian deputies dealt with the October clashes and with the treatment opposition leaders met with from law-enforcement bodies.

The delegation is to meet with the editors of the closed opposition newspapers and with the lawyers of those arrested, as well as making a visit to Russia's Prosecutor-General's Office.

Lobov Delegation Arrives in Paris To Discuss Rail Link

LD1511182593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1719 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Krasnoshchekov]

[Text] Paris November 15 TASS—A Russian delegation led by Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov arrived in France on a visit on Monday [15 November] to discuss bilateral relations between the two countries.

The delegation has been invited by French Minister of Transport and Tourism Bernard Bosson. The main aim of the visit is the presentation of a project at the French Parliament to build a high- speed railway road between Moscow and St. Petersburg, Lobov told ITAR-TASS upon his arrival in Paris.

Lobov expressed the hope that the project will interest French business circles whose representatives are also expected to attend the presentation. Among the most promising fields of Russian-French cooperation Lobov named aerospace industry, and oil and gas industries.

He added that the delegation also plans to meet with the leaders of the French National Security Service and other departments engaged in this sphere to study their experience in solving legal and practical issues.

Joint Venture With Germany To Launch Cable Production

PM1611113593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Denis Runov report: "For Quality Communications. Russian-German Joint Venture Set Up"]

[Text] A treaty on the establishment and activity of the "Voronezhkabel" joint venture was signed at the Russian Federation Ministry of Communications 9 November. Its founders are "Svyazstroy"—Russia's largest concern involved in the construction of communications, radio broadcasting, and television installations—holding 20 percent of the incorporation capital, the "Svyazstroy-1" Joint-Stock Company (51 percent), the All-Russia Cable Industry Scientific Research Institute Science and Production Association (4 percent), and the German firm of "KWO Kabel GmbH" (25 percent).

The "Voronezhkabel" joint venture will engage in the production, marketing, and sale of cable products, the purchase and sale of scientific developments and technologies, and the production of materials, billets, and components.

"The need to set up such an association was dictated by the chronic shortage of cable products," Gennadiy Buday, president of the "Svyazstroy" Concern, said. "The annual shortage of communications cables is around 20 percent."

The new "Voronezhkabel" joint venture is starting by producing communications cables, which had not previously been produced in Russia. It is also important that the cables will be produced from Russian raw materials whose quality is the equal of Western raw materials.

Military Cooperation Plan Signed With Bulgaria

LD1511200993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1910 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent VLadimir Abrosimov]

[Text] Sofia, 15 Nov—Army General Lyuben Petrov, chief of staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, and Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of staff and first deputy defense minister of the Russian Federation, have signed a plan of measures on military cooperation between the defense ministries of the two countries for 1994. Gen. Koleskikov arrived here on a visit today. The document makes provision for exchange of military delegations, expert consultations on military technical matters of mutual interest, and other measures. Russian and Bulgarian military chiefs assessed the cooperation plan as a good foundation for developing further contacts between the military departments of the two states.

Culture Minister Urges Restoring Contacts in Albania

LD1411183393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Nov 93

[Text] Russia's Minister of Culture Yevgeniy Sidorov has spoken out in favor of restoring contacts in the sphere of culture and art between Russia and Albania. On Sunday [14 November] he started his official visit to Albania, RIA reported.

Observers note that this is the first visit by a minister after a severance of relations of over 30 years between the two states.

It is planned that in the course of the visit an agreement will be signed between the culture ministries of Russia and Albania on the exchange of creative collectives, performers, publications, and ideas.

Swedish Minelayer Makes Port Call to St. Petersburg

PM1511152793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 2

[Vladimir Maryukha report: "Warship, Peaceful Visit"]

[Text] Yesterday a Swedish Navy minelayer under the flag of Rear Admiral Sten Svenlund arrived in St. Petersburg on an official visit.

According to the Russian Navy Press Center, the program for the visit includes a visit by Swedish seamen to Kronstadt and the city of Pushkin, as well as to the museums and sights of Russia's ancient capital. By way of a return gesture the Swedish guests plan to receive on board the Visborg minelayer any townspeople and guests of St. Petersburg who want to visit.

Warships Leave Vladivostok for Persian Gulf Exercise

LD1611092893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in Russian 0734 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Grachev]

[Text] Vladivostok 16 Nov—Two Russian warships and a tanker sailed out of Vladivostok on Tuesday [16 November] bound for the Indian Ocean where they are to join the navies of Persian Gulf states in an exercise.

The big submarine chaser Admiral Vinogradov, the big landing ship Nikolay Vilkov, and the tanker Viktor Kolechitsky of the Russian Pacific Fleet are sailing under the command of Captain First Rank Aleksandr Yakovlev who was in the Gulf during the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

Wreckage of Antonov Found in Iran; No Information on Crew

LD1611110693 Tehran IRNA in English 1049 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Kerman, Nov. 16, IRNA—The wreckage of the Russian cargo plane Antonov-124 was found this morning in 'Jupar' region, east of Kerman. No reports are yet available about the fate of the crew. En route to Tashkent from Dubayy, the plane crashed in Jupar after it had received clearance for an emergency landing at Kerman Airport.

The governor general of Kerman Province, Hoseyn Mar'ashi, said that at 10:45 (Kerman time) two search helicopters swept the Jupar heights for a rescue operation and to locate the black box.

The Russian plane crashed at 19:04 hours local time (15:26 hours GMT) Monday. The plane belonged to Dubayy-based Globe Trotters Tourism and Cargo and its pilot was Anatoliy Lubianitskiy.

The Jupar region, a mountainous region 2500 meters above the sea level, lies 35 kms. east of Kerman.

Aeroflot Official Denies Plane Russian

LD1611120293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1105 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Excerpt] Tehran, 16 Nov—[passage omitted] Although the IRNA report asserts that the aircraft was "Russian," this does not correspond to the truth. As the ITAR-TASS correspondent has learned from sources connected with the Islamic Republic of Iran civil aviation organization, the AN-124 did not belong to any Russian airline.

Anatoliy Astapovich, the Aeroflot representative in Tehran, also stated that the aircraft involved in the crash was not Russian, since no information about its flight had been received at the Russian airline's office from the flight control services. According to him, either the aircraft belonged to one of the former Soviet republics and was carrying out a chartered flight, or it had been leased to Iran, possibly for use in the air force. In reply to a question by the ITAR-TASS correspondent as to which of the former Soviet republics he had in mind, the Aeroflot representative suggested that it could have been Ukraine, which had recently "virtually monopolized the production and use of this type of aircraft".

As for the IRNA report, the error is possibly explained by the fact that Iran has not yet drawn a clear line between the new independent states formed since the break-up of the USSR, and therefore often uses the words "Russia" and "Russian" incorrectly.

Agreement on Outstanding Debts Reached With Egypt

PM1611095593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Vladimir Naumov report: "Clean Slate For Russian-Egyptian Interstate Relations"]

[Text] Until recently the stumbling block in the development of trade and economic ties between our country and Egypt had been the unregulated nature of the two states' foreign debt—something which Russia had inherited from the former USSR.

For the past three decades our relations had been based on the clearing principles of recirprocal settlements. But we bought more goods from Egypt than we supplied to it. As a result, Russia owed Egypt 330 million clearing pounds sterling. For its part, the Egyptian side is a major debtor too—it made extensive use of special USSR credits for the purchase of armaments and military hardware, and of state economic credits relating to the construction and operation of major industrial projects. These had latterly been supplemented by commercial credits for various state and nonstate structures.

The collapse of the USSR and the subsequent struggle to restructure foreign debt, along with the notable fall in the ruble's foreign-currency content, finally confused the situation. Russian-Egyptian economic and trade links slumped—trade fell from $1 billion in 1991 to $120 million in the first nine months of this year.

The sides' positions have differed so much that the talks which have been under way since May of last year have failed to bear fruit. Only following the latest round, which ended in Moscow a few days ago, is it possible to say that there is light at the end of the tunnel.

According to Nikolay Nevskiy, a staffer at the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations Department of Trade and Economic Relations with the Countries of Africa and the Near East, a common view of the debt problem has finally been found. Of what does it consist?

The sides arrived at a "zero" option which envisages the repayment of both states' recirpocal debts. An exception is made for the sums granted as commercial credits since 1991. As a result, a protocol has been signed in which Russia and Egypt have granted each other most-favored-nation status in foreign economic activity. It has been decided to abandon the clearing method of paying for interstate trade in the future and to switch to transactions in convertible currency. In a number of cases Russian and Egyptian organizations will be permitted to carry out trading operations with each other in their national currencies—which, in the experts' opinion, will considerably stimulate commercial contacts between businessmen.

But the main result of the talks is that economic contacts will not be any further burdened by past differences and will develop from a "clean slate," so to speak.

Economic Cooperation Agreements Signed in Tunisia

LD1211224193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1634 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Yelistratov]

[Text] Cairo November 12 TASS—Three agreements on cooperation in the economic sphere were signed in the city of Tunis on Friday [12 November] between Tunisia and the Russian Federation.

The first agreement identifies ways of cooperation in the fields of science and trade, another provides for the setting up of a joint Russian-Tunisian commission for economic, trade, scientific and technical relations, and another agreement deals with cooperation in the use of water resources.

Addressing a press conference after the signing, visiting Minister of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation Oleg Davydov called the national market economies and developing private sectors "an important basis on which to strengthen Russian-Tunisian relations".

Although Russia is now completing its transitional period to market relations, "We and Tunisia have similar views on the further development of our national economies".

Tunisia's Foreign Minister Habib Ben Yahya said the agreements signed in Tunisia today were of special importance for his country and stressed that a market economy and support of entrepreneurs created "an appropriate basis for deepening relations with Russia both in the sphere of trade and in capital investments". The Tunisian minister described the present economic relations between Russia and his country as "developing dynamically".

Baltic Residents Exempt From Moscow Registration Fee

LD1611102293 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0801 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Citizens of the Baltic states do not have to pay a registration fee on entering Moscow. However, they will have to register with local authorities. This was explained by the Moscow Mayor's Office to the consulate of the Estonian embassy in Moscow [as heard].

Latvian and Estonian citizens in possession of their own national passports arriving in Moscow with Russian visas have to register with the visa and permit issuance department within 24 hours.

Citizens of Russia residing in the Baltic states, as well as persons without citizenship who have arrived in Russia with internal Soviet passport are exempt from paying a registration fee. These people have to register with house management offices according to places of their temporary residence or a place where a company which they are visiting is registered.

By order of Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, the registration of citizens of the former Soviet republics was introduced in Moscow beginning 15 November. In line with the registration it is necessary to pay a registration fee for a day in Moscow, which equals 10 percent of the minimum wage in Russia.

Foreign Ministry Assails Estonian Population Minister

LD1211175593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1655 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Nov—A representative of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry circulated a statement today which, in particular, says:

Moscow's attention has been drawn to a more than strange statement by Peeter Olesk, the recently appointed Estonian population minister, which he made after visiting a number of Estonian settlements in the rayons bordering the Russian Federation. Mr. Olesk claimed in particular that because of the "so-called administrative border which has been drawn" villages and farms with 7,000 Estonian citizens are located on territory "controlled by Russia" and are now apparently doomed to extinction, and the Estonian children from these settlements have been forced to "crawl under barbed wire" while on their way to school in Estonia.

The refusal by the secretariat of the abovementioned minister to meet the request of the Russian Embassy in Tallin for an official text of the interview has also caused bewilderment.

This and several other facts bear witness to the fact that forces which continue to play the "territorial card" in relations with Russia are becoming active in Estonia and playing on whipping up tension.

In the opinion of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the above statements are all the less appropriate at a time when both parties are moving toward finding solutions to what are certainly complex problems in Russian-Estonian relations, and when preparations for political contacts at the highest level are continuing. It is evident that someone has no interest in the swift establishment of equal and mutually beneficial interstate relations between the two countries.

In this context, it should be borne in mind that the problems of providing for people living on the contiguous territories can be resolved if the appropriate agreement, which is already fully agreed upon, is concluded. The Estonian delegation, however, refuses even to initial it, and in so doing is artificially prolonging the abnormal situation which has arisen surrounding border crossings by the populations of border regions.

The Russian Foreign Ministry is waiting for official explanations of Mr. Olesk's utterances.

Chief Negotiator at Latvia Talks on New Proposals

LD1211220793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] The Russian chief negotiator at the talks with Latvia Sergey Zotov expects that the forthcoming round may become crucial in the negotiating process between the two countries. Latvia and Russia will possibly advance in drafting a treaty and other agreements on the Russian troop withdrawal from Latvia.

The Russian and Latvian delegations are reportedly to meet November 15-17 in Jurmala near Riga.

In an interview with Interfax, Zotov said that the Russian delegations goes to Latvia with a package of cardinally new proposals which, he believes, may help the two sides solve a whole range of problems which could possibly make the deadline for the troop pull-out sooner than was expected.

Until now the Latvian side insisted that 17,000 Russian servicemen be withdrawn before the end of the year. Russia has informed of its preparedness to finish the process before the end of 1994 given Russia is allowed to hold on to, for several years, the radar station, the space observation station and the military port. In addition, Latvia must provide social guarantees for the Russian servicemen, and retired officers and their families who live in the republic.

Zotov said that if drafted, the treaty on the troop withdrawal and the agreement on social guarantees will pave the way for the visit to Russia by Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis.

Envoy Cited on Lack of Progress in Moldovan Talks

LD1211210993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1208 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow November 12 TASS—The absence of progress at the talks between conflicting parties on a political settlement of the conflict in the Dniester region is one of the reasons for a delay with fixing the timetable of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Moldovan territory, Vladimir Kitayev, ambassador at large and head of the Russian delegation at talks on military matters, told ITAR-TASS today.

Assessing the results of the seventh round of the talks held in the Moscow region between November 9 and 11, Kitayev stressed that agreement had been reached at the meeting of the Russian and Moldovan presidents, Boris Yeltsin and Mircha Snegur, last May that the timetable of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova would be synchronised with the process of a political settlement of the conflict in the Dniester region and the defining of a special status of the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova. However, talks between the two conflicting parties, started last January, have been going on rather slowly of late, according to Kitayev. This is hampering the drawing up of a final agreement on the timetable of the Russian troops withdrawal from Moldova.

Talks on 14th Army Withdrawal End

PM1511114593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Boris Vinogradov: "When and How 14th Army Will Leave Moldova"]

[Text] Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Mircha Snegur agreed back in May this year that the 14th Russian Army will leave Moldova. The decision is definitive in principle, and in the opinion of both sides is now subject to review.

But the practical mechanism for withdrawal has still not been determined. Diplomats who have just completed the seventh round of talks near Moscow are struggling over its elaboration. The Russian delegation was headed by Vladimir Kitayev, ambassador for special assignments, while the Moldovan side was headed by Anatoliy Tsaranu, Moldovan ambassador to Russia.

Two blocs of questions were revealed on which the sides have not yet reached unanimity. Above all it is a case of the schedule and procedure for the withdrawal of the 14th army from the Dniester region. Russia will undoubtedly take on the main worries and expenditure for the redeployment of the servicemen and the provision of facilities for them but it is suggesting that Moldova also make its contribution to this expensive operation. According to preliminary figures, over 1,000 apartments must be constructed for officers' families.

Chisinau, complaining of the plight of its economy, is not refusing in principle to do its bit. It claims that the state coffers are empty but the necessary funds can be acquired from the auctioning of part of army property and real estate.

General A. Kurgin, the 14th army representative who attended the talks, insisted that all this property be handed over to the Dniester region.

In addition Chisinau does not agree that the so-called "synchronicity principle," that is linking dates for withdrawal to the political settlement of the conflict and to the definition of the Dniester region's special status, should operate for an infinite length of time. Moldova suggests extending it only through 1 July of next year, thus putting in an impasse its Russian partners, who are asking: What next? Military specialists and some diplomats believe in this connection that the entire process of the 14th army's withdrawal will actually take at least two or three years. The next round of talks is in January.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Interviewed on Power, Constitution

PM1511181593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 4

[Interview with President Boris Yeltsin by unidentified IZVESTIYA correspondents; place and date not given: "Boris Yeltsin: As President, I Am More Committed Than Others to Social Stability. The Russian President Answers Questions From the Newspaper IZVESTIYA"]

[Text] [IZVESTIYA] Boris Nikolayevich, the draft Constitution has been published. All manner of amendments were being made to the draft in Kremlin offices right up to the very last day, and this has provoked criticism in the press and suspicions of secret intentions on the part of the draftsmen.

[Yeltsin] There is no secret here. Preparation of the draft Constitution has taken just over three years. It has been a center of attraction for the best professionals, lawyers, and essentially all political forces. Perhaps there has never yet been a state document around which so many passions and heated discussions have boiled. The draft Constitution did indeed have a difficult birth. Which means that the significance of the fact that the work is finished is all the greater.

Briefly, the chronicle of recent events is as follows.

The Constitutional Arbitration Commission sat 1 November and issued six rulings on the remaining vexed questions. At a meeting with federation component leaders 3 November 1993 a proposal was made to set up a temporary working group to take account of proposals put forward at the meeting. This group of 10 persons worked for 24 hours. Four articles of the Constitution acquired a new look.

A special drafting group was also set up, consisting of major philologists, professional legal draftsmen, and a specialist in terminology (there is such a science). The director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Russian Language Institute convened an academic council to discuss the draft. On the morning of 8 November the draft lay on my desk with their stamps of approval on it and an accompanying memorandum from S.A. Filatov.

By midday the work was entirely complete. For the benefit of historians I will say that I signed the draft Constitution, and, as the saying goes, put the final period, at 1515 hours, 8 November 1993.

[IZVESTIYA] The completion of work on the draft Constitution is, to some extent, the end product toward which your decisive actions this fall have led. But what happened in October provokes conflicting assessments in society. Do you not think that the tragic events of October were the direct consequence of 21 September—the beginning of "stage-by-stage constitutional reform"?

[Yeltsin] The political drama which was enacted in Russia during those days and which ended in tragedy—a tragedy for individuals, for society, and for political institutions—laid bare to the maximum extent the nature of the political impasse in which we found ourselves before 21 September, and from which we are still trying to extricate ourselves.

The events of October were, of course, connected with Edict No. 1400. This edict was formally at variance with the existing Constitution and drastically exacerbated the conflict with the Supreme Soviet. The Supreme Soviet's actions led in their turn to the bloody events in Moscow. This sequence of events makes the president's policy, his decisions, and his team a target.

If we ignore the spectrum of not very convincing arguments that range from accusations that the president ignored the results of the April referendum to suspicions that he attempted to get rid of the opposition, and if we concentrate on more serious arguments, then these turn out to be relatively few in number. And all of them are founded on three basic "pillars": the Constitution, the representative branch, and democracy.

Thus, the Constitution. What relationship should there be between two values—the sanctity of the law (which was supposedly guarded by the deputies) and political expediency (which has allegedly guided the president)?

According to right-thinking principles, the law is always the winner. But let us recall that the old Constitution was born in 1978 in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The RSFSR was a component of another state—the USSR. Then a new state emerged—the Russian Federation (Russia).

The transformation of the former state into the latter has been smooth, albeit not without some difficulties, and has been paralleled by a long and gradual transformation of the Constitution. New words were added to the old Constitution without changing its essence. New institutions (the president) were incorporated. With the intention, however, of avoiding any impact on the Soviet fundamentals.

Consequently Russia has a strange Constitution that has never been adopted. The process of patching it up, renaming it, and amending it cannot seriously be regarded as adopting a Constitution. Can we talk about a state Constitution if its articles are adopted by an organ which only has interim standing orders and which systematically violates these standing orders? Can we urge people to respect the Constitution if the actual process of its coming into being is characterized by blatant disregard for the law?

And now let us turn to the representative branch and democracy. When power, even as a result of direct and free elections, is delegated to a single organ—the Congress of People's Deputies—a constitutionally monopolist and irresponsible body which knows no restrictions either in terms of law or tradition, there is always a risk that power will be usurped. Which is what happened.

The existence of a representative organ of power is by no means a sign of democracy. Democracy is the people's power over all state institutions. In order for this power to be real power, a balance between the branches of state power is needed.

It seems to me that this balance has been found in the draft Constitution that has been submitted to the referendum. Not a fragile, ineffective balance, such as we had prior to 21 September, but a practical balance making it possible to safeguard the country's life, pursue the reforms, and, if necessary, emerge from the crisis.

[IZVESTIYA] How would you describe the period from 21 September through 12 December this year?

[Yeltsin] That is more a matter for the historians. And future historians, at that—"The big picture is visible from a distance."

As for current political evaluations, I would say that this is the period of the **inglorious end of soviet power**. After August 1991, the period of the "leading and guiding role of the CPSU" ended. However, at that time the reformers, myself included, underestimated the soviets' enormous power of resistance. As it transpired, the organizational basis of those organs was able to take the place of the withered ideological basis. The soviets basically became the political bulwark of antireform forces.

Now the soviet type of power is leaving the historical arena, but, let me emphasize, it is not being destroyed so much as **dismantled**. The foundations of really representative institutions will immediately appear in its place. Only the foundations, as yet.

The new federal parliament, the new "dumas," "assemblies," and so forth, will become full organs of representation only with time, when they have created new political traditions, a new political way of thinking, new procedures.

The distinctive feature of the present period is, to use the language of management, the **comprehensive** nature of state building. If, on 12 December 1993, the country's citizens display responsibility—and I have no doubt of that—then Russia will at last acquire a fully democratic basis. The people will simultaneously, or almost simultaneously, acquire their first democratic Constitution and a proper parliament. The Constitutional Court and the already active Supreme Court and Superior Court of Arbitration will continue their normal activity, and the government will operate. After that, representative organs of power of the Federation components and of local self-government will be elected.

The present stage of constitutional reform is the most difficult, at least for a president who has assumed full responsibility. Of course this is abnormal from the viewpoint of democracy. And the shorter this period is, the better. Therefore a relatively short period was set for the preparations and holding of elections to the Federal Assembly.

At the same time I reject accusations of activity of an authoritarian nature by presidential and governmental structures after 21 September. You only have to remember the episode of the imposition and lifting of censorship to see that we are trying to govern, in this difficult period, while observing civil rights and freedoms.

The president has no intention of violating human rights and freedoms, even for a noble purpose such as, for instance, the struggle against crime. Making that struggle tougher should not be accompanied by the violation of the elementary rights of decent people. I do not think a single innocent person should suffer in this struggle, but nor should a single guilty person evade liability.

And if you are looking for historical parallels, I would liken this time to the period when the Russian Provisional Government was in power, particularly after June 1917. For all its mistakes and shortcomings, it was striving to establish a democratic republic in Russia. At that time, the Bolsheviks prevented it, plunging the country into a bloody civil war. Now, 76 years on, the Russian people have their first opportunity, in effect, freely to choose their path. Only after 12 December will it be possible to utter without hypocrisy the well-known sentence: "The people have the government they deserve."

[IZVESTIYA] Are we not too complacent in assessing the situation and excessively confident that we have finally seen the back of communism? What do you think of the opinion of those who think you made a mistake by not excluding communists of every hue from participating in the elections?

[Yeltsin] While bolshevism or fascism survive, the danger of the forcible seizure of power will exist. By their very nature these related ideologies, first, regard violence as a perfectly normal way of achieving their goals. And second, they cannot imagine themselves within the framework of normal political competition, by their nature they are not inclined to share power with anyone. These ideologies recognize only their own monopoly of power. All historical experience confirms this. Both bolshevism and fascism can only exploit the democratic mechanism to gain power. But on receiving power they destroy the very possibility for the people to exercise a free choice over their own destiny.

In many Western countries the communist or fascist menace is small today. For many years, radical parties there have not gained a significant number of votes. The powerful middle class does not vote for them. Although it seems to me that countries with a developed democracy are rather lulled by their stable economic and political development. In Russia, it is simply crazy to underestimate the communist-fascist menace. Too many people are maimed by the bolshevik philosophy, it has sunk too deeply into the consciousness of a certain section of the population, our democratic system is too weak, the country's economic situation is still too grave. These and other factors do not create the best context for the December elections and referendum.

There is, of course, a temptation (and many people are urging the president to do it) to take advantage of the situation to exclude the communists and similar parties from participation in the elections. But I do not think that would be the right step to take.

Since we have decided to create a rule-of-law state, we must think and act within the context of legal logic. It is possible to ban openly criminal organizations from participation in the election campaign. It is another matter to refuse parties the legal opportunity to put forward candidates and campaign for them solely because they are opposed to the reforms. If we go down this road, we will be almost indistinguishable from the Bolsheviks, who first banned and then repressed opposition political parties because they rejected soviet power.

Only the judicial organs are entitled to exclude these forces from the political process. Whether this or that party meets the legal requirements of the democratic system can only be decided in open judicial process, in compliance with all legal procedures.

In addition, banning communists from participating in the election campaign would intensify the tension in society. Today, when a certain proportion of people are not yet ready to accept the values of democracy and a competitive society, when many people still do not think the term "property owner" applies to them personally, to exclude representation of these forces would be to take the struggle of philosophies outside parliament and onto the streets, and to provoke illegal forms of protest.

Since we are talking about the people's free choice, it is incumbent on us to create the conditions for a really free choice.

[IZVESTIYA] There is a widespread view that it is still too soon for us to adopt an integral Constitution. Since society has not emerged from a state of crisis, the argument runs, we should confine ourselves to a temporary "constitutional act" defining the structure of federal power for the transitional period. Furthermore, many people predict that the new Constitution will have a short life: Can it have a long one in conditions of economic and political instability?

[Yeltsin] First, if some kind of temporary "act" on federal power is possible, as some people have suggested, what is there to prevent us from adopting the Constitution in its entirety? Accord has already been reached regarding the section on human rights. What is the point of postponing its adoption "until a later date"? Similarly there can be no delay in constitutionally formalizing the sphere of federative relations. Is it not clear that any delay in adopting the Constitution threatens to intensify disintegration processes? Any artificial delay in solving the constitutional problem, let us be blunt, is fraught with a threat to Russia's integrity.

Second, to be honest I do not have a very clear idea of what "transitional period" they are suggesting we await the end of. Who is to declare that this period has ended? The new Constitution itself is needed primarily in order to help us to stabilize the situation and emerge from the economic crisis. This is what happened in all the states that are customarily called civilized and democratic today. The most durable of the constitutions currently in force—the U.S. Constitution—was adopted by no means at a time of prosperity. And what about the present constitutions of France and Spain? They ushered in lengthy periods of stable and democratic development for these states.

[IZVESTIYA] Why was it decided to adopt the Constitution via a referendum?

[Yeltsin] World practice can show various methods of adopting constitutions. This is usually done by the country's highest representative organ—the parliament. Sometimes a special Constitutional (Constituent) Assembly is convened. In a number of instances constitutions have been brought into effect at the decision of the head of state. Finally, there is the referendum method.

The nationwide vote would not have been necessary if the Congress had fulfilled its own decree and adopted the new Constitution. If in spring or early summer it had proved possible to reach agreement with the Supreme Soviet on holding elections to a Constituent Assembly in order to adopt the Constitution, the country's political development would have taken a different path.

I believe that the path of a nationwide vote is preferable for Russia in the present conditions. Moreover, this is now the only possible path. The Federal Assembly will be elected in a month's time. It will take a while to get into a normal working rhythm. This would inevitably delay the adoption of the Constitution.

You can work endlessly on such a document. Quite possibly there would again have been endless debates virtually about every comma.

The new parliament itself needs a legal basis for its competence, and that basis is contained precisely in the new Constitution.

Moreover, while the old Constitution continues to operate there is a chance of restoration of totalitarian power, of the power of the soviets.

There is yet another reason that urgently dictates swift adoption of the new Constitution. Without it, without a legal basis, and without new legislation it will be a hundred times more difficult to cope with the rampant crime and with disrespect for the law and human rights. The Constitution is necessary in order to create firm legal order, for it alone will ensure citizens' security.

That is not all. Certain articles of the present Russian Constitution concerning federal organs of power have been suspended. If we did not hold a referendum the Federal Assembly would inherit the problem of these "blank spots" in the Constitution. Once again there is a problem here. While working on the new Constitution, we would have to urgently patch up the old one. That is, we would have to embark once again on the pernicious path taken by the former Congress and Supreme Soviet. How many more times can we do this?

There is one more important circumstance. Powerful forces were employed in work on the draft Constitution—both the Constitutional Commission of the former Congress and the Constitutional Conference, which represented a very broad spectrum of different political and social forces. There were the Federation components, various parties, movements, and public organizations, specialists in the sphere of law, representatives of the federal authorities and deputies, ministers, members of courts, and representatives of local self-government. Essentially the Constitutional Conference has no equal in Russia in terms of representativeness.

If special elections to a Constituent Assembly were held, I am certain that the majority of people elected to it would be members of the Constitutional Conference.

Indeed, the Constitutional Conference did what is the most labor-intensive part of the job for any Constituent Assembly—it discussed and elaborated the draft Constitution.

And precisely because consensus among representatives of society emerged around the draft Constitution, there is no sense in referring it for discussion by any elected organ (which does not yet exist) and there is direct sense in turning to the people

[IZVESTIYA] Will ordinary voters be able to grasp all the intricacies of the text of the Constitution? Won't they be voting blind, so to speak, according to the principle of trusting either those who have proposed this Constitution or else its opponents?

[Yeltsin] Possibly some people will indeed vote in that manner. There is nothing reprehensible about this. Some people may altogether refrain from voting on the Constitution, deeming themselves incapable of making an independent decision. In that case they trust the majority of the Russians who do vote to resolve the question. But I think that the majority of Russian citizens certainly can pass independent judgment on whether the provisions of the Constitution accord with their interests as citizens.

In referring the draft Constitution for nationwide voting, we are proceeding from the premise that its contents are nevertheless clear enough to every competent citizen.

[IZVESTIYA] It is sometimes claimed that the draft Constitution reflects the interests of a rather narrow social stratum, of the "new Russians," as the saying now goes, or, in simple terms, of wealthy people. What is your opinion about this?

[Yeltsin] I have often heard such views. But I cannot agree with them. Quite the contrary, the Constitution offers quite a precise balance of the interests of different social groups—both new and old—and the different peoples living in Russia. And, most importantly of all, of **different people.**

Except for the section on transitional provisions, the Constitution is designed not for a short period of a few years but for the long term. Primarily because its basis is the **principle of diversity.** It is precisely this that most accurately reflects the specific nature of Russian life and precludes any standardization or desire to make everybody toe the same line.

The Constitution precludes even the very possibility of the notorious "merging of nations," the loss of regional identity, and primitive leveling. It pursues the principle of freedom of ideology and a multiparty system and freedom of conscience, conviction, and the expression of one's views. Private ownership is fully recognized as the basis of human freedom for the first time in a Russian Constitution.

Overall, the Russian Constitution ensures the necessary conditions for ensuring that people can realize themselves and their abilities. This is the entire state's most important sphere of activity. At the same time the Constitution proclaims the principles of the **social state.** In other words, the state must help people in difficult situations and in solving the most complex problems.

We are retaining a powerful and effective system of social security.

All this is not mere rhetoric nor a concession to the opposition. It is the principled line that we have tried to pursue at even the most difficult moments. And we intend to continue pursuing it.

[IZVESTIYA] Recently you adopted a number of decisions on the problem of federalism. I mean your edicts connected with the proclamation of the "Ural Republic." Do you think this kind of option is not acceptable to the new Russian federalism?

[Yeltsin] Let me begin with the constitutional aspect.

The so-called "Ural Republic Constitution" says that the legal status of the "republic" is determined by the foundations of the Russian Federation constitutional system. But the oblast authorities know full well that these foundations, these principles of the organization of power and principles of the federal system, are included in the draft Constitution of the Russian Federation, which is to be voted on on 12 December.

So the entire logic of the constitutional process has been overturned. Part of the whole—Sverdlovsk Oblast—defines the principles of its existence without waiting for the establishment of more general principles by the whole—the Russian Federation.

The adoption of the "Ural Republic Constitution" can only be regarded as an attempt to blackmail the federal bodies of authority. In a federal state the legal acts of the members of the federation should accord with federal legal acts, and not vice versa.

The oblast authorities' references to the will of the citizens are unfounded. What the oblast had on 25 April was not a vote, but merely a public opinion poll on this issue. This was twice confirmed by a court decision—oblast and Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.

[IZVESTIYA] Another topic that worries our readers is the president's powers. Many claim that they will be all but imperial under the new Constitution.

[Yeltsin] I would advise those who say this—unless, of course, they are setting out to mislead—to reread their history textbooks. They would see that emperors and autocrats have no time for Constitutions. With them they cease to be emperors. The same goes for a dictatorship or any other form of unlimited power.

Of course, modern dictatorships like to have constitutions for cosmetic purposes. But they are no more than a piece of paper. The Constitution did not prevent Stalin from being a bloody tyrant.

The new Constitution will have strong legal guarantees against unlimited power. In the first place, you have freedom to differ, and, second, you have the legal and democratic nature of the actual mechanism for wielding power.

I would not deny that the president's powers in the draft are significant indeed. But what would you like to see? In a country that is accustomed to czars and leaders; in a country where clear interest groups have not been established, where normal parties are only just coming into being; in a country where executive discipline is extremely weak, where total skepticism as regards the law is rife—in such a country do you rely totally or mainly on parliament? Indeed, in six months' time, if not sooner, people would be demanding a dictator. A dictator would quickly be found, I can assure you. In that very same parliament, possibly.

Every era has its own balance of power in a democratic system. In Russia at the moment the balance is in favor of the president. It is no accident that nearly everyone who favors reforms agrees with this model. We are not talking about Yeltsin here, but about people's awareness of the need to have an official who will be answerable.

But that is a general view. If we are talking about individual powers, then you can see for yourself how far they are from those of an "emperor." The president's power is limited by the fact that he implements policy guidelines within the framework and on the basis of a constitution with rather stringent norms. The actual counterweight to despotism is the Constitutional Court—now with real mechanisms for protecting its independence. The president is entitled to put a particular question to a referendum. Is that what you call dictatorship? Is parliament's ability to overcome the president's veto by a qualified majority not evidence of a balance between the authorities?

If you compare the president's powers and the Federal Assembly's powers in an unprejudiced manner you have to admit that they have equal rights and equal strength as the voices and implementers of the supreme power of the people. In the event of a constitutional dispute parliament has the last word in some matters and the president has the last word in others.

It is not inconceivable that the president's right to dissolve the State Duma will frighten some people. I can reassure them. As president I am more committed than anyone else to social stability. Any upheaval in the higher echelons of power, even a legal one, has serious repercussions in society. Moreover, the dissolution of the State Duma can only be envisaged in very specific circumstances.

So the Russian president has exactly the powers he needs to perform his role of reforming the country. He did not arrogate this role to himself and he did not inherit it; he accepted it from the people as a clear political mandate.

[IZVESTIYA] Boris Nikolayevich, I cannot rule out the possibility that after the adoption of the Constitution parliament will put to the president the same arguments about legitimacy which the president presented to the former Supreme Soviet. Why did you change your decision to hold early presidential elections next 12 June?

[Yeltsin] The president's lot is an onerous one. Aside from state concerns, he is left with virtually no rights to have a private viewpoint, hold unofficial opinions, or even display emotion during discussion with invited interlocutors. The president's decisions are, as you know, drawn up in the form of edicts and decrees. I hope you have not forgotten my edict scheduling early presidential elections for 12 June 1994? And so long as I do not repeal that edict, it remains in force.

But I do confess in all honesty that my heart is not in early elections now, and not because I fear competition. We now have the second referendum this year in which—directly or indirectly—confidence will be expressed in the president. When I issued the decree on the 12 June elections, it was all about dialogue and compromises and the search for civil accord. My gesture was spurned by the Supreme Soviet, and I was entitled to take back my word, but I didn't, I merely voiced my inner feelings and sensations.

I would observe that the nationwide vote does not mean that the president won't have a choice; this proposal merely records the legal possibility for the president to go on working until the end of his term of office. But both the president and the government, which is mentioned further on, and the judges of all the courts, including the

Constitutional Court, which are also spoken about in the Transitional Provisions, also retain the right to resign or have a vote of confidence. I would like to know the Federal Assembly's opinion.

[IZVESTIYA] However, there is a huge gap between what is written in the Constitution and our life, as it were. How do you narrow that gap? Is it possible to do so in the conditions of Russia?

[Yeltsin] Indeed, time and great efforts will be needed to accomplish that. And the task is not so much to bring our life into line with the Constitution as to restore our life to a normal framework and create a healthy basis for the stable development of Russia. It is clear today that this won't be easy, but there is something else that is far more important. We have been able to see for ourselves in practice that it is possible.

The former system bequeathed us much in need of discarding. It turned out that it was impossible to reform the CPSU and the system of soviets. We bid farewell to the illusion that socialism could be given a human face. But Russia itself, despite all it has gone through, has retained its vitality, its powerful potential for revival. Even the hard-line opposition has been forced to acknowledge that the market, for all its present imperfect state, is already becoming more effective than the previous, planned economy. The whole world marvels at the commonsense and ability of the Russians to see through the present disordered state to the main thing—the necessity for the changes taking place.

Of course, all the most murky things that were hidden for decades behind the ostentatious facades erected along the so-called "visitors' routes" appear on the surface today. But I believe this can be overcome. We are gradually extricating ourselves from the impasse which adherence to communist dogma got us into.

You ask whether it is possible to speed up the normalization of life in Russia. I think it is. That is why we are adopting the Constitution, that is why we are strengthening the state. And doing so, I would stress, on the basis of democratic principles.

Changing people's attitudes is the main and crucial factor in normalizing our life. And here marked changes are, I think, under way. Pinning one's hopes on the miracle which a new leader could perform is an attitude which is retreating into the past. The notorious commitment to revolution is losing its foundation. Personal initiative and enterprise are gradually being revived. Working for oneself has ceased to be a matter of shame. And this after seventy years of rigid restrictions.

Of course, it will still take us a long while to eliminate our own shortcomings, but it is clear right now that the cause is not a hopeless one. I will say more, I believe that we will achieve success.

Ryabov Rules Out Discussing Constitution

PM1611094593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Central Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov by Vadim Gorshenin; place and date not given: "Ryabov Not Permitted To Answer Certain Questions"—first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] At the end of a Central Electoral Commission session, your PRAVDA correspondent managed to talk with Central Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov. The reason was entirely specific, namely the submission of the country's Fundamental Law—the Constitution—to a referendum.

[Gorshenin] Nikolay Timofeyevich, in his address to the Russian people Boris Yeltsin only spoke about one draft Constitution, the so-called presidential version. At the same time he said absolutely nothing about another draft—the Soviet one—in support of which 1 million Russians' signatures have already been collected. Tell me, is the possibility of putting this draft to a referendum being examined as well, if we are going to talk about building a rule-of-law state?

[Ryabov] Excuse me, what sort of question is this you are asking me?

[Gorshenin] Nikolay Timofeyevich, you are chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, who else am I to ask?

[Ryabov] Right now I am not permitted to answer questions of this nature. You can collect as many signatures as you like, but a decision has now been made both by the president and by the Constitutional Conference to put the text of the draft that has been published to a referendum. That is all. This is the draft that will be studied, examined, and adopted by the population in line with this decision.

[Gorshenin] But judge for yourself: Which is the more legitimate, the Constitutional Conference or the signatures of 1 million Russian citizens? Nobody has repealed the Law on the Referendum....

[Ryabov] So all the legitimacy will be in the voting. The Russian people will vote—and this will provide all the legitimacy we need.

[Gorshenin] And that was the end of our conversation.

Yeltsin Replaces Federal Property Fund Chairman

LD1611102193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0912 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin dismissed Fikryat Tabeyev from the post of the chairman of the Russian Federal Property Fund in connection with a transfer to another job.

Vladimir Sokolov was appointed the head of the fund, according to a decree signed on Monday.

Yeltsin Sets Up Commission for Women, Family

LD1511175293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1643 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 15 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on Monday to set up a Commission for Women, Family and Demography.

The move aims at ensuring a unified state policy to solve the problems of the women, the family and demography.

The decree also determined the composition of the new commission which will operate under the Russian president. Yekaterina Lakhova has been appointed commission chairwoman. She will concurrently act as Yeltsin's adviser on family, maternity and children issues.

Cabinet Meeting Postponed; Members' Absence Blamed

LD1511165493 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] The Presidium of the Russian Council of Ministers has postponed its meeting scheduled for 16 November. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was informed by the government's press service that this is connected with the absence of several members of the cabinet, including Finance Minister Boris Fedorov.

Cabinet Presidium Session Discusses Migration

PM1511143993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 1

[Lyubov Dunayeva report under the rubric "At the Government": "How to Help Migrants: Routine Session of Russian Federation Council of Ministers Presidium on Staraya Ploshchad"]

[Text] The agenda of the current session of the government presidium has been changed. The first two items—on the clarification of budget indicators and taxation—were postponed until the beginning of next week on the suggestion of Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin.

This is due to the fact that, in the premier's words, all the ministers need to carefully reanalyze the expenditure and revenue sections of the budget and submit their proposals. The budget document, according to the head of the Russian Government, is very complex because the budget deficit is large and the solution of this problem requires the effective participation of all ministries.

Thus the question of aspects of migration policy remained to be examined. A report was delivered by Tatyana Regent, director of the Russian Federal Migration Service.

When the Soviet Union was in a state of disintegration there were around 25 million Russians and around 4 million citizens of other nationalities living outside Russia. Today the migration problem has become a problem of state security. Around 2 million refugees, enforced migrants and economic migrants, have arrived in Russia. A mass migration is also being proposed—around 400,000 people from the Transcaucasus, around 3 million people from Central Asia, and almost 500,000 could leave the Baltic states. In other words, the influx of refugees to Russian territory from neighboring foreign states will be at least 3 million people, at most almost 6 million.

The new federal migration program submitted to the session takes into account the problems of all categories of migrants. The most complex problem is housing. Out of 110 billion rubles [R], part of which could be spent on housing construction, only R36 billion has been allocated this year. Thus even the proposed minimum has been cut.

As for problems relating purely to migration, uniform rules must be introduced here. However, at present Krasnodar Kray has one set of rules, St. Petersburg has another, and Moscow yet another. But, to reduce all these rules to one integrated set, the federal service must be allowed to form migration policy. The new program also envisages the conclusion of bilateral agreements on dual citizenship with neighboring foreign countries, which will enable people leaving those countries to transfer their property in full and perhaps be provided with work in their new location.

At the same time measures must be taken with regard to illegal migrants. It is necessary to sharply restrict their entry into Russia. The Federal Migration Service is coming to that conclusion.

Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who spoke in the debates on this question, believes that the prime need is for a strategy of economic support for the Russian-speaking population living in neighboring foreign states. This, in his opinion, is the departure point for the solution of the problem.

Yeltsin Aide Notes Stable Regional Political Situation

PM1511161593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 1

[Commentary by Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the Administration for Work With the Territories at the Russian Presidential Administration, under the "Politics" rubric: "Representative Power in the Regions Should Lead Democratic Reforms"]

[Text] The local authorities are already making their presence felt in the process of putting forward candidate deputies for the Federation Council. The participation of governors in the election campaign is dictated by the times, because the upper chamber must represent the components of the Russian Federation. The preconditions for carrying out the second task, which envisages establishing close ties between the parliamentarians and the regions, have also taken shape.

We also have elections to the state organs of regional power ahead of us, and therefore the regions are concerned that the voting should be conducted successfully, so that the people's free experssion of their will, which is guaranteed by law, is ensured everywhere. In a word, completely normal phenomena are occurring, which are dictated by life: The attention of the power structures is also concentrated on preparations for the elections of deputies to the legislative assemblies—local representative organs of power. We have every reason to hope for a favorable outcome to the referendum on the draft of the new Constitution.

Obviously all this is only possible if work is being conducted in normal circumstances. The sociopolitical situation in the center and in the regions is mainly stable, it is being monitored and is under control although everything is not going smoothly everywhere. The president was forced to issue the Edict on Suspending the Activity of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet, which exceeded its powers by the decision of the deputies not to agree to be bound by the framework of the Federation Treaty or even the draft of the new Constitution. It is not surprising that thousands of Sverdlovsk inhabitants are protesting the declaration of the Ural Republic by the Oblast Soviet. But there is a hope that even there the situation will stabilize in the near future, and that the people everywhere will elect as deputies people who see power as a means of deepening reforms and democratic transformations.

Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Interviewed

PM1511183093 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 13 Nov 93 p 12

[Report on interview with Kremlin deputy chief of staff Vyacheslav Volkov by Asne Guldahl Seierstad; place and date not given]

[Text] Russia's new national assembly must be kept disciplined, and those elected will only be able to discuss politics one a month, the Kremlin's powerful assistant chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volkov, told ARBEIDERBLADET. Volkov, one of President Boris Yeltsin's closest men, is often mentioned as the strongest candidate for the presidency of the new national assembly.

President Yeltsin has instincts as good as those of a wild animal, said Volkov, one of the central ideologists behind the policies that have been pursued in Russian in the last two years. He believes more or less that Yeltsin has a natural talent for leadership.

"It is difficult to choose the right strategy in a country like ours with so many problems and proposed solutions and therefore Yeltsin largely follows his well developed intuition. And this could perhaps be the explanation of Yeltsin's unpredictability." Volkov went on: "It is in the administration and the government that most ideas are born. Yeltsin allows great freedom in the development of alternatives and relies on many advisers, before he finally makes the decision himself."

Vyacheslav Volkov is one of the men Yeltsin listens to. He it was who came up with the idea for the referendum which gave Yeltsin and his government convincing support this spring. Whether this was because of a lack of alternatives is a different question.

Volkov himself will run for election in Murmansk oblast on 12 December. He is running for the national assembly's upper chamber—the Federation Council—and will therefore be able to continue on Yeltsin's staff, because the Federation Council will not be in continuous session, but will only concern itself with the most important legislation which the State Duma handles. As one of the leaders of Russia's Choice, the party which in the polls looks likely to win most votes, he is almost guaranteed a seat. Volkov is one of the most radical people in Yeltsin's camp.

The new national assembly will have less power than the dissolved Supreme Soviet had. According to the proposed new constitution, which will also be put before the voters on 12 December, it will hereafter be the president who appoints the prime minister, all ministers, the central bank chief, supreme court judges, and public prosecutors.

The parliament has lost its power over the central bank, the pensions fund, and state property like the railroads, the postal services, and so on. These will be under the direct control of the president. The president can dissolve the parliament if it passes a vote of no confidence in the government, while the parliament can only remove the president by following very intricate rules—several court rulings are needed, among other things.

Volkov is a member of the drafting committee for the new constitution and he assured me that it will make the system more stable, and that as a result the Russians will be spared major political upheavals in future.

"The parliament will have an important role as legislator, it will approve budgets, and have a controlling function over executive power. The formerly so talkative deputies will have to limit the political debates to once a month," Volkov said.

Nevertheless, Volkov finds it difficult to say what would happen if Yeltsin were to have a parliamentary majority against him. What guarantee is there that Yeltsin would not dissolve parliament again and rule by decree? No, that is something Volkov cannot answer until the composition of the new parliament is known.

"But the president will rule according to the new constitution," Vyacheslav Volkov, "and it clearly states what functions the various branches of power have."

Russia's Choice has received a disproportionately large amount of coverage in Russia's most important medium, television. It is only when that election campaign begins officially three weeks before the election that all parties will receive their allotted time. But Volkov described the election as completely free with equal chances for all.

"In all countries the ruling party must have some advantages, without there being anything odd about it," he said.

Volkov said that only 15 to 20 percent of voters will vote in a deliberate way after studying the party programs; the rest will make their choice according to whether they like the personalities of those running. Is the candidate courageous and determined? Has he a sense of humor? All these are important qualities for a Russian voter. Volkov himself is unable to stand the "ugly mug" of Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zhoganov.

Nor does Volkov think that the fact that Yeltsin has called off the 12 June presidential election will have any particular effect on the voters.

"The people have already elected him twice, and that ought to be enough," said Volkov, who thinks that Yeltsin has again made the right decision. Yeltsin will remain in office until his term runs out in 1996.

"The promise of a presidential election in June was made as an invitation to the opposition, but after it did not want to join the dance, and since the battle in October, there is no reason to stand by this invitation," Volkov said sarcastically.

But putting the Russian economy back on its feet will not be a bed of roses. It is expected that unemployment will materialize in earnest when Yeltsin carries out what he has already announced—that the subsidies to old-fashioned state industries will be phased out.

"We are aware that this could give rise to terrible social problems, but we have to be realists," the chief of staff said.

"Unemployment is unavoidable for every formerly totalitarian country on the road to a market economy. But we will help industry and commerce, so that it will find it easier to absorb those who will be the victims of the mass redundancies. One of the first things we will do will be to reduce taxes on industry.

"Laws benefiting state industries have been in force in Russia for far too long. When these are removed three will be another acceleration of privatization and this in turn will make industry and commerce more viable. This will be able to keep future unemployment within bounds," Volkov said.

"The new and easier rules are also intended to stem corruption which is threatening to eat up the system from within. The mafia has its contacts all the way up to the top levels in the Russian state system. It must become easier to earn money within the system that is legal," he said.

Russia has no tradition of swift trials; those responsible for the coup d'etat in 1991 have still not been sentenced, but Volkov hopes that Aleksandr Rutskoy and Ruslan Khasbulatov will be sentenced before the election, or at least before the new national assembly meets in the New Year.

"We have other things to concern ourselves with than this trial," Volkov said. In addition, this is a simple case: "Those behind the 1991 coup were to be judged according to the old communist paragraph on treason. And it is possible to ask: Who betrayed whom? Was it Yeltsin who betrayed socialism and the Communist Party, or was it those behind the coup who betrayed the fatherland?" Volkov said smiling.

Supports the Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty and EC union are popular among those in power in Russia. Volkov would like to join the EC, but not yet.

European integration is something the Russians like talking about. In reply to a direct question about whether Russia could envisage becoming integrated into the European Union Volkov smiled and answered with another question: "Of course, but who needs us?"

And he answered his own question like this: "I view the Maastricht Treaty with satisfaction and I see before me Russia as a member of the European Union in 8 to 10 years' time. But before that we have to be certain that we are following a stable course and are on the right road, and that there is no longer a possibility either of a coup or of parliament being stormed, and this is not a question that can really be asked," Volkov said.

Volkov has nothing against submitting Russia to the supranationality which the European Union represents. "But we have to start with the little things," he added. "We have to bring about equitable trading conditions, technological exchange, and develop ever stronger links with Western Europe as steps along the road to full integration.

"But before economic integration, there will be military cooperation. This is also something that is much easier to achieve," Volkov said.

"Our stability will be based on these two things: military cooperation with the West and economic integration with Western Europe. As far as economic assistance is concerned, I am not as proud as the opposition which claims that we as a great power do not need any help. The help should be targeted first and foremost on small and medium-sized companies, the retail trade, investments in our own industries, and help in acquiring new technology."

Foreign Ministry To Strengthen CIS Department

LD1511165093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1551 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 15 TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry will reshuffle its personnel, but without any dismissals and the CIS Department of the ministry will be reinforced, the ministry said in a press release Monday.

The decision was taken by the ministerial leadership in view of Russian president's recent visit to the ministry when he called on its staff to increase the professional level of contacts with ex- Soviet republics.

In addition to other functions, the Department of the Commonwealth of Independent States will now be in charge of multilateral cooperation within the commonwealth, including Russian participation in the all-CIS arrangements. Its staff will be strengthened by experts in disarmament and management of international organizations.

Shokhin Foresees Possible Government Crisis

LD1511180693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0520 GMT 15 Nov 93

[From the "Time for Business People" program]

[Text] Last week the Central Electoral Commission announced the results of its registration of electoral associations. The choice lies ahead. But Aleksandr Shokhin looks ahead now to the post-election situation:

[Begin Shokhin recording] At the moment, for instance, I can call on Chernomyrdin or Yeltsin and get them to sign some decision, because the personal relationship is, so to speak, more natural. But if we have party discipline, if we agree that we will cooperate with other factions in accordance with certain principles, if a government is formed along these lines, I may find that when I go to the premier or the president and ask them to sign a piece of paper, I am breaching the terms of an agreement. That will create something similar to a government crisis. [end recording]

Constitutional Court Building Damaged by Fire

PM1611110193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Constitutional Court Burns"]

[Text] Yesterday at 1025 hours in the Russian Constitutional Court building on Ilinka Dtreet a fire broke out, covering an area of about 50 square meters. According to the press center of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry State Firefighting main administration, at 1030 hours firefighting teams were already at the scene and set about putting out the fire, which was extinguished by 1106 hours.

According to preliminary reports during the fire four peope were cut off from the building exits and tried to escape by climbing onto the roof. One of them was cut by broken glass and died from loss of blood.

The reasons for the fire and the scale of the damage caused to the court building by the fire are being investigated.

Tasks of Collective Labor Disputes Service Set Out

PM1611115593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Decree No. 1133 of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government "On the Procedure for the Operation of the Service for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes Under the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor"; signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Moscow on 4 November]

[Text] The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decrees that:

1. The Service for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes under the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor (hereinafter "the Service") will, in the event of a dispute, be entrusted with checking the powers of the representatives of the parties to a collective contract or agreement and the validity of the demands being put forward by both parties, performing the functions of an intermediary in the settlement of labor disputes, and getting involved in the organization of labor arbitration.

2. The organs of executive power of republics within the Russian Federation, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg will assist the Service's regional departments in carrying out the tasks of resolving collective labor disputes that have been entrusted to them.

3. The Service will be entitled to receive from the Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics, the central organs of federal executive power, and through the Service's regional departments, as well as from the organs of executive power of Russian Federation constituent republics, krays, oblasts, autonomous formations, and the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, reports and information contained in state statistical accounts regarding issues that fall within the purview of the Service.

4. The Russian Federation Ministry of Labor will report to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government on the results of the work performed by the Service in 1993 to resolve collective labor disputes and establish regional departments of the Service.

5. It will be established that the director and deputy directors of the Service will avail themselves of the services of the medical center attached to the Russian Federation Government in line with the procedure and

terms that apply for the appropriate categories of Russian Federation ministry staff.

6. The payment of monthly long-service salary increments will be extended to the Service's staff from 1 September 1993.

The size of the monthly long-service salary increments will be fixed in line with the procedure and terms defined by the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decree No. 638 dated 8 July 1993 "On the Procedure and Terms for Paying Monthly Long-Service Salary Increments to Workers from the Central Organs of Federal Executive Power."

7. Point 2 of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decree No. 730 dated 30 July 1993 "On the Service for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes Under the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor" (Collected Acts of the Russian Federation President and Government 1993, No. 31, page 2992) will read as follows:

"2. It will be established that the director of the Service for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes under the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor is to be equal in salary terms to a departmental director in a Russian Federation ministry, and that the senior staffers, specialists, and employees of the Service's central apparatus are to be equal to the relevant categories of Russian Federation ministry staff, whereas the salaries of staff at regional departments of the Service are to be fixed at the salary level of the corresponding categories of staff at the autonomous administrations (departments) of kray and oblast administrations."

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government

[Dated] Moscow, 4 November 1993

Rutskoy, Khasbulatov Allowed Visits at Lefortovo Jail

PM1611110593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Nov 93 p 1

[Aleksandr Golovenko report: "Lefortovo Meetings"]

[Text] Following a month in custody, the Russian leaders arrested in October on charges of preparing and organizing mass disorders have been allowed visits. With the investigators' consent, A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov, and other prisoners in the Lefortovo detention center have already met with their wives. Viktor Anpilov is possibly the only exception. His wife has been unable to obtain the appropriate permission. In the opinion of the investigator handling the case of the "Working Russia" leader, Anpilov has particularly incensed the authorities.

Khasbulatov Rejects Charges of Staging Riots

LD1611131293 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Former speaker of the Russian parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov rejects the charges of organizing mass riots in Moscow on October 3 and 4. Now an inmate of Lefortovo prison, he told Interfax through his defense counsel Vladimir Fomichyov that he regrets not being able to do useful work and wasting time.

If convicted, Khasbulatov faces a prison term of two to 15 years.

Fomichyov told Interfax that the charge was coached in general terms. He says that Khasbulatov has filed no complaints about the activities of investigators, even though he thinks that what happened to him was politically motivated.

Khasbulatov is not interrogated every day, spending his time listening to the radio and reading books and newspapers. He has strolls every day. Khasbulatov has not complained of poor food or about his health. The ex-speaker continues smoking a pipe. Fomichyov strongly denied reports that his client experienced withdrawal symptoms from narcotics.

Khasbulatov has a cellmate but Fomichyov had no information about him. Khasbulatov also had no complaints about his cellmate. Khasbulatov's wife Raisa was allowed to see her husband in prison.

Being confined in a prison cell is a serious psychological stress for anyone but Khasbulatov in no way shows any signs of suffering. "He has experienced no depression," Fomichyov emphasized. "Khasbulatov is a reasonable man who does not yield to emotions and has a sober view of the situation."

The lawyer believes that the high position Khasbulatov used to hold will to a certain extent influence the charges brought against him in court.

Fomichyov is not troubled by public opinion about the October 3 and 4 events and the role his client is said to have played in them. "I expect the prosecution office not to be influenced by what mass media says and to follow faithfully the criminal procedure," Fomichyov said. He added that he had had no reason to question the objectivity of the investigation vis-a-vis his client.

Fomichyov said that Khasbulatov had complained to the Russian Prosecutor General Alexey Kazanik about his parliamentary immunity being violated, about the fact that he was arrested and criminal charges were brought against him without the permission of the Supreme Soviet and that the provisions of the presidential decree of September 21, which guaranteed immunity to members of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, were broken.

Election Issues

Shakhray, Chubays View Election Prospects

LD1611124393

[Editorial Report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1638 GMT on 15 November carries the scheduled 30-minute "Echo of the Week" program, in which correspondent Igor Pototskiy looks to the forthcoming elections and the spread of political parties in the new parliament. He says that this is the last opportunity to speak to election candidates before the restrictions on airtime for electioneering apply.

The program consists primarily of interviews with Russian Deputy Prime Ministers Sergey Shakhray of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord and Anatoliy Chubays who represents Russia's Choice, interspersed with comments by the correspondent, an interview with the executive director of the Roditi industrial and financial corporation and adverts.

Speaking from his office in a recorded interview, Shakhray stressed the importance of parties in the country's future: "In order for us to preserve Russia as a multinational state with such a diversity of regions, we need a political pivot of Russian society, and humankind has so far not invented anything other than parties. In principle it is a good thing for Russia that it has two or three major national parties."

On the possible outcome of the elections Shakhray said: "In my view, the options of either Zyuganov winning or Russia's Choice winning—two extreme situations—are highly unlikely," warning that in the long run both these options would be quite dangerous for society.

Chubays noted the danger of Russia's Choice supporters being complacent about the party's lead in the polls and not actually voting, and said that the fact that small parties failed to be registered for the election was "a major blow" for the democrats because while they have no chance of gaining the required 5 percent of votes they would have effectively split the vote.

Regarding the election campaign, he said: "Much is already clear. The leader in the campaign is clear and the opposition is also clear. Its main forces are the Agrarian Party and the communists, though it is quite difficult to distinguish between them because among the agrarian we can see masses of communists very far removed from the problems of land." Igor Pototskiy then pondered the possible composition of the new parliament. On this issue Chubays said: "There is no danger of the new parliament being more communist or simply communist. That is impossible. The Russian people will never give communists the majority. That is quite obvious to me, but there is a danger that the new parliament will be more populist, that it will be irresponsible, even more so than the last one." Shakhray said he thought the composition of the State Duma would be "quite mixed" and "amorphous", adding: "I think we need to strive for a minimum number of qualities for the future State Duma. First, it should not be in confrontation with the president and government so that we can proceed calmly for the next two years in the transitional period and prepare for the next stage of political and economic reforms." He stressed that the State Duma could and should tackle a minimum number of tasks, namely adopting a civil code, passing the constitutional laws necessary to reinforce Russian statehood, and creating the basis for new democratic elections.

Following advertisements and an interview with the executive director of the Roditi corporation about her views of the political parties and likely outcome of the elections, Pototskiy turned to economic policy asking Chubays whether the emphasis on developing the Russian economy would be on financial stabilization or protecting industry. Chubays explained that in practical terms, a "responsible" government "has no choice, no dilemma, no broad expanse on which it can operate according to the monetary principle or according to the principle of supporting industry." He warned that if any political force or government tried to take the path of supporting industry or agriculture by pouring finances into them, they would be "swept away in three months by a wave of public indignation." He said such a policy would result in a financial explosion and runaway inflation. He cited Ukraine as an example of what happens when "the fine slogans of backing industry, fixed prices, the renunciation of shock therapy, a slowdown of privatization, and state control of the economy" are implemented. In reality they lead the economy to the verge of collapse, he concluded.

Chubays went on to say that the real aim of raising the Russian economy went far beyond the arguments over the merits of shock therapy or financial stabilization: "It is well known that there were serious politicians who placed hopes, say, on Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin when he first came into the government, hopes that he would take another direction and change policy, but it is precisely because the policy was pursued responsibly that it retained the same outline, and this made it possible to save the economy from destruction." He then warned: "If we are to agree today to the crazy demands which the communists and agrarians are continuing to make, calling for an immense injection of all types of financial resources into the countryside, we will destroy the countryside." He explained that though such a policy might appear to benefit the countryside in the short term, it would in fact soon lead to the destruction of the economy and stated: "Industry can be backed, any sector of the economy can be backed only through tough financial policy," adding that only when a financial system is working and inflation is dropping can the government seriously consider which industry needs priority treatment.

Pototskiy's report then returned to Shakhray and the issue of a future coalition. Shakhray explained that "one of the criteria on which a coalition or, say, a political majority will be formed in the parliament will be attitudes to the economy." Of his major opponent, he said: "It seems to me that Russia's Choice is in rather a difficult position though both it and the mass media are beginning to get used to the idea that this bloc is in the lead. The difficulty is that according to the draft of the new constitution, in the transitional provisions, it states that the existing government led by Chernomyrdin is preserved. In other words, the State Duma will not begin its work with the formation of a new government. The president has ensured continuity here. The pivot of the Russia's Choice bloc's whole political program was that the economic reformer, Yegor Timurovich Gaydar, who has my sincere respect, would be made prime minister. Now this possibility has vanished." Shakhray speculated that the bloc would be forced to state officially their support for Chernomyrdin.

Pototskiy then speculated that Yeltsin's announcement that presidential elections would not take place on 12 June has changed the election campaign, making it much less clear. Regarding the position of Russia's Choice, Chubays explained: "Neither the Russia's Choice bloc, nor Yegor Gaydar ever set any personal objectives prior to the election campaign. Russia's Choice does not aim in the election campaign to gain such and such a post. This has never been the issue either in our public statements or in our private discussions. The issue is different, though no less tough perhaps. We are convinced that the Russia's Choice bloc should ensure a powerful political base in parliament in order to influence the direction of Russia's development, both economic and political, and I don't think there are any difficulties in this area. That is clear from all the opinion polls. The Russia's Choice bloc is in a good position, a safe position, a firm position."

Sergey Shakhray indicated his confidence in his party's chances but speculated that if society is polarized at the time of the elections "all parties and blocs from the left of center, right of center, or the center will have very little chance of overcoming even the 5 percent barrier." Chubays concluded: "If, having looked at the options, Sergey Mikhaylovich [Shakhray] believes that the Party of Russian Unity and Accord has good chances, that's great. I think that this can only encourage all those who favor democratic development. It is great if Yavlinskiy has good chances. It is great if Sobchak and Shakhray and all the others have good chances. I think this can only be for the good. It would be wholly foolish for the Russia's Choice bloc to try to achieve a reduction in the results of these political forces." He reiterated: "We support any responsible political forces capable of matching their promises with their actions."

Gaydar Offers Cooperation to Parties, Blocs

LD1511211593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1556 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By correspondents Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] The leader of the electoral bloc Russia's Choice Yegor Gaydar has sent letters to the leaders of 12 parties and electoral blocs allowed by the Central Election Commission to take part in the final stage of the election campaign.

The letter suggests that, to ensure constructive interaction of factions in the future Russian parliament, efforts should be joined for cooperation in forming a new parliament structure and organizing its fruitful work.

It would be expedient first, says the letter, that the leaders delegate 2-3 representatives to joint the experts groups which will hold constant consultations.

Earlier Russia's Choice appealed to parties and constituencies to create a body to would work out and coordinate the principles for effective activities of the Federal Assembly, as well as form three working groups within the commission.

Interfax has been told by a spokesman for the HQ of the Party of the Russian Unity and Accord (Russian abbreviation PRES) whose leader is Sergey Shakhray, that Gaydar's proposal was described as positive.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Several days earlier Shakhray told a news conference in Moscow that his party would not join any political blocs. He said PRES was the only party taking part in the elections which is based not on class and social principle, but on the idea of federalism and self-determination. Shakhray was flatly against Russia's Choice being presented as the presidential-government bloc. Shakhray has called for an end to "engaging in mystification" and said that the president supports all democratic parties and movements, while the government and the prime minister do not take part in the elections.

Election Feature Lists Failed Parties, Blocs

PM1511143193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed roundup of news under the "Election Chronicle" rubric: "'Bloc of the 'Also-Rans' Is Eliminated"]

[Text] The courts in Russia have never been without work. The Information Arbitration Tribunal is no exception. No sooner have the participants in the election races finally managed to register, than a host of questions coming under the tribunal's jurisdiction at once arises. (Let us recall that Anatoliy Vengerov, a professor of the Moscow State Law Academy, was elected chairman of the tribunal).

The tribunal's first open session is expected to take place today, 12 November. It is difficult to discover what the judges will be handling specifically, but most likely they will examine problems of the practical use of paid advertizing (a novelty in the current elections) and make up their minds on indirect advertising, which has hit the pages of newspapers and invaded the airwaves.

In yesterday's newspaper we published a list of electoral blocs and political parties which have won the right to continue the fight for deputies' seats. Of the 21 who gathered 100,000 signatures from voters, 13 remain. Who was left, as it were, "overboard"?

They are the National Republican Party of Russia (leader—Nikolay Lysenko); the Constitutional Democratic Party (leader—Mikhail Astafyev); the Party of Consolidation (chairman—Aleksandr Tikhonov); the Russian All-National Union (leader—Sergey Baburin); the Russian Christian Democratic Party (head of party—Aleksandr Chuyev); the "New Russia" election association (on its list were Telman Gdlyan and Mikhail Bocharov); the "Transformation" political movement (Viktor Korovin), and the Association of Independent Professionals (leaders—Petr Filippov and Andrey Nechayev, former Russian Federation minister of the economy).

The Central Electoral Commission is not yet officially announcing the reasons for which the lists of these parties and blocs were not passed. But we hope that you will be able to read about this in our next issue.

Incidentally, many candidates and leaders whose parties or electoral blocs did not pass this, as it were, intermediary finishing line of the election race, have not thrown in the towel, and have decided to fight for deputy mandates in single-seat districts.

The campaign for election to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly—the Federation Council—is well under way. As of today the president of the Republic of Yakutia (Sakha) and many heads of oblast administrations and leaders of the representative organs of the federation components have already put forward their candidacies. In all there are already over 20 people. Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the Department of the President's Administration for Work With Territories, believes that the participation of leaders of the organs of power of the federation components will enable an organ to be set up representing to the maximum extent the interests of Russia's republics, krays, and oblasts.

Commissions Register 1-Mandate Constituencies Candidates

LD1611095693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0816 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yremakova]

[Text] Moscow, November 16 (TASS)—A total of 145 candidates running for elections to the State Duma and 93 candidates to the Federation Council have been registered by regional electoral commissions in the Russian Federation, Valentina Shabunova, head of the organizing department of the Central Electoral Commission, told ITAR-TASS.

By 24:00 on Sunday night, lists of candidates containing electors' signatures and confirming consent of 1,505 candidates to run for elections to the State Duma and 489 candidates to the Federation Council, had been brought to electoral commissions in all constituences of the Russian Federation, except Chechnya.

Regional electoral commissions will check list of candidates in support of nominated candidates to establish how many of them would be allowed to continue electioneering.

The deadline for the registration of candidates to seats in the new parliament expires on November 19.

'Russian Unity and Accord' Contenders for Duma

PM1511120193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 pp 8-9

["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord" electoral association]

[Text] The following have been nominated as candidate deputies to the State Duma from the "Party of Russian Unity and Accord" [PRUA] electoral association on the basis of the decisions of the PRUA Federal Council of 26 October 1993 and 6 November 1993 (Footnote) (There are gaps in the numbering due to the deletion of two [as published] candidate deputies from the lists):

1. Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich, born 1956, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government; Moscow.
2. Shokhin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1951, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government; Moscow.
3. Zatulin, Konstantin Fedorovich, born 1958, chairman of the "Entrepreneurs for a New Russia" association; Moscow.
4. Kalmykov, Yuriy Khamzatovich, born 1934, Russian Federation minister of justice; Moscow.
5. Kirpichnikov, Valeriy Aleksandrovich, born 1946, president of the Union of Russian Cities; Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast.
6. Melikyan, Gennadiy Georgiyevich, born 1947, Russian Federation minister of labor; Moscow.
7. Tumanov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1940, professor at the Russian Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute; Moscow.
8. Sliva, Anatoliy Yakovlevich, born 1940, deputy chief of the Russian Federation President's State-Legal Administration; Moscow.
9. Nikonov, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich, born 1956, political scientist; Moscow.
10. Makhachev, Gadzhi Nukhiyevich, born 1951, deputy chief of the "Dagneft" Association; Makhachkala.
11. Kozhemyakin, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1956, civil servant; Moscow.
12. Lepekhin, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1959, political scientist; Moscow.

13. Turbanov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1951, chief of the Inkombank Joint-Stock Bank Legal Administration; Moscow.
14. Shichanin, Igor Aleksandrovich, born 1955, chief of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers Apparatus Department for International Cooperation and CIS Affairs; Moscow.
15. Zuyev, Konstantin Eduardovich, born 1961, economist and chairman of the board of directors of the "Tekhnologiya" joint-stock company; Moscow.
16. Kazhlayev, Murad Magomedovich, born 1931, composer, chief conductor and artistic director of the Russian State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting Academy Concert Orchestra; Moscow.

Republic of Adygea
17. (1.) Dmitrenko, Gennadiy Yakovlevich, born 1940, chief of department at the "Kubangazprom" enterprise; Yablonovskiy settlement, Republic of Adygea.
18. (2.) Shevotsukov, Pshemaf Askarbiyevich, born 1946, deputy chairman of the Republic of Adygea Government; Moscow.

Republic of Gornyy Altay
19. (1.) Pekpeyev, Sergey Timurovich, born 1956, president of "Altayenergobank"; Gorno-Altaysk.

Altay Kray
20. (1.) Tverdokhlebov, Valeriy Konstantinovich, born 1942, entrepreneur; Barnaul.
21. (2.) Rogovskiy, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, born 1956, entrepreneur; Barnaul.

Amur Oblast
22. (1.) Sitnikov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, born 1959, permanent representative of the Far Eastern Interregional Association in Moscow; Ussuriysk, Maritime Kray.
23. (2.) Bikbulatov, Valeriy Yakovlevich, born 1943, secretary of the party's oblast branch; Blagoveshchensk.

Astrakhan Oblast
24. (1.) Saushin, Aleksandr Zakharovich, born 1949, commercial director of the "Astrakhangazprom" enterprise; Astrakhan.

Republic of Bashkortostan
25. (1.) Arinin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1955, historian; Ufa.
26. (2.) Muksinov, Irek Sharipovich, born 1932, scientific associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences State and Law Institute; Moscow.
27. (3.) Khusainov, Albert Tagirovich, born 1937, economist; Ufa.
28. (4.) Shafikov, Gazim Gazizovich, born 1939, writer; Ufa.
29. (5.) Valitov, Nazhip Khatmullovich, born 1936, professor at Bashkir State University; Ufa.

Belgorod Oblast
30. (1.) Pigarev, Vladimir Grigoryevich, born 1933, general director of the "Gelios" firm; Belgorod.
31. (2.) Gerasimenko, Vladimir Yakovlevich, born 1948, vice president and chief engineer of the "Belgorodskiy Zavod Energeticheskogo Mashinostroyeniya" joint-stock company; Belgorod.

Republic of Buryatia
32. (1.) Ivanov, Aleksandr Semenovich, born 1948, deputy chairman of the Republic of Buryatia Council of Ministers; Ulan-Ude.
33. (2.) Danilov, Boris Vasilyevich, born 1951, director of the "Inter" limited liability company; Ulan-Ude.

Vladimir Oblast
34. (1.) Bakaleynik, Iosif Abramovich, born 1951, economist; Vladimir.
35. (2.) Yefimov, Viktor Vladimirovich, born 1949, deputy head of the City Administration; Aleksandrov.
36. (3.) Ozhiganov, Edvard Nikolayevich, born 1947, deputy leader of the Russian Federation State Committee for Federation and Nationalities Affairs Federal Research Center; Moscow.

Volgograd Oblast
37. (1.) Rudenko, Vladimir Andreyevich, born 1953, deputy general director of the "Volgogradneftemash" joint-stock company; Volgograd.
38. (2.) Makhmutov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 1950, general director of the Federal Research Center; Moscow.

Vologda Oblast
39. (1.) Shiryayev, Vladimir Fedoseyevich, born 1952, assistant head of Vologda Oblast Administration; Vologda.
40. (2.) Konopelko, Yuriy Petrovich, born 1955, director of the Vologda Directorate for Gas Pipelines Under Construction of the "Severgazprom" enterprise; Vologda.

Voronezh, Kursk, and Tambov Oblasts
41. (1.) Dianov, Maksim Anatolyevich, born 1953, executive secretary of the International Movement for Democratic Reforms; Moscow.
42. (2.) Berg, Oleg Viktorovich, born 1953, chairman of the board of directors of the "Voronezhzhilstroy" joint-stock company; Voronezh.

Ivanovo Oblast
43. (1.) Zimin, Sergey Makarovich, born 1960, general director of the Ivanovo Medical Insurance Company; Ivanovo.
44. (2.) Belov, Dmitriy Yevgenyevich, born 1965, director of the Ivanovo Oblast Business Club; Ivanovo.
45. (3.) Kuzmichev, Yuriy Konstantinovich, born 1949, scientific worker; Ivanovo.

Ingush Republic
46. (1.) Abadiyev, Magomed-Bashir Uruskhanovich, born 1955, deputy chairman of the Council of CIS Heads of Government Internationalist Servicemen's Committee; Nazran.

Irkutsk Oblast

47. (1.) Voronin, Oleg Lvovich, born 1950, director of the Oblast Investment Fund; Irkutsk.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic
48. (1.) Shibdukhov, Oleg Bashirovich, born 1955, deputy chairman of the "Kabbalkagrosnab" joint-stock company; Nalchik.
49. (2) Ilyushchenko, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1948, deputy prime minister of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic; Nalchik.
50. (3.) Ulbashev, Timur Kichibatarovich, born 1956, chairman of a standing commission of the Kabardino-Balkar Supreme Soviet; Nalchik.
51. (4.) Aybazov, Feliks Galimovich, born 1941, director of a leased technological planning and design institute; Nalchik.

Kaliningrad Oblast
52. (1.) Krutov, Gennadiy Georgiyevich, born 1948, deputy supreme hetman of the Union of Cossack Troops in Russia and Abroad; Moscow.

Kaluga Oblast
53. (1.) Boyko, Aleksandr Konstantinovich, born 1939, chairman of a Kaluga Oblast Soviet commission; Kaluga.
54. (2.) Khaychenko, Viktor Yefimovich, 1948, chief metallurgist for the "Kadvi" joint-stock company; Kaluga.

Kamchatka Oblast
55. (1.) Premyak, Petr Grigoryevich, born 1945, chairman of the Kamchatka Oblast Soviet; Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Karelia Republic
56. (1.) Katanandov, Sergey Leonidovich, born 1956, Petrozavodsk city mayor; Petrozavodsk.
57. (2.) Kolesov, Aleksandr Semenovich, born 1949, chairman of the Petrozavodsk City Soviet; Petrozavodsk.

Karachayevo-Cherkessiya Republic
58. (1.) Khatukayev, Murat Khusinovich, born 1948, city administration deputy head; Cherkessk.

Kemerovo Oblast
59. (1.) Moskalev, Vladimir Andreyevich, born 1937, chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Committee for Emergency Situations; Kemerovo.
60. (2.) Velichko, Natalya Dmitriyevna, born 1953, lawyer; Kemerovo.

Kirov Oblast
61. (1.) Savin, Nikolay Andreyevich, born 1946, deputy head of the Kirov Oblast Administration; Kirov.
62. (2.) Ostretsov, Valeriy Ivanovich, born 1944, member of the board of the Enterprise Support Foundation; Kirovo-Chepetsk.

Komi Republic
63. (1.) Trifonov, Vladimir Petrovich, born 1957, Russian Federation Antimonopoly Committee administration chief; Syktyvkar.

Kostroma Oblast
64. (1.) Voronin, Aleksandr Gennadyevich, born 1962, chairman of Kostroma City Soviet; Kostroma.

Krasnodar Kray
65. (1.) Machuga, Vasiliy Nikolayevich, born 1940, president of the "Sportinterprom" joint-stock company; Moscow.
66. (2.) Zhukova, Olga Nikolayevna, born 1950, chairman of Temryukskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies; Temryuk, Krasnodar Kray.
67. (3.) Kolodyazhnyy, Viktor Viktorovich, born 1953, general director of the "Agrostroitel" Association; Novokubansk.
68. (4.) Fedorov, Ivan Semenovich, born 1948, Sovetskiy Rayon Administration deputy head; Krasnodar.
69. (5.) Yeremin, Aleksey Lvovich, born 1958, medical worker; Krasnodar.

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Krasnoyarsk Kray
71. (1.) Anikevich, Anatoliy Georgiyevich, born 1946, head of the Political Science Department at Krasnoyarsk State Technical University; Krasnoyarsk.
72. (2.) Shushakova, Anna Aristarkhovna, born 1948, Uzhurskiy Rayon Soviet chairman; Uzhur, Krasnoyarsk Kray.
73. (3.) Zorin, Dmitriy Konstantinovich, born 1937, vice president of the Russian Union of United Cooperatives; Krasnoyarsk.
74. (4.) Gorelik, Aleksandr Solomonovich, born 1931, head of the Criminal Law Department of Krasnoyarsk State University; Krasnoyarsk.
75. (5.) Tishin, Vladimir Viktorovich, born 1953, member of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Soviet Inner Soviet; Krasnoyarsk.

Kurgan Oblast
76. (1.) Zhigachev, Anatoliy Kuzmich, born 1945, chairman of the Oblast Property Management Committee; Kurgan.
77. (2.) Isayev, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1955, director of the "PKF Iveks" joint-stock company; Kurgan.

Leningrad Oblast
78. (1.) Blokhin, Vladimir Petrovich, born 1956, Kirovsk City Administration head; Kirovsk, Leningrad Oblast.
79. (2.) Pisarevskiy, Aleksandr Grigoryevich, born 1950, chairman of the Commission for the Restoration of the Rights of Rehabilitated Victims of Political Repressions; Kirpichnoye settlement, Vyborgskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast.
80. (3.) Strakhov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, born 1961, City Administration first deputy head; Sosnovyy Bor.
81. (4.) Sopov, Oleg Yuryevich, born 1964, general director of the "Galla" joint-stock company; Pesochnoye p/o [production association], Vyborgskiy Rayon, Leningrad Oblast.

82. (5.) Ivanov, Nikolay Alekseyevich, born 1940, general director of the Vyborgmontazh joint-stock company; Vyborg, Leningrad Oblast.

Lipetsk Oblast
83. (1.) Guchek, Pavel Anatolyevich, born 1948, Lipetsk Oblast Administration deputy head; Lipetsk.
84. (2.) Malyukov, Nikolay Ilich, born 1950, Lipetsk Administration Health Administration chief; Lipetsk.

Magadan Oblast
85. (1.) Gladkov, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1969, director of the "Kulu" sovkhoz; Kulu village, Tenkinskiy Rayon.

Mari-El Republic
86. (1.) Popov, Anatoliy Gennadyevich, born 1948, director of the "Yoshkar-Ola Footwear Factory" joint-stock company and member of the board of the "Mariy Ushem" democratic movement; Yoshkar-Ola.
87. (2.) Gavrilov, Nikolay Nikandrovich, born 1947, president of the Foundation for the Development of the Finno-Ugric People's Culture; Yoshkar-Ola.

Mordovian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]
88. (1.) Soldatov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1940, chairman of the Mordovian Republic Committee of the Agro-Industrial Complex Workers Union; Saransk.

City of Moscow
89. (1.) Stankevich, Sergey Borisovich, born 1954, political adviser to the Russian Federation president; Moscow.
90. (2.) Orlov, Oleg Igoryevich, born 1954, vice president of the Moscow Independent Broadcasting Corporation (TV-6, Moscow); Moscow.
91. (3.) Mozhayev, Boris Andreyevich, born 1923, writer; Moscow.
92. (4.) Olshanskiy, Dmitriy Vadimovich, born 1953, general director of the Strategic Analysis and Forecasting Center; Moscow.
93. (5.) Sebentsov, Andrey Yevgenyevich, born 1945, first deputy leader of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers apparatus; Moscow.
94. (6.) Maley, Mikhail Dmitriyevich, born 1941, chairman of the Security Council Interdepartmental Commission for Scientific and Technical Questions of the Defense Industry; Moscow.
95. (7.) Solomatin, Yuriy Borisovich, born 1954, chairman of the board of directors of the "Torgovyy Dom GUM" joint-stock company; Moscow.
96. (8.) Dontsov, Sergey Yevgenyevich, born 1948, chief of the Moscow Government State Legal Administration; Moscow.
97. (9.) Belov, Leonid Aleksandrovich, born 1947, serviceman and deputy chairman of Moscow City Soviet; Moscow.
98. (10.) Pugachev, Roman Vladimirovich, born 1961, executive secretary of the Foundation for the Economic Reform of Russia; Moscow.
99. (11.) Karpukhin, Viktor Vasilyevich, born 1950, general director of the "Informatsionnyye Tekhnicheskiye Sistemi" firm; Moscow.

Moscow Oblast
100. (1.) Klimenko, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1952, chairman of Moscow Oblast Soviet; Moscow.
101. (2.) Polovnikov, Stanislav Petrovich, born 1937, general director of the "Kompozit" Science and Production Association; Moscow.
102. (3.) Semenov, Viktor Aleksandrovich, born 1958, general director of the "Belaya Dacha" agricultural firm; Kotelniki settlement, Lyuberetskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
103. (4.) Martyushov, Yuriy Semenovich, born 1952, chairman of the Moscow Oblast Soviet Committee on Land Questions; Troitsk, Moscow Oblast.
104. (5.) Kalachev, Konstantin Eduardovich, born 1964, cochairman of the "For Tax and Legal Reform and Freedom of Trade" Association; Moscow.
105. (6.) Lapin, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1952, chairman of Zhukovskiy City Soviet; Zhukovskiy.
106. (7.) Kuznetsov, Anatoliy Grigoryevich, born 1960, chairman of the Oblast Chamber of Entrepreneurs; Khimki.
107. (8.) Galchenko, Valeriy Vladimirovich, born 1951, chairman of Dmitrov City Soviet; Orevo settlement, Dmitrovskiy Rayon.

Murmansk Oblast
108. (1.) Fufygin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1946, deputy chairman of Murmansk City Soviet; Murmansk.
109. (2.) Zolotkov, Andrey Alekseyevich, born 1951, chemical engineer; Murmansk.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast
110. (1.) Silenko, Boris Anatolyevich, born 1963, chairman of the board of directors of the "Nizhegorodskiye Finansy" joint-stock company; Nizhniy Novgorod.
111. (2.) Shchegolev, Igor Lvovich, born 1960, deputy director of the "Volgotransgaz" enterprise; Nizhniy Novgorod.
112. (3.) Lavrichev, Veniamin Merkuryevich, born 1932, chairman of the board of the "Garantiya" pensions and social insurance fund; Moscow.
113. (4.) Samartsev, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1940, staffer of the Nizhniy Novgorod Technical College; Nizhniy Novgorod.
114. (5.) Yasenev, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, born 1948, professor and director of the Nizhniy Novgorod branch of the All-Russia Correspondence Financial and Economic Institute; Nizhniy Novgorod.
115. (6.) Panchenko, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1956, general director of the Nizhniy Novgorod Union of Entrepreneurs; Nizhniy Novgorod.

Novgorod Oblast
116. (1.) Ochin, Oleg Fedorovich, born 1950, general director of the "Interservis" program management center; Novgorod.

117. (2.) Lomonosov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1952, general manager of the "Kapital" check investment fund; Novgorod.

Novosibirsk Oblast
118. (1.) Kiselev, Vasiliy Nikolayevich, born 1947, first deputy head of administration of Novosibirsk Oblast; Novosibirsk.
119. (2.) Ivankov, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1947, general director of the executive board of the "Siberian Agreement" interregional association; Novosibirsk.
120. (3.) Tsikhotskiy, Anatoliy Viktorovich, born 1945, chief of the State and Law Department at the Siberian Personnel Center; Novosibirsk.

Omsk Oblast
121. (1.) Levchenko, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1949, vice president of the Union of Entrepreneurs; Omsk.
122. (2.) Kostyukov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1958, senior lecturer in the State and Municipal Law Department of Omsk State University; Omsk.

Orenburg Oblast
123. (1.) Maltsev, Vyacheslav Nikolayevich, born 1950, worker at the "Strela" Production Association; Orenburg.

Orel Oblast
124. (1.) Kislyakov, Aleksandr Grigoryevich, born 1947, mayor of Orel city; Orel.
125. (2.) Voropayev, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1949, general director of the Orel Oblast Agro-Industrial Complex Commercial Center; Orel.

Penza Oblast
126. (1.) Vasilchenko, Nikifor Grigoryevich, born 1949, Zarechnyy City Administration head; Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
127. (2.) Korobchenko, Aleksandr Yevgenyevich, born 1952, chairman of the oblast branch of the party; Penza.
128. (3.) Knyazev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1951, scientific worker; Penza.

Perm Oblast
129. (1.) Sokolov, Valeriy Gennadyevich, born 1955, chief of the Perm LPUMG [expansion unknown] of the "Permtransgaz" enterprise; Perm.
130. (2.) Nurullayev, Ergash, born 1946, docent at the Perm State Technical University physics faculty; Perm.
131. (3.) Mostovoy, Anatoliy Vladimirovich, born 1957, chief engineer at the "Permtransgaz" enterprise; Chaykovskiy.

Maritime Kray
132. (1.) Zubkov, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1951, chairman of the Union of Small and Medium-Sized Business Entrepreneurs; Vladivostok.

Pskov Oblast
133. (1.) Solodovnikov, Eduard Zakharovich, born 1941, vice president of the firm "Ramek-International"; Velikiye Luki.

Rostov Oblast
134. (1.) Shapovalov, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1951, Rostov Oblast Administration deputy head; Novocherkassk.
135. (2.) Khoperskaya, Larisa Lvovna, born 1958, chief of the North Caucasus Personnel Center's Department for the Analysis of Interethnic Relations; Rostov-na-Donu.
136. (3.) Miroshnichenko, Ivan Konstantinovich, born 1948, chairman of the Rostov Oblast Entrepreneurs' Council; Rostov-na-Donu.
137. (4.) Sudin, Boris Petrovich, born 1952, Rodionovo-Nesvetayskiy Rayon Administration head; Greko-Ulyanovka village, Rostov Oblast.

Ryazan Oblast
138. (1.) Panfilov, Viktor Nikolayevich, born 1941, chairman of the Ryazan Oblast Committee of the Construction and Construction Materials Industry Workers Trade Union; Ryazan.
139. (2.) Sudenko, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich, born 1951, chief of Ryazan Oblast Soviet Social and Legal Department; Ryazan.

Samara Oblast
140. (1.) Ivanov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, born 1951, chairman of Samara City Soviet; Samara.
141. (2.) Tsyrlov, Anatoliy Ilich, born 1950, vice president of the Samara Union of Small Enterprises and Entrepreneurs, director of the firm "MABIS"; Samara.
142. (3.) Samarin, Yuriy Petrovich, born 1936, staffer at the Samara State Technical University; Samara.

City of St. Petersburg
143. (1.) Malyshev, Yuriy Petrovich, born 1956, chairman of the Petersburg Soviet Education Commission; St. Petersburg.
144. (2.) Kalinin, Vitaliy Anatolyevich, born 1952, chairman of Vasileostrovskiy Rayon Soviet; St. Petersburg.
145. (3.) Dmitriyev, Mikhail Egonovich, born 1961, member of the Legislative Proposals Commission under the Russian Federation president; St. Petersburg.
146. (4.) Tolstoy, Mikhail Nikitich, born 1940, scientific associate of the State Optical Institute; St. Petersburg.
147. (5.) Korneva, Tatyana Viktorovna, born 1953, pro-rector of the University of Cultural Ecology; St. Petersburg.
148. (6.) Zubik, Terentiy Mikhaylovich, born 1934, consultant to the Military Medical Academy; St. Petersburg.

Saratov Oblast
149. (1.) Portnov, Viktor Nikolayevich, born 1947, director of a social foundation; Saratov.
150. (2.) Karagod, Leonid Ivanovich, born 1958, deputy director of the "Gelon" joint-stock company; Saratov.
151. (3.) Veshnev, Vladimir Petrovich, born 1943, docent at a pedagogical institute; Saratov.

Sakhalin Oblast
152. (1.) Sirenko, Viktor Sergeyevich, born 1939, Sakhalin Oblast Administration deputy head; Moscow.

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
153. (1.) Alekseyev, Vasiliy Gavrilovich, born 1937, candidate of biological sciences, state counselor to the president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia); Yakutsk.
154. (2.) Khokholov, Arkadiy Semenovich, born 1949, entrepreneur; Yakutsk.

Sverdlovsk Oblast
155. (1.) Gurevich, Yevgeniy Borisovich, born 1966, staffer of the Workers Center for Economic Reforms; Yekaterinburg.
156. (2.) Borisikhin, Yuriy Sergeyevich, born 1944, general director of the Demidovskiy Chamber of Trade and Industry; Yekaterinburg.
157. (3.) Kazakov, Aleksandr Vitalyevich, born 1948, director of the Ural Branch of the Center for Private Law under the Russian Federation president; Yekaterinburg.

Republic of North Ossetia
158. (1.) Makiyev, Soslan Aleksandrovich, born 1958, teacher; Vladikavkaz.

Stavropol Kray
159. (1.) Gavrilov, Roman Imanuilovich, born 1945, president of the GRiS [expansion unknown] concern, member of the Enterprise Council under the Russian Federation president; Pyatigorsk.
160. (2.) Fedosov, Petr Stefanovich, born 1937, hetman of the Caucasian Regular Cossacks; Stavropol.
161. (3.) Sklovskiy, Konstantin Ilich, born 1955, member of the Stavropol Kray Attorneys Collegium; Stavropol.

Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenetsk) Autonomous Okrug
162. (1.) Nikologorskiy, Sergey Petrovich, born 1953, lawyer; Norilsk.

Republic of Tatarstan
163. (1.) Mukhamadiyev, Rinat Safiyevich, born 1948, chairman of the Tatarstan Writers' Union Board; Kazan.
164. (2.) Salayev, Bayram Gadzhiyevich, born 1948, entrepreneur; Moscow.
165. (3.) Zakiyev, Rustem Mirfatykhovich, born 1955, chairman of the Tatar Studies Foundation, president of the Union of Entrepreneurs; Kazan.

Tver Oblast
166. (1.) Belousov, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1947, Tver City Administration head; Tver.
167. (2.) Zheleznova, Margarita Mikhaylovna, born 1946, leader of the executive directorate of the state program for the social and cultural development of Tver Oblast; Tver.

Tomsk Oblast
168. (1.) Rakhmatullin, Rais Adgamovich, born 1948, chief engineer at the Tomsk Petrochemicals Combine; Tomsk.

Republic of Tuva
169. (1.) Bagay-ool, Vladimir Barinovich, born 1951, adviser to the president of the Republic of Tuva; Kyzyl.
170. (2.) Konev, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, born 1949, school director; Kyzyl.
171. (3.) Badra, Igor Irgitovich, born 1952, acting minister of foreign economic activity of the Repbulic of Tuva; Kyzyl.

Tyumen Oblast
172. (1.) Malykhin, Anatoliy Yakovlevich, born 1938, deputy director of the "Tyumen Oblast Development Program" foundation; Tyumen.
173. (2.) Berezin, Lev Savelyevich, born 1952, faculty chief at Tyumen State University; Tyumen.
174. (3.) Stepanov, Aleksandr Mikhaylovich, born 1958, general director of the "Univest" joint-stock company; Tyumen.
175. (4.) Kirsanov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1948, deputy chief of the Urengoygazprom Capital Construction Administration; Novyy Urengoy.

Udmurt Republic
176. (1.) Krasnykh, Aleksey Ivanovich, born 1943, chief of the Izhevsk Radio Plant Information Center; Izhevsk.
177. (2.) Berkutov, Sergey Georgiyevich, born 1962, chairman of a commission of Izhevsk City Soviet; Izhevsk.

Ulyanovsk Oblast
178. (1.) Povtarev, Nikolay Petrovich, born 1951, chairman of Ulyanovsk City Soviet; Ulyanovsk.
179. (2.) Berlyand, Oleg Viktorovich, born 1951, general director of the "Simbirsk-Dialog" joint-stock company; Ulyanovsk.

Khabarovsk Kray
180. (1.) Bekoshina, Valentina Fedorovna, born 1938, chief of an administration of the Russian Federation Antimonopoly Committee; Khabarovsk.

Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug
181. (1.) Tropinov, Yuriy Vladimirovich, born 1953, chief of the Kazym LPU [expansion unknown] of the "Tyumentransgaz" enterprise; Beloyarskiy.

Chelyabinsk Oblast
182. (1.) Lubenets, Nikolay Andreyevich, born 1949, city mayor; Zlatoust-36.
183. (2.) Matushkin, Petr Fedorovich, born 1950, chairman of Chelyabinsk City Soviet; Chelyabinsk.
184. (3.) Stikhin, Andrey Vladimirovich, born 1959, chairman of the board of the privatization assistance bank; Chelyabinsk.
185. (4.) Vyatkin, German Platonovich, born 1935, staffer of Chelyabinsk State Technical University; Chelyabinsk.

Chita Oblast
186. (1.) Nazarov, Nikolay Petrovich, born 1946, Chita Oblast Administration deputy head; Chita.
187. (2.) Chechetkin, Vladimir Stepanovich, born 1938, chairman of the Committee for Geology and Utilization of Mineral Resources; Chita.

Chuvash Republic

188. (1.) Demidov, Mikhail Vasilyevich, born 1956, Chuvash Republic deputy minister of justice; Cheboksary.
189. (2.) Dmitriyev, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, born 1953, vice president of the Chuvash Republic Union of Entrepreneurs; Cheboksary.

Yaroslavl Oblast
190. (1.) Sobolev, Boris Alekseyevich, born 1940, director of the Moscow office of the Yaroslavl "Asoot" Association; Moscow.
191. (2.) Moshkov, Sergey Anatolyevich, born 1958, economist, city soviet deputy; Rybinsk.
192. (3.) Mironov, German Sevirovich, born 1935, staffer at Yaroslavl State University; Yaroslavl.

Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug
193. (1.) Pashchenko, Viktor Aleksandrovich, born 1945, deputy general director of the "Zapsibgazprom" joint-stock company; Tyumen.
194. (2.) Bogun, Ivan Aleksandrovich, born 1954, chairman of the "Nadymgazprom" enterprise trade union committee; Nadym.

'Russia's Choice' Contenders for State Duma

PM1211150893 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Nov 93 pp 10-11

["Federal List of Candidates" for State Duma Elections from the "Russia's Choice" electoral association]

[Text] On the basis of a "Russia's Choice" electoral association decision of 6 November 1993, the following have been nominated from the "Russia's Choice" electoral association as candidate deputies to the State Duma:

1. Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich, born 1956, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
2. Kovalev, Sergey Adamovich, born 1930, chairman of the Human Rights Commission under the Russian Federation President, rights activist, candidate of biological sciences; Moscow.
3. Pamfilova, Ella Aleksandrovna, born 1953, Russian Federation minister of social protection of the population; Moscow.
4. Chubays, Anatoliy Borisovich, born 1955, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government, candidate of economic sciences; Moscow.
5. Kozyrev, Anatoliy Vladimirovich, born 1951, Russian Federation minister of foreign affairs, candidate of historical sciences; Moscow.
6. Fedorov, Boris Grigoryevich, born 1958, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government and Russian Federation minister of finance, doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
7. Volkogonov, Dmitriy Antonovich, born 1928, historian, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor; Moscow.
8. Filatov, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1936, leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration; Moscow.
9. Yemelyanov, Aleksey Mikhaylovich, born 1935, head of department at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, doctor of economic sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences; Moscow.
10. Poltoranin, Mikhail Nikiforovich, born 1939, leader of the Russian Federal Information Center; Moscow.
11. Bunich, Pavel Grigoryevich, born 1925, economist, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Moscow.
12. Makarov, Andrey Mikhaylovich, born 1955, lawyer, candidate of juridical sciences; Moscow.
13. Burbulis, Gennadiy Eduardovich, born 1945, chairman of the "Strategiya" center, candidate of philosophical sciences; Moscow.
14. Zolotukhin, Boris Andreyevich, born 1930, deputy chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission under the Russian Federation president, lawyer and legal expert; Moscow.
15. Aven, Petr Olegovich, born 1955, general director of "Fin PA," candidate of economic sciences; Moscow.
16. Golovkov, Aleksey Leonardovich, born 1956, executive director of the All-Russia Association of Enterprises Undergoing Privatization and Private Enterprises, candidate of economic sciences; Moscow.
17. Gusman, Yuliy Solomonovich, born 1943, director of the Central Cinematographers House, movie director; Moscow.
18. Murashev, Arkadiy Nikolayevich, born 1957, chairman of the Liberal-Conservative Policy Center; Moscow.
19. Yushenkov, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1950, first deputy leader of the Russian Federal Information Center, candidate of philosophical sciences; Moscow.

Northwest Region

Arkhangelsk Oblast
1. 20. Danilov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich, born 1937, leader of the analysis department of the Russian Federation president's representative's office in Arkhangelsk Oblast; Arkhangelsk.

Vologda Oblast
1. 21. Smirnov, Sergey Avenirovich, born 1941, chairman of the Vologda City Municipal Property Fund; Vologda.

Kaliningrad Oblast
1. 22. Tulayev, Nikolay Petrovich, born 1954, Baltic Fleet senior staff officer; Kaliningrad.
2. 23. Gordov, Oleg Viktorovich, born 1958, chairman of the Kaliningrad Oblast Branch of the Afghanistan Veterans Union; Kaliningrad.

Murmansk Oblast
1. 24. Manannikov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1948, machine operator; Kirovsk, Murmansk Oblast.

Pskov Oblast

1. 25. Toptygin, Vladimir Borisovich, born 1933, head of the Economic Theory Department of Pskov State Pedagogical Institute; Pskov.

St. Petersburg
1. 26. Molostvov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, born 1933, philosopher, rights activist; Yeremkovo village, Udomelskiy Rayon, Tver Oblast.
2. 27. Tomchin, Grigoriy Alekseyevich, born 1947, director of the Privatization Department and deputy chairman of the St. Petersburg Property Management Committee; St. Petersburg.
3. 28. Soshnikov, Igor Ivanovich, born 1956, cochairman of the Free Democratic Party of Russia; St. Petersburg.
4. 29. Pustyntsev, Boris Pavlovich, born 1935, "Lenfilm" Studios dubbing editor; St. Petersburg.
5. 30. Savitskiy, Vitaliy Viktorovich, born 1955, scientific associate at St. Petersburg State University; Sosnovyy Bor, Leningrad Oblast.
6. 31. Kudrin, Aleksey Leonidovich, born 1960, deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, chief of the City Hall Finance Department; St. Petersburg.
7. 32. Popov, Sergey Anatolyevich, born 1960, president of the St. Petersburg Commercial Banks Association; St. Petersburg.
8. 33. Chernov, Andrey Yuryevich, born 1953, IZVESTIYA own correspondent for St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg.
9. 34. Berman, Vladimir Romanovich, born 1947, politician; St. Petersburg.
10. 35. Gladkov, Yuriy Pavlovich, born 1949, deputy to the St. Petersburg Soviet of People's Deputies; St. Petersburg.
11. 36. Sungurov, Aleksandr Yuryevich, born 1951, chairman of the St. Petersburg Soviet of People's Deputies Science and Higher Education Commission; St. Petersburg.

Leningrad Oblast
1. 37. Ismagilov, Rashid Faatovich, born 1960, president of the Gatchina Chamber of Trade and Industry; Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast.
2. 38. Medoyeva, Zalina Grigoryevna, born 1949, vice president of the Gatchina Chamber of Trade and Industry; Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast.

Karelia Republic
1. 39. Chukhin, Ivan Ivanovich, born 1948, law-enforcement agency staffer; Petrozavodsk.

Komi Republic
1. 40. Zavyalov, Boris Mikhaylovich, born 1949, docent in the Philosophy Department of the Komi Republic State Pedagogical Institute; Syktyvkar.
2. 41. Kuznetsova, Vera Antonovna, born 1947, director of the Komi Republic Business Development and Support Foundation; Syktyvkar.

Central Chernozem Region

Belgorod Oblast
1. 42. Sergeyev, Ivan Vasilyevich, born 1938, professor at the Belgorod Territorial Department of the All-Union Extramural Finance and Economics Institute; Belgorod.
2. 43. Ivanov, Igor Vladimirovich, born 1960, chairman of the Belgorod Construction Materials Technology Institute; Belgorod.

Voronezh Oblast
1. 44. Zastrozhnaya, Olga Kirillovna, born 1944, city [not further specified] soviet of people's deputies deputy chairman, candidate of juridical sciences; Voronezh.
2. 45. Kuznetsov, Boris Sergeyevich, born 1957, scientific associate, candidate of philosophical sciences; Voronezh.
3. 46. Orlanov, Georgiy Borisovich, born 1946, municipal adviser to the Voronezh City Soviet of Deputies; Voronezh.
4. 47. Davydkin, Viktor Alekseyevich, born 1945, Russian Federation president's representative in Voronezh Oblast; Voronezh.

Kursk Oblast
1. 48. Bashmachnikov, Vladimir Fedorovich, born 1937, president of AKKOR [Association of Russian Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives]; Moscow.

Lipetsk Oblast
1. 49. Bezrukov, Vitaliy Fedorovich, born 1945, deputy leader of the Lipetsk Oblast Property Management Committee; Lipetsk.
2. 50. Fabrichnykh, Yuriy Andreyevich, born 1942, chairman of the "Solidarity" Trade Union oblast committee; Lipetsk.

Tambov Oblast
1. 51. Azovtsev, Yuriy Semenovich, born 1946, lawyer; Zherdevka, Tambov Oblast.
2. 52. Muromtsev, Yuriy Leonidovich, born 1934, head of department at the Tambov Chemical Machine-Building Institute, doctor of technical sciences, professor; Tambov.

Volga-Vyatka Region

Kirov Oblast
1. 53. Yurkus, Andrey Ivanovich, born 1949, scientific associate, candidate of technical sciences; Kirov.
2. 54. Pashchenko, Aleksey Vasilyevich, born 1950, deputy chairman of the board of the "Spetsdorstroy" Association; Kirov.
3. 55. Savin, Yegor Ilich, born 1939, director of the Kotelnichi garment factory; Kotelnichi, Kirov Oblast.

Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast
1. 56. Danilov-Danilyan, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1938, Russian Federation minister of environmental protection and natural resources, doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
2. 57. Sukhanov, Aleksandr Ovidiyevich, born 1952, Volga-Vyatka Personnel Center deputy director for scientific work; Nizhniy Novgorod.

3. 58. Zagryadskiy, Yevgeniy Vasilyevich, born 1929, chairman of the Deputies Commission for Science and Industry of the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Nizhniy Novgorod.
4. 59. Nenashev, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, born 1933, deputy to the Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Nizhniy Novgorod.
5. 60. Smirnov, Stanislav Aleksandrovich, born 1950, deputy chairman of the Nizhniy Novgorod Trade Union Organization Committee of the Association of Socialist Trade Unions; Nizhniy Novgorod.
6. 61. Kozlov, Stanislav Nikolayevich, born 1938, Ketovskiy Rayon Administration head of department; Ketovo, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast.

Mari-El Republic
1. 62. Trakhtenberg, Valeriy Simonovich, born 1939, head of the Information Science and Systems Programming Department at the Mariy El Polytechnical Institute, candidate of technical sciences; Yoshkar-Ola.

Chuvash Republic
1. 63. Yarov, Yuriy Fedorovich, born 1942, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Government; Moscow.

Far East

Amur Oblast
1. 64. Malyshev, Boris Sergeyevich, born 1936, chairman of the Tynda City Soviet of People's Deputies; Tynda, Amur Oblast.

Kamchatka Oblast
1. 65. Veykhman, Vladimir Veniaminovich, born 1934, chairman of the Kamchatka Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Standing Commission on Culture, Public Education, and Science, candidate of technical sciences; Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy.

Magadan Oblast
1. 66. Levin, Boris Samuilovich, born 1940, deputy to the Magadan Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Magadan.

Maritime Kray
1. 67. Sovasteyev, Vitaliy Vladimirovich, born 1947, docent in the General History Department of the Far East State University, candidate of historical sciences; Vladivostok.
2. 68. Ksenzuk, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, born 1947, general director of a joint-stock company; Vladivostok.

Jewish Autonomous Oblast
1. 69. Vayserman, Motya Isaakovich, born 1938, secondary school director; Birobidzhan.

Urals

Perm Oblast
1. 70. Tatarchuk, Valentin Ivanovich, born 1937, vice president of the "Russian Timber Industrialists" Joint-Stock Corporation; Moscow.
2. 71. Pokhmelkin, Viktor Valeryevich, born 1960, scientific leader of a private legal policy research institute; Perm.
3. 72. Gelfenbuym, Boris Viktorovich, born 1949, manager of the Chusovoy regional branch of the Permkombank; Chusovoy, Perm Oblast.
4. 73. Zimov, Valeriy Nikolayevich, born 1947, oil and gas extraction administration chief engineer in Osa city; Osa, Perm Oblast.
5. 74. Volchek, Grigoriy Arkadyevich, born 1967, president of the Perm television and radio company T-7; Perm.
6. 75. Bykov, Vladimir Nikiforovich, born 1933, professor at Perm State University, doctor of geological and mineral sciences; Perm.

Sverdlovsk Oblast
1. 76. Aulov, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1952, personnel center staffer, candidate of philosophical sciences; Yekaterinburg.
2. 77. Ivanov, Sergey Nikolayevich, born 1951, lawyer, candidate of juridical sciences; Moscow.
3. 78. Matrosov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1936, chairman of a committee of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Yekaterinburg.
4. 79. Mishustina, Larisa Pavlovna, born 1949, chairman of a commission of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Yekaterinburg.
5. 80. Karelova, Galina Nikolayevna, born 1950, deputy chairman of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Yekaterinburg.
6. 81. Popov, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1949, docent at the Ural Technical University, candidate of philosophical sciences; Yekaterinburg.
7. 82. Alekseyev, Valeriy Dmitriyevich, born 1961, chief economist of the "Vita" joint-stock company; Yekaterinburg.
8. 83. Kuzmin, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1953, docent at the Ural Technical University, candidate of economic sciences; Yekaterinburg.
9. 84. Malygin, Sergey Fedorovich, born 1953, chairman of the Education Commission of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies; Yekaterinburg.
10. 85. Yachevskiy, Stanislav Valeryanovich, born 1942, chairman of a commission of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet of People's deputies; Yekaterinburg.

Chelyabinsk Oblast
1. 86. Pochinok, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1958, Russian Federation deputy minister of finance; Moscow.
2. 87. Golovlev, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1957, chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Property Management Committee; Chelyabinsk.
3. 88. Zaslavskiy, Ilya Iosifovich, born 1960, chairman of the Moscow Government Council of Experts; Moscow.
4. 89. Alekseyev, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, born 1949, consultant at the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration Auditing Office; Chelyabinsk.

5. 90. Kushnar, Aleksandr Leonidovich, born 1954, president of the Ural Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs; Chelyabinsk.
6. 91. Mizrakhi, Boris Aleksandrovich, born 1950, chairman of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration Coordinating Council for Questions of Intraregional Policy, Public Relations, and the Mass Media; Chelyabinsk.

Kurgan Oblast
1. 92. Bitkov, Sergey Semenovich, born 1953, engineer-designer, labor collective council chairman; Kurgan.

Orenburg Oblast
1. 93. Nuzhdina, Larisa Aleksandrovna, born 1941, correspondent for the All-Russia Television and Radio Company; Orenburg.
2. 94. Solobutov, Mikhail Nikanorovich, born 1940, president of the city organization of the "Solidarity" trade union; Orenburg.
3. 95. Romanov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1952, crew commander, airman; Orenburg.

Udmurt Republic
1. 96. Podoprigora, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1954, leader of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly apparatus; Mozhga.
2. 97. Lopatin, Aleksandr Konstantinovich, born 1953, chairman of the board of the Udmurt International Division of the "Strategiya" Center; Varaksino settlement, Zavyalovskiy Rayon, Udmurt Republic.
3. 98. Kryukova, Svetlana Borisovna, born 1952, section chief on the newspaper IZVESTIYA UDMURTSKOY RESPUBLIKI; Izhevsk.

West Siberia

Kemerovo Oblast
1. 99. Denisenko, Bela Anatolyevna, born 1941, laboratory chief at the Institute of Economics of the Transitional Period, doctor of medical sciences, professor; Moscow.
2. 100. Zbronzhko, Igor Vladimirovich, born 1958, senior editor at the Kemerovo Television Studio; Kemerovo.
3. 101. Ivanov, Vadim Vasilyevich, born 1948, docent at the Kuzbass Polytechnical Institute, candidate of technical sciences; Kemerovo.
4. 102. Myasnikov, Valeriy Sergeyevich, born 1961, scientific associate at the Institute of Economics of the Transitional Period; Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast.

Novosibirsk Oblast
1. 103. Saltykov, Boris Georgiyevich, born 1940, Russian Federation minister of science, candidate of economic sciences; Moscow.
2. 104. Sychev, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, born 1951, deputy chief of the territorial administration of the Russian Federation Committee for Antimonopoly Policy; Novosibirsk.
3. 105. Krasnikov, Nikolay Grigoryevich, born 1955, head of administration of the Koltsovo science campus in Novosibirsk Oblast; Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Oblast.

Omsk Oblast
1. 106. Minzhurenko, Aleksandr Vasilyevich, born 1946, Russian Federation president's representative in Omsk Oblast, candidate of historical sciences; Omsk.
2. 107. Tyulkov, Boris Vasilyevich, born 1936, member of the Omsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Inner Soviet; Omsk.
3. 108. Artemyev, Viktor Nikolayevich, born 1947, director of the Omsk Republican Medical College, candidate of medical sciences; Omsk.

Tyumen Oblast
1. 109. Grishkevich, Vladimir Filippovich, born 1950, laboratory chief at the West Siberian Hydrometeorological Research Institute, candidate of geological and mineral sciences; Tyumen.
2. 110. Ramazanov, Salikh Musayevich, born 1958, property fund chairman; Yalutorovsk, Tyumen Oblast.

Tomsk Oblast
1. 111. Sulakshin, Stepan Stepanovich, born 1954, Russian Federation president's representative in Tomsk Oblast, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences; Tomsk.
2. 112. Bauer, Vladimir Anatolyevich, born 1946, Tomsk Oblast Administration deputy head; Tomsk.

Altay Kray
1. 113. Ryzhkov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, born 1966, Altay Kray Administration secretary; Barnaul.
2. 114. Starkov, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1955, chief physician at the kray cardiology center, doctor of medical sciences; Barnaul.
3. 115. Bavarin, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1936, Barnaul City Administration head; Barnaul;

Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug
1. 116. Aypin, Yeremey Danilovich, born 1948, Russian Federation president's representative in Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug; Khanty-Mansiysk.
2. 117. Gilev, Aleksandr Petrovich, born 1963, entrepreneur; Surgut, Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug.

East Siberia

Irkutsk Oblast
1. 118. Alekseyev, Gennadiy Alekseyevich, born 1945, expert-specialist for the Russian Federation President's Administration; Irkutsk.
2. 119. Kalininchenko, Igor Vasilyevich, born 1959, economist; Irkutsk.

Chita Oblast
1. 120. Kuznetsov, Oleg Vladimirovich, born 1964, expert-specialist on the apparatus of the Russian Federation president's representative in Chita Oblast; Chita.

Krasnoyarsk Kray and Republic of Khakasia
1. 121. Tetelmin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, born 1944, corresponding member of the Russian Engineering Academy, professor at the Krasnoyarsk Engineering Construction Institute; Krasnoyarsk.

2. 122. Mityukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich, born 1942, chairman of the Legislative Proposals Commission under the Russian Federation president; Abakan.
3. 123. Grudin, Yuriy Grigoryevich, born 1945, chief of Sverdlovskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Section, Krasnoyarsk, lawyer and legal expert; Krasnoyarsk.
4. 124. Popov, Anatoliy Viktorovich, born 1950, first deputy head of the oblast administration [as published]; Norilsk.
5. 125. Veprev, Arkadiy Filimonovich, born 1927, agronomist; Stepnoye village, Nazarovskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Kray.

Republic of Buryatia
1. 126. Mantatov, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich, born 1945, leader of the ecological-humanitarian center, president of the Baykal Foundation, doctor of philosophical Sciences, professor, academician of the International Academy of Information Science; Ulan-Ude.
2. 127. Pshenichnikova, Raisa Ivanovna, born 1945, pro-rector of the East Siberian Institute of Culture, candidate of pedagogical sciences, docent; Ulan-Ude.

Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
1. 128. Yefremov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1948, scientific worker; Yakutsk.
2. 129. Zalevskaya, Tatyana Nikolayevna, born 1947, lawyer; Yakutsk.

North Caucasus

Rostov Oblast
1. 130. Titenko, Boris Mikhaylovich, born 1954, chairman of the Rostov Regional Organization of the Russian Federation Republican Party, candidate of medical sciences; Rostov-na-Donu.
2. 131. Yemelyanov, Mikhail Vasilyevich, born 1962, docent at Rostov University Law Faculty, candidate of juridical sciences; Rostov-na-Donu.
3. 132. Zmeyev, Viktor Borisovich, born 1959, chairman of the Novocherkassk City branch of the Union of Afghanistan Veterans; Novocherkassk.
4. 133. Poddubnyy, Anatoliy Ivanovich, born 1937, engineer; Rostov-na-Donu.
5. 134. Kulikov, Aleksandr Ivanovich, born 1947, chief of the Rostov Oblast Administration personnel section; Rostov-na-Donu.

Krasnodar Kray
1. 135. Gritsan, Vladimir Vasilyevich, born 1937, chief of the legal center of the Kuban branch of AKKOR; Krasnodar.
2. 136. Nekhay, Vyacheslav Nurovich, born 1950, president of the "MNL" company; Kavkazskaya village, Krasnodar Kray.
3. 137. Komlatskiy, Vasiliy Ivanovich, born 1949, faculty chief at the Kuban Agrarian University, doctor of agricultural sciences; Krasnodar.
4. 138. Sudakov, Valeriy Pavlovich, born 1939, director of the "Aramis" individual private enterprise; Krasnodar.
5. 139. Pavlovskaya, Tatyana Nikolayevna, born 1952, editor at the "Kuban" television and radio company; Krasnodar.

Stavropol Kray
1. 140. Gevorkov, Vladimir Georgiyevich, born 1952, attorneys' legal advice bureau chief; Mineralnyye Vody.
2. 141. Popov, Sergey Ivanovich, born 1954, deputy director of the social problems department and chief of the section for interethnic relations and liaison with public organizations of Stavropolskiy Kray Administration; Stavropol.
3. 142. Titovskiy, Gennadiy Aleksandrovich, born 1948, economist; Novosilyevskoye village, Stavropol Kray.
4. 143. Mertsalov, Viktor Leonidovich, born 1950, chairman of the territorial agency of the State Committee for the Management of State Property, candidate of philosophical sciences; Pyatigorsk.

Republic of Adygea
1. 144. Sopov, Aleksandr Valentinovich, born 1962, research student at the Adygea State University History Faculty; Maykop.

Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic
1. 145. Malykhin, Vladimir Ivanovich, born 1958, chief economist at the Russian Federation Central Bank Main Administration for the Karachayevo-Cherkess Republic; Cherkessk.

North Ossetian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]
1. 146. Yenaldiyev, Konstantin Dmitriyevich, born 1957, deputy director of the Vladikavkaz "Vtortsvetmet" Enterprise joint-stock company; Vladikavkaz.

Kabardino-Balkar Republic
1. 147. Bolov, Vladislav Ramazanovich, born 1949, director of the "Antistikhiya" science and production center of the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control, doctor of geographical sciences; Nalchik.

Volga Region

Astrakhan Oblast
1. 148. Surkov, Aleksey Porfiryevich, born 1943, deputy chief of administration at the Russian Federation President's Administration, lawyer and legal expert; Moscow.

Volgograd Oblast
1. 149. Kuznetsov, Yevgeniy Stepanovich, born 1944, Russian Federation president's representative in Volgograd Oblast; Volgograd.
2. 150. Yushchenko, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, born 1938, Volgograd Administration first deputy head; Volgograd.
3. 151. Umetskaya, Svetlana Ivanovna, born 1940, member of the Legislative Proposals Commission under the Russian Federation president; Volgograd.

Penza Oblast

1. 152. Markin, Valeriy Anatolyevich, born 1957, financial director of the "Delta Tsentr" joint-stock company; Penza.

2. 153. Bezmenov, Vasiliy Vladimirovich, born 1954, deputy chairman of the Penza Oblast Union of Afghanistan Veterans; Penza.

Samara Oblast

1. 154. Fedorov, Anton Yuryevich, born 1961, deputy chief of administration of the Russian Federation President's Administration; Moscow.

2. 155. Feygin, Mark Zakharovich, born 1971, chairman of the Samara Russian Solidarity Club, lawyer; Samara.

3. 156. Kutuzov, Georgiy Petrovich, born 1961, chief of the economic analysis department of the Samara City Property Management Committee; Samara.

Saratov Oblast

1. 157. Yuzhakov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, born 1951, rector of the Volga Personnel Center, doctor of philosophical sciences; Saratov.

2. 158. Motornyy, Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, born 1947, president of the "Slaviya" insurance company; Saratov.

3. 159. Markov, Viktor Konstantinovich, born 1958, deputy chairman of the Saratov Oblast Property Fund; Saratov.

4. 160. Leyman, Nikolay Leontyevich, born 1953, candidate of technical sciences, general director of the "Nadezhda" commercial economic association; Saratov.

Ulyanovsk Oblast

1. 161. Bagdasarova, Alla Grigoryevna, born 1939, editor of the newspaper SIMBIRSKIY KURYER; Ulyanovsk.

Republic of Kalmykia

1. 162. Nasunov, Aleksandr Borisovich, born 1951, historian, candidate of historical sciences; Elista.

Republic of Tatarstan

1. 163. Galyautdinov, Damir Gilmutdinovich, born 1939, city soviet deputy; Kazan.

2. 164. Shtanin, Aleksandr Vasilyevich; born 1942, docent at Kazan University, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences; Kazan.

3. 165. Mikhaylov, Valentin Vakhtangovich, born 1944, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences, deputy of the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet; Kazan.

4. 166. Martynov, Gennadiy Alekseyevich, born 1939, chairman of the Coordinating Council of Democratic Forces of Tatarstan; Kazan.

Central Region

Bryansk Oblast

1. 167. Belyshev, Stanislav Valentinovich, born 1962, leading specialist at the Russian Federation president's representative's office in Bryansk Oblast; Bryansk.

Vladimir Oblast

1. 168. Bragin, Vyacheslav Ivanovich, born 1939, chairman of the "Ostankino" Russian State Television and Radio Company, candidate of historical sciences; Moscow.

Ivanovo Oblast

1. 169. Zadonskiy, Georgiy Ivanovich, born 1940, administration chief at the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences; Moscow.

2. 170. Zelenkin, Viktor Vasilyevich, born 1947, chairman of Ivanovo City Soviet of People's Deputies; Ivanovo.

Kaluga Oblast

1. 171. Timofeyev, Lev Mikhaylovich, born 1936, journalist; Moscow.

Kostroma Oblast

1. 172. Isayev, Nikolay Viktorovich, born 1956, chairman of the Kostroma Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies Standing Commission on Economic Reform and Planning and Budget Questions; Kostroma.

Moscow

1. 173. Selyunin, Vasiliy Illarionovich, born 1927, economist, journalist, writer; Moscow.

2. 174. Vorontsov, Nikolay Nikolayevich, born 1934, chief scientific associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences Koltsov Institute of Developmental Biology, doctor of biological sciences, professor, vice president of the Academy of Natural Sciences; Moscow.

3. 175. Nuykin, Andrey Aleksandrovich, born 1931, deputy director for science at the Cinema Art Research Institute, journalist, candidate of art studies; Moscow.

4. 176. Ignatyev, Kirill Borisovich, born 1966, first deputy company chairman and leader of the administration of the "Ostankino" Russian State Television and Radio Company; Moscow.

5. 177. Ponomarev, Lev Aleksandrovich, born 1941, chairman of the board of the "Economic Initiatives Foundation," doctor of physico-mathematical sciences; Moscow.

6. 178. Radzikhovskiy, Leonid Aleksandrovich, born 1953, journalist, candidate of psychological sciences; Moscow.

7. 179. Nisnevich, Yuliy Anatolyevich, born 1951, scientifc associate, deputy general director for information science at the "Litsom k Litsu" joint venture; Moscow.

8. 180. Dashkevich, Vladimir Sergeyevich, born 1934, composer, president of the International Association of Composers' Organizations; Moscow.

9. 181. Andreyeva, Iren Aleksandrovna, born 1933, art historian; Moscow.

10. 182. Oskotskiy, Valentin Dmitriyevich, born 1931, writer, secretary of the executive committee of the Association of Writers' Unions, candidate of philological sciences, docent at Moscow State University; Moscow.

11. 183. Truyevtsev, Konstantin Mikhaylovich, born 1943, scientific associate; Moscow.

12. 184. Kalugin, Oleg Danilovich, born 1934, expert consultant at the Information Service Agency; Moscow.

13. 185. Usov, Aleksandr Arsenyevich, born 1929, rear admiral, retired; Moscow.
14. 186. Orlikovskiy, Gleb Aleksandrovich, born 1960, president of a consulting firm; Moscow.
15. 187. Suvorova, Ksana Aleksandrovna, born 1938, engineer and programmer; Moscow.

Moscow Oblast
1. 188. Yakunin, Gleb Pavlovich, born 1934, priest; Moscow.
2. 189. Shabad, Anatoliy Yefimovich, born 1939, senior scientific associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences, doctor of physico-mathematical sciences; Moscow.
3. 190. Belogurov, Andrey Alekseyevich, born 1952, head of the Bolshiye Vyazemi Rural Administration; Malyye Vyazemi, Odintsovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
4. 191. Novikov, Oleg Ivanovich, born 1941, chief of the Moscow Antimonopoly Administration; doctor of economic sciences; Moscow.
5. 192. Luchin, Viktor Aleksandrovich, born 1943, scientific associate; Staraya Kupavna settlement, Noginskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
6. 193. Yeltsov, Yuriy Aleksandrovich, born 1939, member of the Legislative Proposals Commission under the Russian Federation president; Ramenskoye, Moscow Oblast.
7. 194. Vaydin, Sergey Aleksandrovich, born 1944, manager; Odintsovo, Moscow Oblast.
8. 195. Shalyganov, Dmitriy Yuryevich, born 1968, general director of the "Konsul" joint-stock company; Nakhabino, Moscow Oblast.
9. 196. Lintsov, Aleksey Vasilyevich, born 1959, chairman of the council of the "Prima-bank" commercial bank; Krasnogorsk-5, Moscow Oblast.
10. 197. Astashchenko, Aleksandr Moiseyevich, born 1940, head of laboratory at an agricultural research institute, doctor of agricultural sciences; Nemchinovka settlement, Odintsovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
11. 198. Chirkov, Gennadiy Petrovich, born 1937, candidate of biological sciences, Noginsk City Administration first deputy head; Chernogolovka settlement, Noginskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast.
12. 199. Obukhov, Igor Andreyevich, born 1955, general director of the "Lido" joint-stock company; Zvenigorod, Moscow Oblast.
13. 200. Aleksakhin, Yuriy Ivanovich, born 1948, scientific worker, candidate of physico-mathematical sciences; Dubna, Moscow Oblast.

Orel Oblast
1. 201. Galinina, Nadezhda Alekseyevna, born 1945, deputy mayor of Orel and chairman of the Orel City Property Management Committee; Orel.

Ryazan Oblast
1. 202. Sheroziya, Georgiy Arkadyevich, born 1953, scientific worker, doctor of technical sciences; Ryazan.

Smolensk Oblast
1. 203. Novikov, Sergey Vitalyevich, born 1954, journalist and chief editor of the newspaper SMORENSKIYE [as published] NOVOSTI; Smolensk.

Tver Oblast
1. 204. Belov, Viktor Ivanovich, born 1940, lawyer, Russian Federation president's representative in Tver Oblast; Tver.

Tula Oblast
1. 205. Sidorov, Yevgeniy Yuryevich, born 1940, Russian Federation minister of culture; Moscow.
2. 206. Pashchenko, Eduard Aleksandrovich, born 1939, Tula Universal Stock Exchange administrator and economic adviser to the Tula Oblast Administration head, candidate of economic sciences; Tula.
3. 207. Matveyev, Nikolay Aleksandrovich, born 1949, specialist in the apparatus of the Russian Federation president's representative in Tula Oblast; Tula.
4. 208. Gubarev, Valentin Vladimirovich, born 1945, deputy head of the Leninskiy Rayon Administration, Tula Oblast, economist; Khrushchevo village, Tula Oblast.

Yaroslavl Oblast
1. 209. Generalov, Andrey Ivanovich, born 1964, chamber of commerce and industry president; Tutayev, Yaroslavl Oblast.
2. 210. Surkov, Boris Aleksandrovich, born 1947, assistant to the Russian Federation president's representative in Yaroslavl Oblast; Uglich, Yaroslavl Oblast.
3. 211. Markovin, Yuriy Borisovich, born 1929, chairman of the Yaroslavl branch of the "Memorial" society; Yaroslavl.

Parties To Pool Efforts on Assembly Function Documents

LD1511213293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1956 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Representatives of 9 parties and election blocs, out of the 13 left in the race for the State Duma, have decided to combine their efforts in working out documents on the functioning of the future Federal Assembly. The agreement was reached at a meeting initiated by Russia's Choice bloc in Moscow today. The bloc proposed setting up a competent commission to develop and agree on the principles of the Federal Assembly's efficient work.

The Federal Assembly's press office told INTERFAX that the meeting was attended by the Communist Party of Russia, Women of Russia movement, Russia's Future—New Names association, Cedar ecological movement, Agrarian Party of Russia, Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Dignity and Charity association and Russian Movement for Democratic Reform.

The meeting decided to set up three working groups composed of representatives of each organization. One of them will develop the concept, program and procedures for both chambers of the future parliament. Another one will handle matters related to its legislative activities. The last one will define the principles of the forming and functioning of Russia's government.

According to the agreement, the three groups will hold a joint plenary meeting in the Social and Political Center in Moscow on Thursday.

The Democratic Party of Russia, Civic Accord In The Name Of Stability, Unity and Progress association, Party of Russian Unity and Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc failed to take part in the meeting. Though, the Democratic Party of Russia sent in a list of its representatives to the working groups, one to each group.

Communists Seen Incapable of Rallying Opposition

MK1611121993 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 79, 16 Nov 93 (Signed to press 15 Nov) p 2

[Report by Dmitriy Kuznets, under the "Elections" rubric: "The Russian Opposition: Liquidationists and Rejectionists. There Will Not Be Enough Deprived People To Vote for Everyone"]

[Text] Gennadiy Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Federation Communist Party [RFCP], has been repeating several times a week as a mantra: "Let each communist and patriot turn out for the elections, and then..." Then he offers variations on the theme of the opposition's assured success: "Yeltsin's" constitution will "fall through," the democrats will fail to win a majority in the parliament, and so forth. What is needed is that every single voter should turn out to cast his or her vote.

Despite obvious exaggerations, the RFCP leader indeed hopes to "garner" votes of the entire opposition electorate. The fact is that the "deprived proletarians" have no one else to vote for. Only the agrarians could compete with the RFCP, but there again only in rural districts. Mr. Zyuganov, however, is not intent on combating them at all: The communists are willing to "share" votes with their "comrades in the struggle against the bourgeois dictatorship."

Apparently, the latest metamorphoses in the opposition camp must have disappointed Mr. Zyuganov. The "rightist left-wing" movement, which was torn apart by contradictions even earlier, has burst at all its seams on the eve of the elections. The split among "national statists" over the "crucial issue"—the attitude to the communists—proved to be the "patriots'" undoing long before 12 December. Nationalist leaders have managed to convince their supporters of the insurmountability of the differences. Each "patriot" has presently chosen one dwarfish party. Naturally, none of them collected the requisite 100,000 signatures. Viktor Aksyuchits, leader of the "Christian Democrats," explained that had all the national statists campaigned as a single bloc, they would have lost whatever support they might have. "Our supporters would never have voted for Baburin," Mr. Aksyuchits said. It is Baburin's "Russian All-People's Union" [RAU], however, that stands closest to the RFCP. Gennadiy Zyuganov is ready to help RAU candidates in one-mandate districts in the hope that in response, Sergey Baburin will "give orders" to vote for the RFCP list. The other "patriots," although they "do not have objections against Zyuganov personally," disdain his "overly communist companions." Even among RAU members not everyone is a Communist Party supporter. The communists' only trump card in the contest for this part of the electorate—the stance of their leader, who has long been trying "to impart" an air of nationalism to his party—may backfire in the communists' own campaign for "the mass turnout for the elections." Which is what Gennadiy Zyuganov fears most.

The RFCP—by far the largest among numerous communist parties—may fail "to garner" the votes of the communists who would choose to heed the call by the radicals from the "red" organizations banned by President Yeltsin's edict and refuse to come to the ballot boxes.

The Russian Communist Workers Party [RCWP] under the "imprisoned" Anpilov and other extremists, who have never favored Zyuganov, currently accuse him of appeasement and call him a "social democrat," a nickname insulting for a communist. In their view, by taking part in the voting the opposition would legitimize "Yeltsin's elections." Advocates of a "boycott," whose stance is similar to that of the rejectionists [otzovisty] who recalled the deputies from the first Duma [1905], emerged even among RFCP members. All the more so because many rank-and-file communists share the RCWP's radical ideas.

Apparently, the communists' hopes and the "democrats'" fears regarding the creation of "a formidable opposition front" on the basis of the RFCP are groundless. Opponents of the government course are presently even more divided than government members themselves.

Gennadiy Zyuganov is unlikely to persuade the "radicals" to give their backing to the RFCP in the elections, nor will he be able to reach his own voters' ears. In his words, the communists find the mass media inaccessible. However, the Communist Party leader places his hopes on a "human-chain mail service"—"the campaigning will be done from person to person." Regardless of transportation costs.

Civic Union Seeks Way To Lobby Parliament

LD1611112493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1033 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow November 16 TASS—"The civic Union Electoral Bloc has joined the election campaign in order to have a channel for "parliamentary lobbying" of interests of domestic industrialists and entrepreneurs," said president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Arkadiy Volskiy at a congress of the union on Tuesday.

Volskiy said that the future parliament should consist of professional law-makers who constitute more than half of candidates put on list of candidates running for parliament from the Civic Union. Volskiy pointed out that only 19 per cent of the Civic Union candidates are Muscovites.

According to the leader of the Civic Union, 86 candidates from his electoral bloc will be put on ballot from one-mandate constituencies, while the total number of electors' signatures collected in favour of the Civic Union reached 214,000.

Volskiy welcomed a decision adopted by a group of industrial ministers not to run for elections to the new parliament.

The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE) led by Volskiy has a membership of 2,800 and includes almost 1,900 enterprises of different kinds of property.

The RUIE has representatives from 57 public associations and unions of entrepreneurs, 44 banks, stock exchanges and insurance companies.

Taking part in the RUIE are over 50 foreign businessmen, including from major influential associations of foreign entrepreneurs from industrially developed countries.

'Yabloko' Loyalists Seen Influential in Foreign Ministry

MK1611092093 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Mikhail Shchipanov report under the "Behind the Scenes" rubric: "Diplomats on the Run"]

[Text] Little by little, the Russian Foreign Ministry is becoming an apple [yabloko, also a slang acronym for the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin and company" political bloc] of interparty discord. Career diplomats have been active as never before as their internationally resounding names adorn lists of various electoral blocs.

Basically, candidates with diplomatic ranks have split into two camps. Minister Kozyrev, who was the first to call on the president to sit in the Kremlin until his tenure expires, is running on the "Russia's Choice" list, while Vladimir Lukin, Russian ambassador to the United States and Kozyrev's indirect opponent of liberal-patriotic hues, heads the "Yabloko" bloc together with Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. Relations between Kozyrev and Lukin can be described by what the French paradoxically call "a love-hate relationship." Andrey Kozyrev, who was in fact Lukin's appointee when the latter was chairman of the Supreme Soviet Foreign Affairs Committee, found Lukin's heavy, commanding hand too burdensome as early as the summer of 1991; this is why he could not but feel relieved at Lukin's appointment as ambassador to the United States. Lukin, however, has retained true to himself even away in the United States.

The situation was made even more poignant by the fact that next to Lukin is Kozyrev's first deputy, Anatoliy Adamishin, a professional with a formidable reputation, who has effectively made public his special relationship with the minister's most prominent opponent. It does not appear to have been a coincidence that Kozyrev's new deputy, Krylov, who was given broad powers, including on personnel matters, is seen by many observers as an urgent counterbalance to Adamishin's clout at the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, in company with Lukin and Adamishin there is Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, another influential diplomat who was tipped to become but never appointed Russian ambassador to Rome. Hence, drawing on the most visible "foreign policy core," "Yabloko" will undoubtedly lay its claims to the Foreign Ministry. Of course, in proportion to its success in the elections. This is why in certain circumstances the skyscraper on Smolenskaya Square may become small change in the bargaining between "Russia's Choice" and the "Yavlinskiy-Lukin Bloc," to which Kozyrev may find himself a hostage.

'New Names' Bloc Seeks Support of Youths

MK1611120093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No 79, 16 Nov 93 (Signed to press 15 Nov) p 3

[Gleb Cherkasov report in the "Youth" column: "'New Names' Consider Themselves Centrists and Want 'People To Live Without Fear and To Be Comfortably Off'"]

[Text] At the end of last week the first news conference of the "Future of Russia—New Names" electoral association, created on the foundations of the Youth Movement in Support of the New Russia People's Party [NPSR], the Civic Union political and economic association, and the Russian Youth Union [RYU], was held in Moscow. The association has managed to raise the requisite number of signatures to include its slate of candidates into the federal-wide election district list, bypassing more renowned competitors. The New Names list is headed by RYU leader Vyacheslav Lashchevskiy, NPSR's youth wing representative Oleg Sokolov, and Institute of Politics Director Vladimir Mironov. In addition to these, the New Names include businessmen, in particular Gazprom representatives, and RYU functionaries; also Mr. Ivanenko, former chairman of the Russian KGB; and Irina Vinogradova, a "normal Russian woman"—former Russian deputy and leader of the NPSR faction in the Supreme Soviet included in the list on the insistence of the Novosibirsk-based organization NPSR Youth [Molodezh NPSR]. According to assurances by the press conference organizers, the candidates are "people who have already accomplished practical results in production, entrepreneurship, science, and politics." The association is contesting the elections under the slogan "To live in one's own country without fear, comfortably well-off, and being proud of Russia" and it hopes to poll approximately 10 percent of the vote, counting on the votes of the youth and "those who do not believe anyone."

The bloc's participants stated that they have proposed to Civic Union, PRES [Party of Russian Unity and Accord], the Fatherland [Otechestvo] bloc, and also other associations to create a broad- based centrist election coalition. But "owing to the excessive ambitions of certain leaders," the initiative has failed, although, according to Mr. Lashchevskiy, the disagreements over the program were "small change" ["kopeyechnyye"]. Therefore, in spite of the tempting proposals being made to New Names, it has decided to contest the elections on its own.

According to Vyacheslav Lashchevskiy, the elections will have meaning only if "new people" come to parliament who were not involved in the internecine struggle which ended in the 3-4 October tragedy. "The more of our people get into parliament, the better." New Names intends to take up a centrist position in the State Duma and contribute to a "wide application of the practice of coordinating the interests of various social groups and regions." A potential affiliation of Civic Union, Shakhray's party, and the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc was deemed the best possible coalition for the association to join.

The New Names program is based on the recognition of the supremacy of the "rights, freedoms, and life values of the individual and society over the state." To this end, according to the program authors, it is necessary to "restore civil peace, make the state secure for society," create a "market economy in the interests of the wide strata of society based on its own economic potential," and to define a foreign political doctrine "with strict consideration for Russia's national and state interests." The association favors the formation of an effectively functioning, truly federative democratic state, the strengthening of its positions in the economic sphere, and raising the prestige of the army in the process of converting to a mixed contract and draft system of meeting its manpower needs. With the aim of ensuring "a better patriotic indoctrination," bloc leader Mr. Lashchevskiy said it was important to organize RYU chapters in military units. It is not known whether the army leadership is ready for this.

It is not entirely clear how attractive the New Names' "centrism," compiled from the programs of groups that earlier aspired to the role of a political center, will be to the bloc's supposed electorate. Rather, the electoral association's leaders should be counting on a positive reaction from citizens who have reached the age of 18 by putting forward openly populist slogans of the "easy living" kind.

Candidates Air Views in TV Election Program

LD1511230993

[Editorial report] Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1847 GMT on 15 November carries an unscheduled 31-minute program entitled "For the Voter," preceded by a brief explanation of the rules for televised party political broadcasts. The announcer says that members of the Central Electoral Commission and arbitration court monitor such programs to make sure they conform to regulations on equal opportunities and to current law. Such programs are in accordance with Boris Yeltsin's edict relating to information accessibility, which, the announcer says, allows blocs air time on state television as well as commercial air time.

The first two candidates to speak represent the bloc Russia's Future—New Names. Aleksandr Pyzhikov, captioned as a historian, says that the people in his bloc do not want to be involved in the two political camps which fought at the White House on 3-4 October. Many of them are students and post-graduates. The second speaker, Vyacheslav Lashchevskiy, captioned as leader of the Russian Union of Youth, talks of the need for new people in politics, especially young people. They should be allowed a place in the national economy, he says, so that Russia will no longer have to beg from abroad.

The announcer then introduces two candidates of the next pre- election bloc—Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress. The bloc's main support is from people working in the production sphere, according to Aleksandr Vladislavlev, captioned as professor and doctor of science. His party is tired of seeing educated people unable to live on their salaries. The bloc wants to see economic links with former Soviet republics restored, and regards Gaydar's Russia's Choice bloc as being at the opposite pole to itself. Vladimir Chernavin, captioned as fleet admiral, then criticizes as "detrimental" the policy of demilitarization, which Russia's Choice supports. If you take into account Russia's wealth of natural resources and mammoth defense potential, Chernavin says, "you cannot rule out the possibility that certain forces in the world might decide to live off someone else or to grab what is not being looked after or protected properly." The state of Russia's military-industrial complex determines the level of industrial development in the country, and Russia's military industry as formerly of world standard, Chernavin says. Vladivlaslev calls for better conditions for servicemen.

Ostankino To Carry Results Throughout 12 Dec

LD1611131193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1123 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] The Board of Directors of the All-Russia State TV and Radio Company Ostankino is planning to inform of the preliminary results of voting during the night of December 12.

The program will involve representatives of the Central Electoral Commission, and the Federal Information Center, and will be prepared by the Central Electoral Commission, the Federal Information Center, the TV-Neva company, the Rezonans studios and Russian and foreign experts.

Finance Oversight Commission Not Ready

MK1611090093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Dmitriy Kamin: "Financing of Electoral Campaign. Central Electoral Commission Will Keep Tabs on Spending"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] In line with the president's directive of 9 November, today marks the end of the period within which the Central Electoral Commission was supposed to approve the status of the Inspection and Control Service (ICS) and its composition. The ICS is supposed to investigate instances of violations in transferring and spending of funds accumulated in special accounts of electoral associations and individual candidates and designated for financing the electoral campaign. KOMMERSANT-DAILY, however, knows of no such account having been opened to date.

The need for the ICS is being explained at the official level by the wish of the president to rule out possible financial violations and abuses in the course of elections, and to lend the electoral campaign a more civilized appearance. The ICS will be made up of staffers of a number of Russian ministries and agencies: The Finance Ministry, the State Taxation Service, the Security Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been instructed to provide three specialists each. The new service will be headed by a Central Electoral Commission member. According to information available to KOMMERSANT-DAILY, the ICS will be led by Valeriy Bagin, an aide to the Tyumen Oblast administration head; his job on the Central Electoral Commission is the provision of finances for the elections and the drafting of normative base for the forming of the ICS.

Talking with your KOMMERSANT-DAILY reporter, Mr. Bagin did not voice any wish to become head of the ICS, and commented on the very fact that it is being created and on the principles that will form the basis of its operation. The service is not supposed to work on a fixed schedule. It will go into action on complaints coming to the ICS about violations of established election financing rules. Groups made up of specialists of financial and law and order organs will check on electoral associations' special accounts.

Bagin believes that the high status (not below that of a deputy minister) of the state structure's representatives will enable the ICS to "effectively solve the assigned tasks." He is convinced, however, that the service should react only to well-documented complaints and to limit their probes to the facts described in the documents.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY experts note that this restraint in the operation of the ICS comes from ill-defined legal standards. Not a single electoral association has been able to secure official status for their electoral fund to date because the Central Electoral Commission instructions on the opening of special accounts for financing the elections (the principle object of ICS attention) were only coordinated with the Finance Ministry, Central Bank, and Justice Ministry at the end of last week.

Electoral Official Explains Funding Provisions

LD1611130693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1100 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Each of the 13 electoral associations havaing the right to be included in the federation-wide lists for the elections will receive 50 million rubles from the state. This figure was announced by Valeriy Bagin, member of the Central Electoral Commission reponsible for financing the elections. At the same time, he expressed puzzlement over the fact that authorized representatives from some electoral associations, whose federation-wide lists have been registered with the Central Electoral Commission, are for some reason not hurrying to get permission to open a current account and are obviously relying on powerful financial support from other sources.

He recalled that according to the provisions for the elections, all money coming to the funds of the electoral associations or people standing as candidates for the post of deputy are credited to this account alone and not to any other bank current account, since once the elections are over they have to account for their expenditure.

Residents in Lithuania To Vote in 12 Dec Elections

LD1511234893 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1900 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Russian citizens resident in Lithuania will take part in the elections on 12 December. Aleksandr Antipov, first secretary at the Russian Embassy in Vilnius, reported this today. There are around 12,000 Russian citizens currently living on Lithuanian territory registered with the consulate. The diplomat added that Russian citizens resident in Lithuania would vote for parliamentary candidates in two Moscow constituencies.

Commission Chief on Election Process to Date

PM1511153393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Ivanchenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, by Vladimir Ivanov; place and date not given: "It Is the Electorate That Has Decided the Fate of the Eight, Central Electoral Commission Deputy Chairman Believes"]

[Text] The campaign for elections to the State Duma in the federal electoral districts, where 225 seats are being contested, has entered a new phase—the registration of candidates and the beginning of the electoral contest. A total of 35 electoral associations started off in it. Only 21 arrived at the interim finishing line 6 November, and following the collection of signatures and the registration of the nomination lists at the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission, only 13 names remained in the list of participants in the campaign. Another eight associations dropped out. Why is it that only slightly more than one-third of the associations which started the election marathon are reaching the election race stage? Aleksandr Ivanchenko, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, answers this question.

[Ivanchenko] The fate of the eight that did not get through the second qualifying round, and indeed the fate of the 14 organizations eliminated at the initial selection stage, was decided by the electorate. And the organizations themselves are partially to blame for the defeat. Some of them had only just submitted the federal lists of their candidates for registration. After that, strictly speaking, they could only start collecting signatures on 5 November—the day before the official deadline for handing in nomination lists to the Central Electoral Commission.

[Ivanov] What were such organizations counting on?

[Ivanchenko] It is hard to say. As it turned out, some of the latecomers, for example, the "Fatherland" and "Alternative" associations, were hoping that the deadline for the collection of signatures would be extended for them. They notably made such requests to the Central Electoral Commission. Naturally, we refused.

[Ivanov] In world practice, is there such a norm as extending the deadline for the collection of signatures for a particular organization, or several organizations, participating in an election campaign?

[Ivanchenko] No, from the viewpoint of world practice the idea is absurd. After all, in actual fact they were demanding privileges for themselves as compared with the other participants in the election campaign. It is a maxim of law that everyone should have equal terms.

[Ivanov] Nevertheless 21 organizations did hand in their nomination lists, and you allowed only 13 to carry on campaigning.

[Ivanchenko] There were serious reasons for that. First of all, as it turned out when the lists were being registered, by no means all of the associations which handed in lists had the number of signatures established by law—100,000. Only two associations—the New Russia bloc and the Association of Independent Professionals—withdrew their lists themselves and called on their supporters to vote for others: New Russia—for parties of a democratic orientation, and the Association—for Russia's Choice. We ourselves had to remove a further six associations—the Consolidation Party, the National-Republican Party, the Constitutional Democratic Union-Party of People's Freedom, the Russian All-National Union, the Transformation bloc, and the Russian Christian Democratic Party.

[Ivanov] Why was that?

[Ivanchenko] They were the ones which had an insufficient number of signatures or had not carried out the second requirement in the statute on elections—the signatures had to be collected in at least seven regions of Russia.

[Ivanov] We know that protests have been lodged in connection with your decisions.

[Ivanchenko] Only the Russian All-National Union, which complained that 20,000 signatures that were collected had been stolen, made an official protest to the Central Electoral Commission. However, the entire organization of the work to complete, formulate, and store the nomination lists is the concern of the electoral associations themselves. The commission has made an inquiry about this to the Prosecutor's Office, but no official reply has been received yet. At the same time the actual fact of a theft, even if it is proved, does not give the union the right to special privileges in comparison with other associations.

[Ivanov] What events can we expect in the election process in the near future?

[Ivanchenko] The registered federal lists of parties and electoral associations which have gathered the necessary support will be published in the press. And this will give them the right to start putting forward candidates from among those included on these lists in single-seat districts where the majority system operates. All the necessary documents for this must be presented to the district electoral commissions by 2400 hours 14 November.

[Ivanov] What about the candidates who are not on the lists of associations?

[Ivanchenko] They are now actively being put forward, and according to reports we have received, some of them have already been registered by the district electoral commissions. The collection of signatures in their support and the collection of documents must end 15 November. Five days after the registration, electioneering will begin in the single-seat districts. It will be the electorate who will have the final word in the election campaign, however, and not the parties. The electorate has to determine the fate of the elections and the country's future political structure.

Election Campaigning Continues in Regions

LD1511144293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0440 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents]

[Summary] Moscow, 15 Nov—At midnight last night the period for candidates in single and two-deputy constituencies to register themselves for the elections to the chambers of the Federal Assembly ended.

The Sakhalin constituency electoral commission reported that candidates were still bringing in the necessary 5,000 signatures up to midnight. Among the six candidates who registered for the Federation Council elections were the oblast governor, Yevgeniy Krasnoyarov, and the head of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk administration, Igor Farkhutdinov, as well as industrial chiefs. Four candidates registered for the elections to the State Duma, including Russian Deputy finance Minister Valentin Fedorov.

The Khabarovsk constituency electoral commission has received registration applications from five candidates for the Federation Council and seven candidates for the State Duma. Only four candidates gathered the necessary number of signatures in Komsomolsk-na-Amure single-deputy constituency No. 57 for the State Duma elections.

In the Komi Republic six candidates applied to the Syktyvkar constituency electoral commission to register for the Federation Council elections. These include Komi Supreme Soviet Chairman Yuriy Spiridonov and Council of Ministers Chairman Vyacheslav Khudyayev. Seven candidates registered for the elections to the State Duma.

Six candidates have registered with Altay Kray Electoral Commission No. 22 for the State Duma elections where two seats are being contested. Nikolay Shuba, the presidential representative in Altay Kray, is among them.

Roundup of Activity

LD1511185593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1600 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Report by correspondent Mikhail Kustov]

[Text] On 16 November, lots will be drawn at the Central Electoral Commission for the allocation of air time to electoral associations, whose federal electoral lists have been registered by local electoral commissions.

Meanwhile, reports about the official registration are still coming in. Eleven candidates have been nominated from (Zayelovskiy) electoral district in Novosibirsk Oblast. Ilya Konstantinov, leader of the banned National Salvation Front, who is at present in the Lefortovo isolation block, is among them. A list of signatures in support of his candidacy was collected by a local branch of the Fatherland Bloc, and submitted to the electoral commission 10 minutes before the end of registration.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has been nominated as a candidate to the State Duma by the Russia's Choice bloc in an electoral district in Murmansk.

Valentin Fedorov, former governor of Sakhalin, deputy minister of the economy, is registered as a candidate to the State Duma from the electoral district on Sakhalin. The fact that the local 3,000- strong Communist bloc did not manage to collect enough signatures for its candidate was seen as a sensation here.

Vladimir Shtygashev, the chairman of the Khakasia Supreme Soviet, has announced in the local press that he is not going to run for a seat at the Federation Council. ITAR-TASS reports that he based his decision on the fact that, according to him, there was no legal basis for the upcoming elections.

According to the current electoral rules, professional servicemen of the Russian Armed Forces cannot be deputies of the Federation Council. Permission to do so is given only to those who leave the Army or go to the reserve. However, this does not mean that there will be no one in the future parliament to defend the interests of servicemen, an RIA correspondent was told by retired Colonel General Grigoriy Yashkin, candidate to the State Duma from the Dignity and Mercy bloc, and the chairman of the Russian Union of Veterans of the Armed Forces.

One more report: Yegor Gaydar, has said that the press has distorted the facts about the possibility of nominating him a presidential candidate for 1996 elections. Gaydar said that mass media probably interpreted his remark, that it was too early to discuss this matter, as an intention to run for president.

Further on Campaigning

LD1511222393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By observer Igor Minayev; From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpts] So the next stage of the election campaign has come to a close. The term for registering candidates to parliament from single-and two-mandate constituencies has ended, and the parties and blocs that have already been registered have started election campaigns. One hopes that it will not turn into mutual mud-slinging and a settling of political scores in the Russian tradition that has developed, otherwise the deputies to the Federal Assembly will turn out to be compromised already at the election campaign stage. [passage omitted]

All day today the Central Election Commission processed lists of signatures behind closed doors. We got in touch with the Central Election Commission, and it turned out that its staff had made no official statements about postponing the time for presenting the lists [of signatures]. [passage omitted on the election campaign situation in various Russian regions, where it seems that it is mostly representatives of power structures that are aspiring to deputy mandates]

In Novosibirsk Oblast, 10 minutes before closing time, the Okrug Election Committee got a surprise: A list of voters' signatures was delivered, according to which Ilya Konstantinov, the leader of the banned National Salvation Front, who, as is commonly known, is at present in Lefortovo prison, ought to be registered. The local Otchizna [Fatherland] bloc cares about prolonging the political career of Konstantinov, who is under investigation.

INTERFAX reports that Ruslan Khasbulatov, another Lefortovo prisoner, has been nominated to the State Duma from a single-mandate constituency in Dagestan. [passage omitted on insufficient state financing of the elections and the referendum] [video shows Zatulin's news conference, people on the streets of Moscow, Karelia, Khakasia, Novosibirsk oblast, and Lefortovo prison cells]

Campaign Heating Up

MK1611100093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 79, 16 Nov 93 (Signed to press 15 Nov) p 1

[Report by Petr Zhuravlev in the "Marathon" column: "Central Electoral Commission Believes the Elections Will Take Place. Ruslan Khasbulatov and Ramazan Abdulatipov Again Want To Get Into Parliament"]

[Text] Last Sunday at 2400 the district electoral commissions closed the acceptance of signatures in support of candidates to the Federation Council and to the second half of the State Duma. According to a report by the Central Electoral Commission [CEC], as 15 November there are 1,505 nominees contesting the 225 seats in the State Duma to be distributed on a majority basis (in single-seat constituencies). The number of candidates officially registered by now is 127. There are many familiar names here—Yuriy Voronin, former deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet; Valentin Agafonov, former head of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Republic; Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha, in charge of the agricultural sector in the incumbent government. It is known that subscription lists in their own support were presented to the CEC by Vasiliy Lipitskiy, leader of National Party of Free Russia; Sergey Baburin, head of the Russian All-People's Union; and also by former Supreme Soviet Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov, who is now in Lefortovo prison. This was announced yesterday by his older brother, Yamlikhan Khasbulatov. He said that the disgraced chairman is running in Dagestan and that many of his compatriots in Chechnya are ready to apply for an absentee ballot [otkrepitelnyy talon] in order to vote on the territory of that republic.

To the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly (176 seats—two from each Federation component) 489 candidates have been nominated, 93 of which have already been registered. In all the components three or more people are contesting the two "senate" mandates. The only exception is Tatarstan where there are only two candidates, which contradicts the Regulations on Elections—the principle of diversity [alternativnost] is not being observed. Apparently elections to the Federation Council in Tatarstan will be moved back by 12 weeks. Those nominated as senators include in particular Ramazan Abdulatipov, former chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities; presidents of Ingushetia, Yakutia, and Kalmykia Ruslan Aushev, Mikhail Nikolayev, and Kirsan Ilyumzhinov respectively; Akhsarbek Galazov, head of the North Ossetian Supreme Soviet; and also Amangeldy Tuleyev, chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet dissolved by the president.

Addressing a CEC working session yesterday, Nikolay Ryabov stated that the campaign stages completed so far give every reason to say that the elections to both chambers of Russia's future parliament will take place.

The district electoral commissions are to complete the verification of subscription lists in support of candidates and the execution of papers by Friday evening whereupon resolutions will be adopted on registering candidates or refusing them registration.

Khasbulatov Nominated as Candidate to State Duma

LD1511163293 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former speaker of the Russian parliament, who is now on remand, has been proposed as a candidate for the State Duma in a single-seat constituency in Dagestan. Interfax was told this today by Ruslan Khasbulatov's elder brother, Yamlikhan. The number of signatures necessary to register Khasbulatov's candidature has already been collected.

Blocs Meet To Discuss 'Organizational Matters'

MK1611093093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Yekaterina Deynego report: "First Commission Meeting. Candidates To Parliament Have Begun Work"]

[Text] Yesterday, the first meeting of the commission for drawing up and agreeing upon the fundamentals of the Federal Assembly's effective operation, which was set up at the initiative of the "Russia's Choice" electoral bloc, began at the Parliamentary Center. Representatives of nine blocs discussed organizational matters: areas of activity and the makeup of working groups, and the presence of the press. Also discussed were communications with the presidential administration; with Nikolay Podoprigora, chief of the Federal Assembly's emerging staff; and with the Commission for Legislative Proposals.

The first meeting of the commission was attended by nine electoral associations registered by the Central Electoral Commission: the "Russia's Choice" bloc, the

Russian Agrarian Party, the "Cedar" Constructive-Environmental Movement, the Russian Democratic Reform Movement, the "Russia's Women" Association, the "Dignity and Charity" electoral association, the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia, "Russia's Future—New Names," and the Russian Federation Communist Party. According to Sergey Yushenkov, a member of "Russia's Choice" organizing committee, the next meeting, which was scheduled for next Thursday, will be attended by all the electoral blocs: "At least we have not received any refusals."

Gennadiy Burbulis, candidate from "Russia's Choice," said that there was no need to wait for the results of the 12 December referendum, but they should start drawing up a concept for a new legislative body right now. "We should set up the Federal Assembly's staff and devise the fundamentals of its lawmaking activity as soon as possible in order not to waste time on this later," Burbulis noted. To make the commission's work more efficient, it was decided at the constituent conference to set up three standing working groups that would include both candidates and experts. A technical subgroup was also created to deal with matters related to the accommodation and equipment of the new parliament. In addition, another group for contacts with the mass media may be set up in the near future.

Economic Issues

Fedorov Explains Concept of Ruble Zone

PM1511135793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Finance Minister Boris Fedorov: "From 'Ruble Zone' to CIS ECU"]

[Text] CIS politicians and economists are still focusing their attention on the fate of the "new-type ruble zone." Various hypotheses are being put forward regarding the prospects for the economic integration of the former Union republics, but many analysts are inclined to conclude that now, since the Kazakhstani Government has announced that it is introducing its own national currency, this process will slow down considerably and the prospects will become rather more than vague. It has even been said that the Russian Government is "elbowing" its CIS neighbors out of the "ruble area." How justified are these accusations? That is a question for Finance Minister Boris Fedorov.

[Fedorov] The ruble zone as we understood it in 1992—and as some representatives of the former Union republic still do even now—that is, where Russia supplies cash for free and gives nonrepayable loans, has no right to exist.

When I talk of the "ruble zone" I personally mean above all a normal economic mechanism, which does indeed ensure unified currency circulation subordinate to a single means of regulation, an area where there is the same level of inflation, roughly the same average wage, and a rate of exchange that cannot be rigged if it is based on market principles.

I am in favor of finding opportunities for real union with all the former USSR republics, but it is not a question of finding political solutions to fit certain ideas, however attractive. I personally am in favor of these ideas, but I am opposed to the kind of measures that would import inflation into our country. Why should our citizens' money be depreciated unnecessarily? After all it is obvious that those with a weaker unit of currency will certainly benefit from such a union.

I must make one comment about the statements regarding the unacceptable terms that the Russian Government is allegedly setting. We cannot open up Russia's economy in return for promises of future integration. That is why we have proposed issuing cash during the transitional period in return for a 50 percent security. We do not get dollars for free from the United States; we buy them. Why does Uzbekistan, which has several hundred tonnes of gold, not want to use some of it to buy Russian currency?

If anyone wants to merge with the Russian economy at once, we tell them that the doors to the Russian Federation are always open, but a responsible political decision has to be adopted for that to occur.

Let me say once again that there has effectively been no "ruble zone" since 1 July 1992 when correspondent accounts were introduced and the republics' noncash money acquired varying clout. I therefore welcome our neighbors' introduction of their own national currency. Practice shows that this is no obstacle in trade and economic relations between the countries. It is not a question of the name of the bank notes, but of money really being money. In the future I by no means rule out the idea of our creating our own universal unit of payment—the CIS ECU—based on the CIS countries' units of currency.

Gaydar Lauds Land Edict at AKKOR Council Session

PM1611094393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Veniamin Vylegzhanin report: "Support for Farmers Guaranteed: 240 Investment Projects Will Ensure Independence of Private Farms"]

[Text] Will the Russian President's edict on land encourage the development of the private farming movement? At an enlarged session of the AKKOR [Association of Russian Peasant (Private) Farms and Agricultural Cooperatives] Council recently this question was examined most thoroughly. Many farmers expressed the opinion that this document in the main enshrines everything which has been worked on in the past three years. That is why farmers are asking that a section to legalize and regularize the issue of plots of land be included in the documents that the president is preparing for the purpose of implementing the edict. A peasant who withdraws from a sovkhoz or kolkhoz must be given his share not out in the back of beyond but close to his home.

Farmers are also worried about how auctions for the sale of land will be conducted. They would not like these auctions to be held without the participation of the association of private farms.

There was also a proposal expressed on the earliest possible formation of a land bank, which could issue credits on surety of land.

Yegor Gaydar, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers, attended the session and rated the president's edict highly, stressing that the edict "will make it possible to place land relations on a qualitatively new basis and promote the cause of agrarian reform."

Regarding support for the farmers' movement, the vice premier noted that even in the most difficult economic conditions the government has given and will continue to give assistance to the new rural commodity producers. In particular, he announced that restrictions on the export of most types of agricultural produce have been lifted virtually entirely, the matter of the sharp reduction of export duties has been resolved, and state purchases have been abolished. Documents are now being elaborated relating to the use of land and agricultural produce as surety.

Gaydar supported the farmers' proposal on the creation of peasant banks. "I would support the issue of budget loans for the establishment of such banks," he said. The vice premier spoke against support which was not targeted. He favors the kind of aid which would eliminate the bottlenecks in the agro-industrial complex, such as in processing and storage. In this regard he announced that 240 investment projects have now been elaborated which will enable farmers to escape the diktat of the agricultural produce processors.

Deputy Minister Explains Land Ownership Provisions

PM1611121393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with Vladimir Shcherbak, first deputy minister of agriculture, by Aleksandr Gavrilyuk; place and date not given: "Vladimir Shcherbak: You Cannot Turn Arable Land Into a Tennis Court"]

[Text] There is no more important question now than the question of land. Private ownership of land, unprecedented in Russia, with the right to buy and sell it, is no longer a subject for debate but a reality and a fait accompli, rated unequivocally by society. I discussed this with Vladimir Shcherbak, the country's first deputy minister of agriculture and an Agrarian Party candidate deputy for the State Duma.

[Gavrilyuk] It is known that the edict had a long and difficult birth, and it is said that the peasants' opinion was not taken into account in preparing it. This is probably why at the last session of the Agrarian Council under the Russian Federation Government Viktor Chernomyrdin was asked to delay its signing, and the premier promised to do so. So who participated in the work on the edict?

[Shcherbak] The edict was prepared by specialists of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Roskomzem [Russian Federation Committee for Land Resources and Land Management] or, rather, before the Roskomzem specialists, by practical scientists and leaders of oblast agricultural organizations. The fact that their involvement was nonspecific and insignificant is another matter. Hence the complaints, but I believe that it is pointless to discuss such documents in a referendum. Such polarity and such a divergence of opinions would arise that it would not be possible to reach agreement in principle.

Then work on the edict was conducted openly, many people knew its main provisions, the draft was passed from hand to hand, and opinions were divided. Some people believed that under this decree the land would be taken away from kolkhozes and might go out of agricultural production. Others were sure that the land would now be assigned forever to the former kolkhozes and that a land market could not take shape.

Let us give the matter some thought together. Juridically, both on the remaining kolkhozes and in the newly formed joint-stock companies, cooperatives, and societies, collective property is split up into shares, into portions. Both the land and the fixed capital. Everyone has the right to come up with his share and run the farm independently. That is juridically, but now the edict also reinforces the economic aspect. In addition, the document stipulates the mechanism for selling, mortgaging, or leasing one's share of land.

Or again—the document states that the priority right to redeem land belongs either to a member of this collective or to the collective as a whole. Thus, if a shareholder thinks of selling his share, the collective will be his first purchaser and will thereby increase its land holding.

Finally, it is forbidden to sell land not for its targeted purpose. To put it crudely, you cannot turn arable land into an airfield or a tennis court. So fears might not be groundless, but provision has been made for protective measures.

[Gavrilyuk] Will it not turn out that the edict will be a great gift to foreign partners? For Point 2 of the edict states that land holdings can be transferred to the capital funds (capitals) of joint-stock companies with "foreign investments."

[Shcherbak] Well, first, under the existing legislation the sale of land to foreign partners is prohibited. To both corporate and individual partners. As regards joint ventures, the share of Russian enterprises is, as a rule, significantly larger, and so I personally do not see any danger here.

[Gavrilyuk] Speaking in Bashkortostan recently, Vice Premier A. Zaveryukha declared roughly the following: "We must not make a tragedy out of the signing of the edict. It enshrines the basic provisions, which must be approved later in documents of the future legislative organ." Does this mean that the edict is an interim document, if I may put it like this?

[Shcherbak] The edict in itself is a direct-acting document, and the provisions enshrined in it are inviolate without a change to the edict itself. At the same time many points will be determined by subsequent documents which the government is preparing. For example, it has been entrusted with approving within one month a statute on holding competitions and auctions for the sale of land, on state control over the use and protection of land, on taxation, and on mortgages. Incidentally, if today's private farmer has some asset today, it is land. By mortgaging it, he will obtain credits, without which he cannot survive.

[Gavrilyuk] The edict enables a landowner to employ hired labor. Consequently, will the word "batrak" [farm laborer] reappear in our vocabulary?

[Shcherbak] I have no doubt that there will be a stratification of society in a market economy. There will be rich people and poor people, and they already exist. As regards terminology, everyone is free to choose whatever words he likes.

New Foreign Currency Loans Decree Summarized

PM1611094793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 3

[Oleg Utkin article: "How Money Can Be Borrowed Abroad and By Whom. Government Brings Order to Arrangement of Credit"]

[Text] On the basis of the Council of Ministers decree, the Finance Ministry is introducing a new procedure for work with foreign credits.

What has prompted this? It is quite clear that the government intends to streamline as quickly as possible the situation regarding the arrangement and utilization of foreign currency loans.

The reason for this is extremely simple. Hitherto complete disorder had reigned in respect of the basic division of obligations and, consequently, of the responsibilities of the departments involved in this sphere. Thus, one department would define our material requirement for imports supplied on credit, another would hold talks on arranging loans, another department would use those loans, and yet another would pay for it all. The result was that in 1993 Russia's credit policy as a whole remained based on the needs of enterprises and whole sectors for import purchases without any real consideration being given to the country's ability to pay.

That is why credit resources worth $17 billion have been arranged for the Russian Federation as additional sources of financing in order to maintain production potential and safeguard current consumption in 1992-1993! As you can see, this is a considerable sum, and it means that a new debt is rapidly building up in addition to the former USSR's foreign debt.

Different principles for organizing the work to arrange and utilize foreign loans are now being established on the basis of Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government decree No. 1060 of 16 October.

The main principles are that talks with foreign lenders about financial credits will be conducted by the Finance Ministry, while talks on commercial and investment credits will be conducted by the Finance Ministry in conjunction with the Ministry of the Economy, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development. Other interested ministries, departments, and organizations will take part.

Intergovernmental agreements on questions of arranging foreign loans and providing government guarantees are to be signed by the finance minister or by an official appointed by the Council of Ministers.

The relevant documents will be recorded by the Finance Ministry in the State Foreign Debt Register [kniga] and will be considered to be in force from the time they are issued with a registration number. If necessary, these documents will be ratified by our legislative organs. Any talks, agreements, or protocols of intent that have not been correspondingly arranged by the ministry have no legal force and no connection with official Russian loans.

State foreign debt will be based solely on foreign currency credits received directly by the government or by organizations on its instructions, and on loans guaranteed by the Council of Ministers.

The country's strategy in the sphere of foreign loans in 1994 will be based on the following principles: a reduction by the government of commercial and investment credits, up to and including their complete abandonment; an orientation toward credits from international financial organizations for balance of payments, reserve, and major infrastructure project purposes; the arrangement of new loans on the state's behalf in amounts that take account of the need to repay the existing debt and the abilities of the federal budget; flexible regulation and the arrangement of foreign loans by private firms and banks.

Budget Process Hindered by Conflicting Players

MK1611091093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 1

[Oleg Polukeyev report in the "Finances" column: "The Budget Is Handled by All, and All Taken Together Are Increasing the Budget Deficit"]

[Text] Since yesterday morning the Commission for Ongoing Affairs [po operativnym voprosam] of the Council of Ministers-the Russian Federation Government has begun to address a question that had earlier been tackled by the parliament, without particular success. It discussed and adjusted the 1993 budget plan. Indeed, this problem calls for prompt intervention. This must be why it has now been addressed also by Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets.

The heads of 40 ministries and departments made their proposals, but whereas Soskovets (and not him alone) was primarily concerned over a reduction of the spending part, his discontented opponents in fact were arguing for the need to further support the vital sectors. In a single national economic complex each sector can be so called by right.

According to estimates made public yesterday, the budget deficit may reach between 11 and 22 trillion rubles. The Finance Ministry still insists on a figure of 17 trillion, which is 10 percent of GNP, and no matter what kind (or otherwise) feelings this ministry's initiatives and efforts might arouse, it is incapable of resolving the problem of cutting the budget deficit and with it the problem of forming it properly, on its own. No one can, for that matter. Mistakes are inevitable.

It is known that before, the budget (in its pre-perestroyka meaning) was handled by Gosplan. The Finance Ministry and the State Bank have come out in the peculiar role of main economic agencies of the former quasi-economic monster whose personnel knew everything about everybody. They had their own way of "working" both with the sectors and concrete enterprises and with the regions, and although in the present government there are some people who in the past mastered this science, they are still not being tapped.

The government is generally concerned with the transition to a new type of planning—indicative planning. There is an aspiration to set a firm time frame and costs involved in implementing particular nationwide programs or projects. Representatives of particular sectors in the government are using this pretext (and not only it alone) to pull the patchwork budget blanket over themselves.

The regions are singing their well-known lament about the one-channel budget: The Center is confiscating everything, leaving nothing for us, and the Finance Ministry, which hitherto has not dealt with the problem of defining priorities in allocating monetary resources, is beginning, to the amazement of many, to gradually repeat the Central Bank practice of the Matyukhin period: I will give to this one but not to that, and it is generally holding back the allocation of funds.

In this situation, meanwhile, the Central Bank, having risen above the squabble between the financiers and the sectors, and also the people of the new economic generation, presents today a really imposing figure. Its position in based on the logic of creating an effective market in the country, primarily a money market. At the same time it has stopped even talking about its own budget as a concept of actions to raise funds and spend them with the best possible results. From the abnormal situation of the Gosplan period we have moved into an even more abnormal situation when the budget is handled by anyone who is tasked to do so. Although the budget deficit should be cut by any means and in any event.

Today at 1000 the Council of Ministers Presidium was to discuss a draft federal budget for 1993. The session was moved to 1500. Rumor has it that this important event is again going to be shifted to some other day.

Gas, Oil Industry Deregulation Advantages Questioned

PM1611103193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Report by Sergey Leskov: "Reorganization of Oil and Gas Industry Is Being Prepared"]

[Text] The president's edict and the government decree "on deregulating the energy market" is at the stage of the final touches. These documents are aimed at increasing the competitive environment in the oil and gas industry by breaking up giant Russian oil and gas plants into smaller ones. Considering the determining place of the fuel and energy complex in our economy, the importance of this reform is inestimable.

The package of documents which have been prepared provides for the break-up of the world's largest companies, "Gazprom," "Yukus," "Surgutneft," and "LUKoyl," with the subsequent privatization of the enterprises thus formed. For three years after privatization extracting and processing enterprises are forbidden to own shares in the enterprises which transport and trade in energy carriers. In the first half of 1994 there is to be a fundamental reorganization of all oil and gas transport systems and of electricity grids.

The documents were prepared by World Bank experts with the active participation of the Goskomimushchestva [State Committee for the Administration of State Property]. A number of proposals coincide with the long-standing wishes of Russian power engineering specialists above all the Ministry of Fuel and Energy. Obviously experts in the sector will support the intention to introduce as of 1 January 1994 gas prices which are differentiated according to region. Henceforth it will be possible to obtain the right to operate deposits only as a result of open tenders.

The reorganization of the fuel and energy complex is not being undertaken for the fun of it. In January-September there was a further 14.7 percent reduction in oil extraction compared with last year. It is clear that we will not manage to extract more than 340 million tonnes of oil in 1993. Below that level Russia will be obliged to halt the export of oil.

The creation of giant Russian oil companies a year ago has not yet helped the sector to overcome the crisis. A number of experts also cast doubt on the prospects of the new structural reorganization. The oil industry experts' main problem is nonpayments by consumers (about 1,800 billion rubles) and also the fact that the increase in fuel prices lags behind the inflation level.

But the reorganization of the gas industry may be most painful. For technological reasons the single chain of the gas transportation system cannot be broken up into independent regional links. The independent firms' struggle for a place on the single pipeline is suicidal for the sector and is not allowed in any country. Even in our country in all previous reforms the principle of the unity of transport systems was preserved as something sacred.

The conceived reform under conditions in which in our expiring economy "Gazprom" is almost the only goose still capable of laying golden eggs (the revenue from gas deliveries to remote foreign parts alone is $7.5 billion) is particularly perplexing. Great importance attaches to "Gazprom's" independent emergence onto the European market and subsequent open expansion in that direction.

"Gazprom" chairman Rem Vakhirev believes that the signing of the documents which have been prepared would essentially cancel out all Russia's achievements on the world market. With the decentralization of the gas industry an end would be put to very promising projects for the development of rich new deposits in the Arctic. Small enterprises will not take the risk and will simply be incapable of the necessary investments.

A number of informed specialists anonymously voice opinions that many provisions of the documents which have been prepared objectively accord with the interests of Russia's competitors on the oil and gas market. Indeed, during a recent visit to Moscow Doctor Burchard Bergman, a member of the board of "Ruhrgas," did not conceal the fact that this very large European firm is extremely concerned by "Gazprom's" independent operations on the world market. It is perfectly obvious that after the giants of Russian industry have been turned into small extracting and trading offices our competitors will rub their hands.

Military & Space Issues

Yeltsin Edict on Stabilizing Defense Industry

PM1511145193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 4

[Edict No. 1850 of the Russian Federation President "On the Stabilization of the Economic Status of Defense Industry Enterprises and Organizations and Measures To Guarantee the State Defense Order," dated 6 November 1993, The Kremlin, Moscow and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text] In order to stabilize the economic status of defense industry enterprises and organizaitons, make conversion measures more effective, and provide for state needs in the defense sphere I decree that:

1. The interdepartmental working commission to examine conversion programs for the purpose of granting targeted credits is to review enterprises' and organizations' conversion programs before 1 December 1993 from the viewpoint of their economic effectiveness.

The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government is to join the Russian Federation Central Bank in ensuring continuous funding of enterprises' and organizations' conversion programs, approved in accordance with the established procedure, until they are completed.

2. Those placing Russian Federation state orders are to be entitled to make advances under state contracts to those carrying out work on the development and production of products (commodities, works, and services) with a lengthy production cycle (six months and more) and, if necessary, buy the raw materials, supplies, and components to carry out the state order. Moreover, the contracts for the supply of products are to include the cost of the raw materials, supplies, and components in the price of the finished product in line with the level of prices at the time of the advance.

Advances to those carrying out work on the state defense order will not exceed 20 percent of the annual volume of budget appropriations for the purchase of armaments, military equipment, and military-related scientific and technical products.

3. When state orders are being carried out, the level of profitability ensuring the creation of a stable financial base for the production, scientific and technical, and social development of enterprises supplying state defense order products is to be fixed for each type of product and included in the prices of products (commodities, works, and services).

The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government is to decide the size of the fixed level of profitability for each type of product and also the procedure for increasing it in the case of the production of a new, highly efficient product with no equivalents.

4. Russian Federation enterprises and organizations carrying out the state defense order are to be authorized from 1 January 1994, when setting contract prices for defense products, to include expenditure on pay in the prime cost of the aforementioned products in the following amounts:

for working people in enterprises and organizations engaged in work on the state defense order—no more than eight times the minimum monthly pay in the Russian Federation;

for working people of Russian Federation Atomic Energy Ministry enterprises and organizations directly engaged in the development, production, and dismantling of nuclear weapons—no more than nine times the minimum monthly pay.

5. The Russian Federation State Tax Service and the Russian Federation Finance Ministry are to join the Russian Federation Economics Ministry, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry, and the Russian Federation Atomic Energy Ministry in elaborating and presenting to the Russian Council of Ministers-Government in the proper way before 1 December 1993 proposals on additions to existing legislation connected with the procedure whereby enterprises and organizations carrying out the state defense order calculate the tax on profits, given that in the calculation of taxable profits expenditure on pay included in the part of the regulated amount that is incorporated in the prime cost of the product is set at the amounts stipulated in point 4 of the present edict.

6. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry is to submit in the proper way, in the fourth quarter of 1993, a disarmament program for the period up to 2000.

7. The Russian Federation State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry and the Russian Federation Atomic Energy Industry,byn agreement with the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property, the Russian Federation Economics Ministry, the Russian Federation Finance Ministry, the Russian Federation Labor Ministry, the Russian Federation Defense Minstry, and the Russian Federation Justice Ministry, are to prepare and submit to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government before 20 November 1993 proposals defining the particular activities of state enterprises and organizations in the defense complex that are not due for privatization, with the intention of creating conditions in which they can function in a stable way in a market economy.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 6 November 1993

Grachev Cited on Military Doctrine, Local Wars

PM1511154393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 1

[Comment by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev under the "Security" rubric: "Local Wars and Armed Conflicts Are the Main Danger to Stability and Peace"]

[Text] The likelihood of the emergence of armed conflicts in individual regions is intensifying, and this is confirmed by events in Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Dniester Region, Abkhazia, Tajikistan, and other "hotspots" in the world. In the event of the emergence of a local war or armed conflict, the Russian Federation military doctrine envisages the prompt localization of the seat of tension and the suppression of hostilities at the earliest possible stage as the main objective in the use of the Russian Armed Forces. If a large-scale conflict with the use of state of the art weapons and weapons of the future does nevertheless arise, then in the face of this, the military doctrine eschews the absolutization of any specific ways and methods of waging combat operations. Such forms, methods, and means of armed struggle will be chosen in the course of repulsing the aggression, as will be in line with the laws of armed struggle and with the conditions of the prevailing situation.

Grachev Denies Servicemen To Get Pay Raises, Benefit Cuts

LD1611094193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Lately in some publications rumors have appeared about allegedly planned pay raises for Russian servicemen and about the simultaneous abolition of their benefits provided for in the law on the status of servicemen. Our correspondent asked the minister to what extent the given information is in line with the truth.

[Begin recording] [Grachev] I have actually expressed criticism regarding some clauses in some laws. First and foremost this was relating to the way in which military service was done. However, regarding the abolition of benefits that currently exist, including a concession like that of income tax, as the minister of defense I personally will apply every effort to ensure that these will be not be abolished. What is more we will try to get more benefits for servicemen. Concerning pay raises, however, in October we raised servicemen's pay by 1.8 times. I do not think there is any need to increase it every month or every two or three months. [end recording]

No Changes in State Order for Defense Sector in 1994

LD1511171193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1604 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Rudenko]

[Text] Moscow November 15 TASS—Russian Vice-Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets said on Monday that the state order for the defence industry in 1994 will be preserved at the 1993 level.

Speaking at a meeting with directors of leading industrial enterprises in St. Petersburg, Soskovets said that new types of weapons and combat hardware will be included in the state order to preserve the industry's high scientific and technological potential.

The mechanism of military exports is unjustifiably complicated and the government plans to expand the rights of enterprises in arms trade on the world market, the vice-premier stressed.

The participants also discussed the pace of economic reform in the region, production of consumer goods, conversion, ways to increase the efficiency of the local power engineering complex and improve the credit and monetary policy.

Report on Chemical Troops New Tasks

LD1511234793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2146 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By correspondent Sergey Tolstov; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] The Russian chemical defense troops have marked their 75th anniversary.

[Tolstov] These troops are not spoiled by journalists' attention. Our press mentions them only in passing. Two reasons were behind this attitude. First, there is little showiness in their military training. Indeed, these lads do not seem to be very different from, say, motorized riflemen, but the main reason was the secret nature of the goal for which these troops were set up. Their professional anniversary, therefore, did not get much publicity.

These shots we are showing to you for the first time. True, now they are called differently: radiation, chemical, and biological defense troops. It was only during the tragic days of the Chernobyl catastrophe, perhaps, that we learned for the first time the true content of their combat operations. The destruction of chemical weapons has been added to the number of tasks on their list today. [video of hardware, military training]

[S. Petrov, chief of radiation, chemical, and biological defense troops of the Russian Defense Ministry] In the course of long research we have come to conclusion that, from this point of view, the construction of facilities in the storage sites will be the best solution to the problem of destruction of chemical weapons. Specifically, the issue has already been solved, in general, regarding Saratov Oblast—on destroying the chemical weapons kept there. The issue has been practically solved with Udmurt Republic, too.

Problems of Armed Forces Funding Examined

PM1511134193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Nov 93 p 2

[Article by Doctor of Military Sciences Professor Mikhail Kasenkov, correspondent member of Russian Federation Academy of Natural Sciences, under the "Military Organizational Problems" rubric: "Classic Problem With Several Unknowns. Can We Economize on State Security?"]

[Text] I will not hide the fact that an item published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (its 22 October issue) under the headline "Supertough Budget: What Does It Mean for the Army?" has been something of a cue for my own article. However, I have not put pen to paper in order to engage in polemics with Russian Federation Deputy Finance Minister Pochinok, who has shared his opinions on the said issue with the newspaper's readers. As a military professional, I would like to try and examine the problem of state security from a somewhat broader perspective, without restricting myself to just one aspect of it. Especially as the Russian Federation Security Council has just approved the "Fundamental Provisions of the Military Doctrine." It is also a fact that in our country, and in extremely influential circles moreover, the existing ideas about the many-sided and arduous process of military organizational development in Russia, its aims and its tasks, are to my mind somewhat oversimplified. Today, when we are merely on the threshold of implementing a new state military doctrine, there seems to me to be a particular need to weigh things up very carefully.

Let us take, for example, the familiar argument that the Armed Forces and other state military security structures should guarantee protection of the state's important interests connected with independence and territorial integrity, and should strive as much as possible not to burden the economy. Definite contradictions are evident here. We face the classic problem of optimizing requirements and potential. In this case the requirements may be seen as ensuring the constitutional function of the Armed Forces and the fulfillment of their inherent tasks. The potential includes the share of the state's national income allocated for the upkeep and development of the Armed Forces. If this share is less than what is needed, the Armed Forces will be unable fully to perform their function with all the dire consequences this would entail. Therefore, in examining the issue of military expenditure, we do not simply need to bear in mind the state's potential with regard to maintaining the Armed Forces. Something else is important too: Whether or not the Armed Forces can perform their function taking account of the total military expenditure that has been planned.

Why does Russia need an Army? First and foremost, to deter a potential aggressor from attacking and to destroy an aggressor that attacks nonetheless. On this basis, it seems, we need to stick to at least three main principles of military security in the organizational development of the Armed Forces. First, in order to deter an aggressor from wishing to launch an attack, the military might of our defensive and strike (offensive) groupings should be approximately equal. Second, in order to repulse aggression, the Armed Forces should have the opportunity to increase the combat might—defensive initially, and then offensive—of their groupings faster than an aggressor. And finally, in determining and forecasting the size, structure, and deployment of the Armed Forces, the quantity and quality of their weapons, and the state's mobilization resources, we need to have a thorough idea of the existing and future level of military threat.

Let me anticipate a question which has been frequently asked recently: Does Russia actually face a military danger? If by military danger you mean the likelihood of strong-arm pressure and military interference in our state's internal affairs, then the answer, I think, can only be unequivocal: Yes, such a threat does exist. Why? It is well known that a number of states—both our immediate neighbors and countries further afield—have and will have interests in and claims on our country (territorial, economic, national-ethnic, and so on). At any time—and this is hard to predict—a deterioration in the situation could lead to sharp confrontation. Let us not forget that some of these states possess fairly powerful armed forces that are capable of waging large-scale offensive operations, but these states' military and political leaders are certainly not renouncing the use of military and strong-arm methods to achieve their foreign policy ends.

When we talk about the level of military danger, it is customary to assess it on three qualitative levels.

The first corresponds to the situation in which Russia currently finds itself—when a targeted military threat from any one state cannot be picked out against a backdrop of an objectively existing military danger. In this situation our country should possess Armed Forces that are capable of repulsing a potential threat from any direction. The most economical option for achieving this end is the timely creation of comparatively small but well equipped covering forces with a high degree of combat readiness deployed in specific areas in peacetime, powerful high-mobility forces that can rapidly be deployed to threatened regions in order to reinforce them, and also a strong strategic reserve stationed in Russia's central oblasts.

The second level of military danger—the targeted threat—corresponds to a situation in which a particular state (or group of states) displays its hostile intentions toward Russia and may be regarded as a likely enemy. In this case all the components of our Armed Forces, having been provided beforehand with the necessary combat potential, should concentrate promptly in the threatened area.

The third level—an immediate military threat—corresponds to a situation in which a known enemy, having completed basic steps in preparation for aggression, resolutely seeks to unleash war. The implementation of the principles and requirements of military danger may in this instance be reached through prior warning of an impending assault, sightings of troops (forces) which were already in a basically deployed defensive grouping increasing their level of combat readiness, and the holding of necessary mobilization measures.

How likely is it that Russia will be threatened with a transition from the first level of military danger to the next? As well as bearing in mind historical experience and political logic, which unequivocally attest to the frequent unpredictability of conflict situations and the possibility of a rapid change from normal interstate relations to confrontational relations, it would be useful, in my view, to familiarize ourselves with the U.S. military-political leadership's approach toward the same problem. The very first of the four fundamental strategic concepts of U.S. defense strategy is geared toward planning the organizational development of the armed forces to take account of uncertainty: "...We should cut back and reorganize our forces not only with a view to confronting immediate threats which we cannot assess in precise terms today, or threats defined on the basis of currently existing trends in the way a situation is developing. We should also insure ourselves against the emergence of unexpected threats and a drastic change in trends that are favorable to us." And further on: "The element of risk can never be completely ruled out, and therefore we should enshrine within current programs of military organizational development the sort of flexibility that will enable us to neutralize the adverse consequences of any possible mistake on our part."

It seems to me that this blueprint is fairly logical and sound. It would be a dangerous delusion to conclude that a rapid increase in the level of military threat would be impossible in Russia's case as well. On the contrary, this possibility should certainly be borne in mind when planning the military organizational development of our Armed Forces. These forces, judging by remarks made to the press by the Russian Federation president, should be "...compact, highly skilled, equipped with modern weapons, mobile, capable of performing combat tasks in varied conditions, ready to spring to the defense of the fatherland, and able to effectively ensure the security of the state and the defense of its national interests. Of course, time and considerable funds will be required to achieve this." Similar demands have also been formulated in the "Fundamental Provisions of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine."

Applying what has been said to the Armed Forces that we currently possess, it is not hard to see that they are not an entirely well-oiled military mechanism, the upkeep of which requires a stable percentage of the national income. At the same time, unlike armies that have existed for many years, the upkeep of the Russian Armed Forces which are udergoing reform requires considerable additional expenditure. First, to reestablish an extremely costly military infrastructure (new elements of the air defense system, the missile attack warning system, administrative elements, rear support elements, the airfield and transportation network, military bases corresponding to the new deployment of units and combined units dictated by the changed military-strategic situation, and so forth). Second, as Aleksandr Pochinok rightly notes in the aforementioned report, an increase in military expenditure is necessary to change the structure of the Armed Forces, to withdraw troops from abroad and then to quarter and supply them, to introduce a contract system of manpower acquisition, and finally, to enable troops to participate in regional conflicts. Additional expenses will also be needed to maintain the constantly growing number of military pensioners (following the intensive cutbacks in the Armed Forces).

The expensive and necessary measures I have listed are swallowing the lion's share of the already extremely small military budget. In these conditions, the funds allocated to ensure that the Armed Forces perform their main task—to deter and reliably repulse military aggression—are obviously inadequate.

The same can be said of other qualitative characteristics of the Armed Forces. Thus their professionalization necessitates rearming a significant proportion of the Army and Navy with new, up-to-date means of waging armed struggle, the cost of which is increasing unchecked, and also requires an improvement in the quality of officer training and an increase in their material remuneration. This ultimately entails substantial expenditure on fuel, munitions, and special equipment for more intensive and targeted [predmetnyy] combat training, and much more besides. At the same time it is only possible to equip the Army and Navy with up-to-date equipment by ensuring the development and manufacture of the necessary (considerable) quantity of the most modern weapons and military hardware, and also by satisfying the Army's demands for clothing, food, and many other inexpensive material assets and military equipment. An increase in the Armed Forces' mobility is impossible without the expansion and regular renewal of an expensive fleet of transport aviation and an increase in expenditure on training special contingents of rapid-deployment troops and their equipment.

However sad it may seem, none of the demands listed above can be met fully at the present time. Primarily because of the acute shortage of appropriations for defense needs. Wholesale conversion of the military industry and a drastic loosening of discipline in deliveries of the basic necessities which the Armed Forces require in order to function normally, as well as manpower acquisition difficulties, are having an extremely negative impact. Hence we can understand a question that is alarming many people: Will our Armed Forces be able, they ask, to perform the tasks of deterring and repulsing aggression? Professional military men also share this concern. Moreover, they are clearly aware of the considerable inertia of the Armed Forces as a large and complex system, which objectively dictates the impossibility of increasing its combat might in the short term unless a wide-ranging complex of expensive mobilizational and other measures is prepared in advance.

Moreover, the combat power structure contains elements whose decreased funding would give rise to practically irreversible consequences. It would take years or even decades to restore them (for example, the loss of scientific potential in the production of new types of weapons or the lack of prior training in the necessary quantity and quality of mobilized resources).

Now let me turn to the idea that the Armed Forces should be compact. There is a school of thought which says that one way of stabilizing the Russian budget is to make constant and intensive cutbacks in military expenditure. Moreover, it is proposed to do this primarily by reducing the size of the Armed Forces to a virtually symbolic level. Arguments for these ideas are usually justified by the fact that the size of the army in the most developed European countries—Germany, France, and Britain—does not exceed 500,000 men.

From the scientific viewpoint, this sort of argument is unsound for a number of reasons. The main reason is the peculiarity of Russia's geopolitical position, which consists of its vast territory, the extreme length of its land borders, its abundant natural resources, and the fact that it is directly bordered by over a dozen states, most of which have major interests in Russia, and some of which have fairly overt claims. Considered objectively, all this compels us—although there is no mention of this fact in the doctrine—to keep our Armed Forces at a peacetime strength, in the near future at least, of no less than 1 percent of the total population. Calculations show that any deeper cuts will not allow the Armed Forces to meet the requirements of military security.

So the conclusion is obvious: It would be an irreparable mistake from the viewpoint of Russia's national interests not to take into account the main purpose of Russia's Armed Forces when planning military expenditure.

WGF Commander Tours Facilities in Volga Region

PM1511144993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 1

[Sergey Volgin report under the "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "How Have Settled at Home, Comrades in Arms?"]

[Text] To analyze experience of providing facilities for the units of Russian troops withdrawn to the Volga Military District in 1991-1993 and to study the region's special features for completing their relocation from Germany in 1994 Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces [WGF], visited the Volga region.

The group headed by the commander in chief of the WGF includes operations directorate officers, rear services and utilities organ specialists, and representatives of the mass media.

Army's Involvement in Politics Considered

PM1611092993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 2

[Observer Aleksandr Golts article under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "The Army and Politics. A Discussion of 'Terms' Or a Debate on the Armed Forces' Role in Society?"]

[Text] Following the tragic October days, the Armed Forces have once again found themselves the center of attention for the public, politicians, and political experts. The troops who participated in the Moscow events had not had time to return to barracks before highly contradictory interpretations of their role began to be made.

Some people set about rebuking the Army for interfering in political altercations. Others, on the contrary, said: The military took too literally the thesis that "the Army is outside politics" and showed some hesitation. In short, the problem of "the Army and politics" is once again at the focus of public opinion. The same arguments and counterarguments as were used two years ago, when the question of the "departyization" of the Armed Forces and the elimination of the institution of political workers was being decided, are circulating once again.

So what lies behind the words "the Army is outside politics"? This formula has come into common use. I will not be sinning against the truth if I say that it has also entered the psychology of the Russian serviceman. What is more, it has been understood and accepted by him. Russian legislation also enshrines a number of statutes protecting the Army from heterogeneous political influences.

At the same time it is obvious that the formula "the Army is outside politics" is not quite accurate in itself. Those who point out that the Army is a tool of state policy and so cannot be outside it are undoubtedly right. The argument that the military are a part of society and cannot be totally isolated from political processes is also incontestable. Military people, like other citizens, have certain interests, sympathies, and antipathies. They, like everyone, participate in elections.

But it is clear that in the context of this formula what is understood by politics is not the academic interpretation of this term. It would be too simple to reduce everything to a theoretical discussion of terms. This is not the point. What is important is the essence. Namely that what is dangerous for a democratic society is not the Army's involvement generally in the political sphere. To pose the problem conscientiously, it is possible to formulate quite specifically precisely outside what the Army must be. Outside party influences, outside contradictions between particular state institutions, outside the struggle between the ruling party and the opposition, finally outside political intrigues.

Clarity and certainty are particularly important here today because, on reading certain articles analyzing the recent dramatic events, you notice quite an alarming trend. You will occasionally hear the idea that Russia does not need a parliament at present and that it is not mature enough for democracy. That it would be better for it to live through a transitional period under conditions of "enlightened authoritarianism."

At the same time those who campaign for a path toward democracy by way of authoritarianism prefer to keep quiet about the fact that any authoritarian state, by virtue of its nature, sees its own role as being to lead the "foolish people" by force toward a bright future (whether capitalist or socialist is not important in this case). The main point is that priority is given precisely to compulsion, not to fulfilling the people's will. In this system of coordinates the Army, which concentrates the maximum power potential within itself, becomes the chief, if not the most important, instrument of power. It enters into a special relationship with the upper echelons. In such a case it really has to be educated politically in the spirit of loyalty to certain ideas, parties, groups, and an individual, not to the country and society. They win it over and share power with it, but we have already been through all this. We know well how such a thing ends.

A society which recognizes the supremacy of law and of human rights and considers the people the source of law is something else. They do not try to compel this people to do anything. The role of politicians consists in offering them certain alternatives, one of which they choose as a path of development by means of a vote.

Such a society has a vital need of the Army—this is universally recognized—not just for defense against external threats but also to ensure internal stability, as stated directly in Russia's new military doctrine. I will remind you: The legislations of the United States, the FRG, France, and many other states which we regard as democratic propose the use of army units to end mass disturbances in cases where there are insufficient police forces to do so. Not so long ago, for example, marines were used to instill order in Los Angeles. Incidentally, nobody in those countries raises the question of excluding the armed forces from the sphere of politics. There is no point to such arguments there. If only because all restrictions concerning the army's place in the political sphere are clearly prescribed in legislation.

In addition, a definite political tradition has been worked out: On the one hand, it is inconceivable for politicians to resort to the "army argument" in disputes. On the other hand, military people themselves have been educated accordingly.

At the same time it must be understood that the army occupies a special place in the political system of a democratic society. This stems from the army's very nature. For, in order to successfully fulfill the tasks facing it, the army is built, because of their specific nature, on principles which differ fundamentally from those on which society itself is built: not freedom of choice but unquestioning fulfillment of an order, not democracy but one-man command, not personal interest but loyalty to the oath....

At a time of political crises there is a danger that someone will attempt to use this specific feature of the army organism in his own interests. There is also a danger that the army itself will enter the political game. This has happened repeatedly before. Let us recall Chile or Greece. This is feared in seemingly stable democratic states. Thus, constant fear of a military coup is characteristic of the Italian public. Any democracy seeks to insure itself against the army's coming to play an independent political role. Otherwise democracy turns into authoritarianism.

They seek to do this legislatively, as stated above, by imposing serious restrictions, if not prohibitions, on political activity in the army. No party propaganda is permitted. All political debate is left outside the barrack gates. Servicemen are prohibited from associating themselves with a particular party. Moreover, in certain countries there are also serious restrictions on servicemen's voting rights.

While seeking the armed forces' noninvolvement in internal political struggle, however, people in the West are far removed from seeing servicemen as some kind of soulless automatons who are ready to carry out any order unthinkingly. On the eve of the Moscow events I had a very curious conversation with a delegation of Western servicemen.

On a visit to one of our military educational institutions they were struck by how literally, if not to say primitively, the idea that the army must be outside politics was perceived there. There all sociopolitical disciplines have simply been excluded from the program. And yet, they tried to convince me, renunciation of involvement in internal political struggle not only does not rule out but, on the contrary, demands of officers, particularly those in the top command link, in-depth, conscious knowledge of society, of how it develops, and of how its institutions function. It is no coincidence that the overwhelming majority of U.S. generals have arts degrees: in history, philosophy, political science. The army must not be blind. It must consciously serve the ideals of a given society.

In my view it would be a very serious mistake—one which would have consequences for the future—to consider that, having been forced by bleak circumstances to participate in the events of 3-4 October, the Army thereby "returned to politics."

To regard a tragic and extraordinary situation, which transcends all the canons of normal civilized society, as grounds for such "lessons" means also admitting that similar situations will be repeated in the future. It means admitting that we will never learn to find a sensible way out of a crisis and will always descend into a power confrontation. I believe that this does not suit any sober-minded people. This can suit only those who intend to demand the Armed Forces' loyalty not to the country and the state as a whole but to some political forces or theories. Including those theories which stem from the fact that power must be seized, above all by armed means.

It would accord with the interests of democratic development in Russia for the Army to act as a guarantor of civilian peace. Politicians should think not about how to "constitute" the Army's return to politics somewhat more adroitly but about how to rule out such a possibility for purposes of state security and of preserving democracy. It is necessary right now to think about elaborating a state ideology or, more accurately, a clearly formulated national system of values which will be supported and implemented by the state and which could become the basis for educating the Armed Forces.

A person whose name has recently been appearing quite frequently in the pages of our press voiced his opinion on this better than anyone. A person who resolved not in theory but in practice very complex problems of the relationship between army and society. On the eve of his latest return to power, when he was faced with putting down a military revolt in Algeria and then with radically restructuring the state system of France, General De Gaulle visited Saint-Cyr, the forge of the armed forces' elite. This is what he said to the future officers: "You have chosen the military craft. It will require the renunciation of freedom and money. It is associated with grave trials. But it gives you in exchange a high awareness of maturity, a joyful sense of serving a great cause, and great pride." Let us not forget that this was conceived certainly not by a romantic but by a most highly refined politician, and he did this at a critical time for his country....

Pacific Fleet's Problems, Future Examined

PM1611101193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Nov 93 pp 1, 2

[Vladimir Maryukha and Vladimir Shirokov report: "Russia Had and Still Has a Pacific Fleet. What Will It Be Like Tomorrow?"]

[Text] In the opinion of Admiral Igor Kasatonov, first deputy commander of the Russian Navy, under whose leadership the 1993 end of training period performance evaluation was carried out, the fleet makes a good impression—certainly not by engaging in window-dressing for the inspecting officers; there was simply no performance evaluation as such. The fleet went about its established routine and it was this everyday work by the men of the Pacific Fleet that the inspecting officers studied. This happened because the Pacific Fleet is becoming more important for Russia with literally every day that passes, and combat readiness is not measured solely in terms of an inspection review.

What is more, U.S. naval forces in the Pacific and U.S. nuclear submarines doggedly patrolling our shores will not wait while the Pacific Fleet musters forces and leaves shore to defend Russia's interests in the oceans of the Far East, and there are after all also the naval forces of Japan, which aspires to play the leading role in the region, and the South Korean Navy. Problems regarding the plundering of the sea's wealth in Russia's economic zone, piracy, and many other painful issues are still on the agenda. That is why the Pacific Fleet simply has to attain a...

Qualitatively New Operational Level

The Pacific Fleet can be said today to have not only retained the level of 1992, the most adverse year, which saw the "burial" of fairly modern aircraft-carrying ships (the Minsk and the Novorossiysk) and almost killed off any hope of recovery for the fleet itself. Paradoxical as it may seem, the number of combined units that do not keep a percentage of their forces on constant readiness has halved! Despite the fact that a considerable number of ships have exceeded the prescribed timeframe between repairs [istekli mezhremontnyye sroki] and another 20 ships or more have been in service for over 20 years.

For these reasons among others the number of times that Pacific Fleet ships put to sea has almost halved, but nevertheless seamen have been able to detect dozens of foreign submarines in their zone of responsibility and maintained contact with them for a long time. At the same time the Pacific Fleet has been able to ensure its nuclear submarines' combat services and alert status. Some 12 surface ships were also on alert status and this is an extremely high figure given the highly acute shortage of fuel and the poor quality of the fuel.

Two months before the end of the year the fleet has also carried out 95 percent of the planned combat training and, largely, during bilateral exercises. But regrettably by no means everything in combat training is gauged in terms of the number of exercises performed. Over the last three years, for instance, the Pacific Fleet has not carried out minelaying exercises. What is more, the last minelayer in the Russian Navy was scrapped at the beginning of the year. Fleet personnel's special training has also become less intensive. The result being around 30 accidents and incidents, 80 percent of them technical.

So much for the fleet's ships. The Pacific Fleet also comprises naval aviation, which has to its credit the detection of many foreign submarines in the fleet's area of responsibility. Admittedly, it was mainly instructor personnel that took to the skies this year and in simplified conditions at that. Only a negligible number of pilots flew the maximum permissible distance and number of hours because of fuel quotas and hardware being outdated and written off.

Nonetheless it must be pointed out that Pacific Fleet aviation began reform before other combined units, and plans to complete it by next April. Provided there is anything to fly and anyone to fly it. Some garrisons, for instance, have only 5 percent of the prescribed number of inducted personnel, without whom no aircraft will take to the skies.

Metal Fatigued, But What About People?

Why has the Pacific Fleet suddenly had an uplift instead of its predicted slow demise? Adm. Igor Kasatonov ascribes this not least to the almost 100 percent change of command echelons—the fleet is not so much being shored up by injections from outside as by people devoted to their job. At the same time the fleet and the people who comprise it have not avoided the ordeal arising from the uncontrollable development of the market. In the opinion of Rear Admiral Nikolay Zelenin, assistant commander in chief of the Navy for work with personnel, a drastic decline in official activity has been recorded in the Pacific Fleet, officers have no desire for professional advancement. This year officers have already submitted over 1,500 applications for discharge into the reserve and 794 requests have been granted. Among them even applications from ship commanders first rank.

Temptation with unofficial business has likewise caused the number of ensigns on strength to barely exceed half the required level. Nor has the recent authorization for the quota of contract personnel to be increased by 10,000 salvaged the situation. They receive their money on time, but in terms of the level of professionalism and military discipline they are no different from inducted personnel. The state of military discipline is also aggravated by the lack of one-fourth of the regulation number of officers—trainers, deputy commanders for work with personnel.

The move to contract service did not happen overnight in the U.S. Army either, and this is especially hard to accomplish in Maritime Kray, which is not that rich in manpower resources. As with the fleet's level of technical equipment, it is onshore infrastructures that are crucial here, the fundamental problems with which are rooted in the distant and the recent past.

Plenty has been said about the fleet's problems stemming from the critical state of the Russian economy. Today the external enemy image has become obscured for the men of the Pacific Fleet by the "fight" to extort the means to survive from the center. Construction of the fleet's onshore infrastructure has virtually been curtailed and, according to forecasts, in two or three years around 30 percent of the reservoirs of fuel and lubricants will become unserviceable. Given the fact that only 60 percent of the required fuel and lubricants are being supplied, this will ultimately "tie" ships to their moorings. Add to that the number of thefts which are on the increase amid the fertile environment of fuel shortages—exactly half of all Navy losses and thefts occur here in the Pacific Fleet—and the percentage of thefts recovered is the lowest in the Navy. That is where technical readiness and the human factor meet: Conscientious service is "penalized" by holdups with wages, while thieving and negligence are "encouraged" by an increase in undeserved well-being.

The trouble here is one common to Russia. Here you have the weakness of law enforcement structures, the emergent market in scarce goods, and much else besides that impedes economic recovery and the improvement of the country's state institutions, but one must realize that the fleet, the Pacific Fleet included, should not simply be a participant in market relations.

How can one explain for instance the fact that the fleet owed food suppliers around 8 billion rubles, while fines account for around 10 percent of the Pacific Fleet food service's entire expenditure? The state must either feed the fleet if it needs it, or simply send them all out to "pasture." In order to settle these and other "debts" the fleet should not take on alien functions like providing transportation services. After all, the state will itself thus be opening the way to abuse, reducing the service life of the equipment that is being leased in order to recondition this same equipment. At the moment only one-fifth of the Pacific Fleet's required funds are supplied by the state. To put it simply, this means that four out of five seamen go not only without pay, but also without uniform, food, and a chance of putting their ship to sea.

However, the men of the Pacific Fleet go "unpaid" and put their ships to sea. This means that the Pacific Fleet does not want to resign itself to being assigned second-rate status. Russia's interests in the Far East are by no means second-rate and so a first-rate fleet is required. In other words, the emergent upsurge in the status of the Pacific Fleet should be backed by all Russia. Otherwise the expectation of better times to come and a "reduction" in traveling times from Moscow to the very edge of Maritime Kray will simply not make it possible to preserve the things that still can be preserved, much less create anything new, and new friends and rivals will simply not hang around for Russia to fill this vacuum.

Draft Decree To Boost State Support for Space Effort

PM1611115993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[INTERFAX report: "Space Rocket Industry Receives State Support"]

[Text] Russia's space rocket industry will receive substantial state support in the near future. At the present time, according to information at INTERFAX' disposal, the government is considering a draft decree "On Urgent Measures To Ensure State Support for the Russian Federation's Space Activity in 1994 and Through the Year 2000," which provides, in particular, for the targeted allocation of 320 billion rubles [R] (around $273 million at the current exchange rate).

These funds will be used to pay off 1993 debts, to ensure the fulfillment of the state order and the state defense order for space technology in 1994, and to support the space program's ground-based infrastructure.

The decree provides for the elaboration of a draft program to ensure Russia's independent access to space with proposals "to transfer the development and production of materials, elements, and component parts for space rocket technology from the CIS countries to Russia."

Projects that involve the development or use of military-purpose space technology will receive the status of special-purpose federal programs and be given priority funding. The decree provides for allocation of an additional 10,000 personnel from outside the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in order to achieve tasks involving the maintenance and use of systems for scientific or national economic purposes.

Regional Affairs

President Yeltsin Arrives in Tula Region

LD1611122193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1142 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Anna Melnikova, Vladimir Gondusov, and Valeriy Rudenko]

[Text] Tula November 16 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has arrived in Yasnaya Polayna in the Tula region on Tuesday afternoon, which is the birthplace of Russian writer Leo Tolstoy.

Addressing journalists at the helicopter, Yeltsin said that it was his first visit to the home-museum of the writer, adding that "it was his duty as a Russian citizen and the president to visit the place."

Yeltsin went on to say that heads of Russian regions and districts have gathered in Tula to exchange the experience in conversion. "Local experts have something to show us in this respect," the president said. He pointed out that military exercises would be held in the Tula paratrooper division on Wednesday which he would attend jointly with heads of administrations. "Let them see how our military can defend Russians," Yeltsin added.

The Russian president and his entourage have begun to familiarize themselves with the home museum and an estate which used to belong to the renowned writer.

Tatarstan Not To Vote in Parliamentary Elections

LD1511162893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Tatarstan's voters will not elect deputies to the Federation Council because only two candidates, not three as required by law, have submitted signatures in their support. They are Tatarstan people's deputy and leader of the bloc of democratic forces Ivan Grachev and Deputy Chairman of Tatarstan's Supreme Soviet Aleksandr Lozovoy. Vice Premier Filza Khamidullin did not submit signatures and two other activists of the bloc of democratic forces did not manage to collect enough signatures in their support.

Former Deputy Chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet Yuriy Voronin, who runs for the State Duma (the lower house of the new parliament) has successfully ended the first stage of his campaign. The necessary number of signatures in his support have been collected.

In the Moskovsky electoral district of Tatarstan his rivals will be Rashid Akhmetov, the leader of the republic's

Democratic Party branch, chairman of the Soglasiye (Accord) federalist movement Vladimir Belyayev and independent Midkhat Kurmanov.

Moscow Denies Obstructing Chechnya's Ties With Outside

LD1511180393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1608 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Vosboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Russia's Foreign Ministry has no intention of obstructing relations with the outside world for members of the Russian Federation, such as Chechnya, a senior official from the Middle East Department of Russia's Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Baybakov, told Interfax on Monday.

He expressed surprise in connection with a statement made by the head of the Press and Information Department of Chechnya's Foreign Ministry, Movladi Udugov [name as received] to the effect that "Russia's Foreign Ministry blocks the delivery of humanitarian aid to Chechnya." Udugov maintained that Russia's diplomatic establishment declined to grant visas to the crew of a Jordanian transport plane destined for Groznyy.

According to Baybakov, permission for the flight in question was given to the dispatcher of the cargo—a Jordanian charity society—about a week ago. As for the delay in the granting of visas to the crew, it occurred "through the fault of the Jordanian side, which requested visas at the last minute."

In accordance with accepted procedure, Russia's normal turnaround time for entry visa applications is one week, Baybakov told Interfax. "In this case we did our best to reduce the time in question to two days, and we can only deplore the reaction of the Chechen representatives," the diplomat said.

Chechnya: Inclusion in Federation 'Provocative Attack'

LD1511163093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Chechnya has described the republic's inclusion as a constituent member of the Russian Federation in the latter's draft new constitution as a "provocative attack." Head of the republic's Information Department Movladi Udugov told Interfax in an interview Monday that the Chechen leadership viewed the inclusion as a "provocative attack" designed to make relations between Russia and Chechnya, in which some issues remained unsolved, more stringent.

Meanwhile, Interfax has been informed, the Information Department revealed its anxiety in a statement issued Monday over the fact that "the Chechen leadership's fears are being confirmed: the Russian authorities retain in their positions those who consider that the Chechen issue must be resolved by force."

"Once again Grozny, in view of the above, confirms its willingness to negotiate with the Russian Federation at any level on any issue in the interests of avoiding any forceful methods of resolving disputes," the statement read. The document also reiterates that the republic is ready for "the peaceful solution of all disputes arising between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic."

Pro-Yeltsin Opposition Holds Congress in Krasnodar

PM1511151193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Bulygin under the "Regions" rubric: "Forgetting Squabbles for the Sake of the Cause"]

[Text] Krasnodar—More than 20 political parties and social movements united by ideas of democracy and support for the Russian president and his reforms have formed the nucleus of the opposition to the present executive power in the kray.

This is not a tactical election maneuver but a desire to accelerate the process of changes, the organizers of the congress of democratic and patriotic forces of Krasnodar Kray explained at the kray headquarters of the sociopolitical movement "Russia's Choice." We intend to coordinate the efforts of the parties, unions, and associations who think like us. After all, we are talking about opposition not to the federal authorities but the local authorities.

The congress derided functionaries past and present who rose to power on the wave of August 1991. They were swept from the captain's bridge in December last year by the latest stormy struggle for leadership posts. They do not want to drown in a maelstrom of personal score-settling now. On the eve of the congress the flames of political passions were fanned by groups supporting contenders for deputies' seats in the State Duma and the Federation Council, who promised to "delight" journalists and voters with scenes of "carnage" on the election battle front and a series of scandalous revelations. The first "sign" was given at the congress: It is not only local functionaries who have gone too far but also leaders of enterprises and organizations who ordered the collection of signatures in support of Kuban governor Nikolay Yegorov.

At the kray administration's press service it was explained that it is not news to them that just the day before Nikolay Dmitriyevich was devastated by these "signals" and demanded that measures be taken to prevent the possibility of a repetition of such extraordinary occurrences. The governor himself is remaining in the shadows during the election campaign as though this has nothing to do with him, saying: This is no time for politicking, it is time for action.

Vasiliy Dyakonov, ex-governor, cochairman of the union "Rebirth of the Kuban," and one of his rivals for a seat in the Federation Council, has his own arguments: Fresh teams are needed in the power structures, people capable of new ideas and actions.

It was not a fervent desire to punish a specific leader which dominated the minds of the almost 1,000 participants in the Kuban democrats' forum but more a striving to clear away the aftermath of an all-powerful system which had fundamentally stifled people's desire to work honestly. People may have different views of the political credo of the parties and movements of a democratic orientation but you have to be objective in assessing their activity. While remaining in opposition to the present kray authorities the "Rebirth of the Kuban" union could rise above personal interests. For example, staffers of the Institute of Socioeconomic Problems and Expert Analyses created under the public association joined with leading Russian and European specialists in the formulation of a system of finance and cost-covering of private farms and in the creation of an infrastructure for the processing and sale of agricultural produce. Academician Pavel Bunich, a member of the president's Consultative Council, and Lev Ponomarev, a member of the "Russia's Choice" executive committee, who took part in the work of the congress, also shared their wise counsel with the "Kuban revivalists."

With no ulterior motive in mind, sociologists are predicting a good chance of victory in the election campaign for the kray organization of the "Russia's Choice" sociopolitical movement, which is part of the "Rebirth of the Kuban" bloc. The "Kuban revivalists" themselves are not concealing their hope that soon their representatives will predominate in the local power structures. The main thing is that whatever the outcome of the voting, the fragments of valuable experience and useful knowledge of all scientists and practical workers concerned for the fate of Russia should not go to waste.

Mari Republic Adopts New Laws on Elections

LD1611101893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1510 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Moscow, 15 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—[passage omitted] According to a report from Yoshkar-Ola, Mari President Vladislav Zotin has signed a whole series of normative acts concerning the reformation of the representative bodies of power. Among them is a law on the election of deputies to the republic's State Assembly (the Kugyzhanysh Pogyna). This dual title was confirmed by the deputies at the last extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet.

The adopted document regulates, among other things, the number of elected deputies. There should be no more than 30. Moreover, 22 of them will be elected in one-seat constituencies formed on the basis of a single government norm, and eight in a republic-wide constituency.

A law has also been adopted on the election of deputies to the town (rayon) assembly. The number of seats has also been limited here—one deputy from every administrative-territorial unit. [passage omitted]

Kabardino-Balkaria Head Urges Presidential Election

MK1611101593 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Nov 93 p 3

[Igor Terekhov report under the "Kabardino-Balkaria" rubric: "Russia's New Constitution Will Contribute to Strengthening the Federation's Unity, Kabardino-Balkaria President Valeriy Kokov Believes"]

[Text] Kabardino-Balkaria President Valeriy Kokov held a press conference in Nalchik to answer questions about the sociopolitical situation in Kabardino-Balkaria on the eve of the elections for the Russian Federation Federal Assembly. In Valeriy Kokov's view, the adoption of the Russian Federation's new constitution will contribute to strengthening the Russian Federation's unity and will help in the end "to achieve prosperity and material well-being." With regard to stylistic characteristics of the constitution's text, Kokov noted that the removal of the term "sovereign republic" in itself did not amount to narrowing the rights of the republics that are part of the Russian Federation. The Kabardino-Balkaria president thinks that the main objective of the republic's executive authorities in the near future will be to see to it that citizens turn out for the referendum and elections on 12 December.

The Kabardino-Balkaria president told correspondents that we was disappointed by Yeltsin's decision not to hold early presidential elections. Kokov remarked that by doing so the Russian president may have deprived himself of the possibility of winning renewed popular support. With regard to the internal situation in the republic, the Kabardino-Balkaria president said that Kabardino- Balkaria was on a par with its rich northern neighbors (Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays) in terms of providing people with food, and was ahead of its southern and eastern neighbors (Dagestan, Ossetia). One of the important problems facing the Kabardino-Balkaria government, in Kokov's view, is the implementation of the Russian Council of Ministers decree on providing social and economic support to Balkars who were deported to Central Asia and Kazakhstan in 1944. Out of the 14 billion rubles required for paying cash compensation to the victims, the republic will get only 1 billion—thus payments will be made first to those aged 60 and over. At the same time, President Kokov remarked that Kabardino-Balkaria has already received around 4 billion rubles for upgrading the social and production infrastructure of Balkar-populated areas.

Regarding the Russian president's edict on the introduction of private ownership of land, Kokov expressed the opinion that in the conditions of Kabardino-Balkaria this edict could not be implemented "to the full extent." In a multi-ethnic republic suffering from a shortage of land, the implementation of the edict article by article may lead not only to a civil standoff, but also to interethnic conflicts. The president announced his intention to carry out land reform in Kabardino-Balkaria taking into account local distinctions.

Zhurbenko Monitors N. Caucasus Military District

PM1511142993 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 1

[Nikolay Astashkin report under "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Combat Readiness of North Caucasus Military District Checked by General Staff"]

[Text] A final check for 1993 began among the troops of the North Caucasus Military District 10 November. It is being directed by Lieutenant General Vladimir Zhurbenko, first deputy chief of the General Staff.

Over the next week members of the commission will evaluate the combat readiness and training standards of units and combined units and the state of hardware, discipline, and order in military collectives. Special attention will be devoted to a study of living conditions, the organization of combat training, and the provision of facilities for the units and combined units being withdrawn from abroad.

Kaliningrad Air Defense Officers Unpaid for 2 Months

PM1511143393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 2

[Valeriy Gromak report under the "Urgent Signal" rubric: "Do We Await Protest Actions?"]

[Text] Kaliningrad—For several months now the officers of the air defense unit commanded by Colonel Vladimir Ushakov have been unable to explain to their children why the "uncles in black greatcoats"—the naval seamen who serve nearby—are receiving money, while their air defense daddies are not.

"Most of the unit's officers," Col. Ushakov said, "did not receive their pay for September, and no one has gotten any money for October. There is nothing with which even to pay for municipal services, just to feed the children...."

The unit commander's appeal to the corps command in Riga and to the army command in St. Petersburg produces the standard reply: "There is no money."

Maybe it would be advantageous for some people at this difficult time to stoke discontent among air defense officers? For there is already serious talk of protest actions in the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Balamarchuk....

Karelia Changes Government; Yakutia Welcomes Constitution

PM1511143793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 12 Nov 93 p 2

[Unattributed feature under the general headline "Monitoring"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Regions

A blueprint for transforming the organs of state power in Karelia has been adopted by deputies from the local parliament at the latest session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. In line with this blueprint, the highest organ of power will henceforth be called the Legislative Assembly. Today the session also formulated the question that will be posed at the republic referendum slated for 12 December 1993: "Do you think that Karelia's highest official (head of the executive branch) should be elected on a nationwide basis?" In the opinion of opposition deputies, this referendum will complicate the already saturated program of elections for 12 December. It is also planned to introduce the office of president in Karelia.

Yakutia President Mikhail Nikolayev has welcomed the draft of the new Russian Constitution. Speaking in Yakutsk, he said: "There are difficulties, and extremely serious ones, but we need to bear in mind the characteristics of the moment and rise above what seems immutable. We are not talking about the republic losing its autonomy or reviewing its constitution. The gains we have made on the road to developing our sovereignty are secure, and we will protect them under the banner of the Russian Federation Constitution."

International Affairs

Citizens View Russia as 'Main Adversary'

MK1311132093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 13 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Skachko in the "Ukraine" column: "Russia Is the Main Adversary. Such Is One of the Results of an Opinion Poll"]

[Excerpts] A sociological survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives independent research and training center in 11 centers of Ukraine in October and November has shown that material problems remain the focus of public attention. [passage omitted]

At the same time, two-thirds of the respondents recognized that economic reforms in Russia are proceeding better than in Ukraine and only 20 percent said they favor the Ukrainian reform program. Nonetheless, in spite of the generally high assessment of the Russian reforms, responding to the question "With respect to which state does Ukraine have the highest risk of military conflict?," 32.1 percent of the respondents cited Russia. [passage omitted]

The idea of preserving nuclear weapons in Ukraine until international security guarantees have been provided was favored by 32.5 percent of the respondents; 8 percent called for Ukraine to proclaim itself immediately and unequivocally a nuclear power; 40.6 percent supported the republic's neutral status, and the same proportion favored Ukraine's accession to NATO by itself or jointly with other CIS states. [passage omitted]

In the run-up to the upcoming elections noticeable changes have occurred in the respondents' attitude to political leaders and political parties. On a five-point scale, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma polled 2.86 points; President Leonid Kravchuk, 2.59; Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil, 2.34; parliament speaker Ivan Plyushch, 2.24; and Levko Lukyanenko, Ukraine's former ambassador to Canada and founder of the Ukrainian Republican Party, 2.04. [passage omitted]

Envoy to Britain Meets With Minister Hogg

LD1311222493 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Text] Sergey Komissarenko, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Great Britain, met Douglas Hogg, British minister of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. During the meeting, the ambassador stressed the need for nuclear powers in the West to provide Ukraine with security guarantees as a condition for its nuclear disarmament. He related Ukraine's negative attitude to the prospect of granting Russia's Armed Forces an international mandate to perform peacekeeping functions on the territory of the former Soviet Union. They also discussed cooperation between Ukraine and the United Kingdom in preparation for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the allied forces' victory in World War II.

The two officials dwelt separately on the issue of revising the outdated regulations of the Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls], an organization set up by Western states to control the export of new technology from and to Ukraine and former socialist bloc countries. The sides came to the shared view that given the collapse of the world Communist system, the Cocom regulations must be changed. They must be conducive to economic development of the new states formed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

EC To Assist Kiev With Chernobyl Aftermath

LD1211214993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1432 GMT 12 Nov 93

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Aleksey Petrunya for TASS]

[Text] Kiev November 12 TASS—Participation of Western countries in eradicating the effects of the Chernobyl power plant disaster was in the focus of talks between Ukrainian parliament Chairman Ivan Plyushch and visiting members of the Euro-Parliament and the Commission of European Communities.

The Ukrainian parliament chief expressed gratitude to these organisations for their contribution to studies of the actual scope of the accident and the desire to help those afflicted.

"It is our duty to create normal living conditions for these people. But Ukraine which is now in an economic crisis cannot cope alone. This is why we ask the European Parliament to take up the problem once again and step up work among Western countries to increase assistance to Ukraine. We are not asking for free humanitarian aid but for loans for which Ukraine will be able to pay in time". Plyushch said.

As concerns Ukraine's nuclear safety, Plyushch stressed that the problem embraces not only nuclear weapons but also atomic power engineering. Historically, this industry's cycle was complete within Russia. And it is now impossible to assert that Ukraine will be able to ensure its own nuclear security. Two questions are awaiting solution—economic, with all problems of the closed cycle handles on an equal basis and political including collective security.

Delegation members told the Ukrainian official they would do everything in their power to put the Chernobyl issue and assistance to Chernobyl issue on the agenda of the European Parliament and the Commission of European Communities.

Greenpeace Blocks Asbestos-Laden U.S. Ship

LD1511220693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By correspondent O. Targulyan; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The story of the U.S. vessel, the United States, which arrived in Sevastopol at the beginning of November, is starting to develop in an unexpected way. Its present Turkish bosses are trying to find a town prepared to dismantle and store 300,000 square meters of asbestos roofing. Such work would cost the United States $125 million. Turkey, following numerous protests from the "greens," banned the dismantling within its territorial waters. A factory in Sevastopol, that would be prepared to do this for $1 million, is being picketed by Greenpeace representatives, together with concerned members of the public. They are indignant over the intention to bury the asbestos, which is causing cancer and other grave illnesses, on the southern coast of the Crimea. However, the borders of the CIS are clearly inaccessible to waste products.

The United States now plans to take the asbestos to Russia and to bury it in the town of Azbest. A practice whereby rich countries produce waste and the poorer pay for it with their health and lives through burying, processing, or destroying it is absolutely immoral, Greenpeace says. We are demanding the immediate return of this poisonous vessel to its homeland, the United States.

Deputy Council Chairman Receives Canadian Envoy

AU1311172193 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 6 Nov 93 p 1

[Text] On 5 November, first deputy chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council, V.V. Durdynets, received Canadian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Ukraine Francois Matisse at his request.

In the course of their talks, opinions were exchanged on a whole range of issues of mutual interest on developing and strengthening mutually advantageous cooperation between Ukraine and Canada. They also spoke, in particular, about the package of bills that the Supreme Council intends to discuss at its plenary meetings by the end of the year and, in particular, the bill on elections.

Francois Matisse showed an interest in the basic principles of the bill and in the forthcoming elections. He outlined how Canada could give Ukraine practical assistance in solving problems, which it is willing to do, actively promoting the implementation of policy steps to build Ukrainian statehood.

Vasyl Vasylyovych Durdynets also expressed gratitude to Canada for its interest in the building of our state and for showing kind readiness to continue the practical development of interstate cooperation and interparliamentary ties.

Talks Held With Komi Side on Ties, Oil

AU1511133593 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "They Want To Trade Without Intermediaries]

[Text] Yesterday Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament Ivan Plyushch received a delegation from the Komi Republic headed by Chairman of the Supreme Council Yuriy Spiridonov. Welcoming the guests, I. Plyushch pointed out that the Komi representatives will have an opportunity to directly view the processes that are taking place in our state. This is important, because the Ostankino Television Company is often biased in elucidating and commenting upon events in the Ukraine. Yu. Spiridonov stated that he was in favor of establishing close economic cooperation between the Komi Republic and Ukrainian oblasts. We strive to develop direct ties, he stressed, and not through Moscow or Kiev. The sides discussed questions of possible oil and gas supplies to our country and problems of those Ukrainians who reside in the Komi Republic. It was decided to create special parliamentary groups for the rapid resolution of these problems.

National Affairs

Deputies Discuss Ratification of START I

LD1511230893 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2101 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 15 Nov—A broadly representative meeting of a working group of deputies for issues relating to the ratification of the START I treaty has examined a comprehensive program for the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons, endorsed by a council of ministers meeting. Valeriy Shmarov, Ukrainian deputy prime minister for issues of the military and industrial complex and conversion, delivered a report.

No copies of the program were distributed among the deputies. Despite this, Deputy Serhiy Semenets pointed out that it is a combination of many versions. The program is to take effect after a political decision as to the ratification of START I is made by the Supreme Council. A political decision without economic backing, however, is impossible. The amount of money needed to implement the program will depend on the version that is adopted. Endorsing this program, in Deputy Sements' words, will mean that Ukraine effectively gives up on one of the three conditions of the ratification of the treaty, which is financial assistance in dismantling the missiles. (Around $5 billion is needed to dismantle 176 missiles.)

In Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov's words, the START I Treaty will be ratified this week.

The working group is to continue its discussions in a lunch break at the Supreme Council session on 16

November. It is there that the issue of the ratification of the treaty is to be resolved, Deputy Supreme Council Chairman Vasyl Durdynets, who chaired the meeting, said. He pointed out that deputies "must arrive at a decision on START" and that the commission would recommend that the Supreme Council deputies ratify the treaty.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy and Foreign Affairs Minister Anatoliy Zlenko took part in the working group's meeting.

Kravchuk's Adviser on Cuts in Nuclear Missiles

LD1511210893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1608 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Vosboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Anton Buteyko, Ukrainian presidents foreign policy adviser, said in a national TV interview Sunday that "the former USSR's successors must decide themselves how many rockets each of them will cut... Ukraine has repeatedly suggested holding a conference with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia to determine the extent of cuts in compliance with the Lisbon Protocol but has never had a response to this proposal."

Buteyko said that Ukraine was pressed from both West and East. Some are worried by the threat posed by the nuclear weapons while others would deprive Ukraine from the weapons without compensating for them, he complained.

Buteyko said that Russia wanted to implement START-1 at Ukraine's expense. The presidential adviser recalled that Russia has paid Ukraine nothing for the use of the former USSR's foreign assets and skirted sharing the Diamond Fund of the former USSR. Buteyko thinks that Russia should, as the successor of the USSR, to undertake the servicing and take responsibility for security of the rockets that were manufactured on its soil.

The presidential adviser feared that if it signed START-1, Ukraine would not be technically capable of implementing it.

New Defense Chief Orders Personnel Changes

AU1511201593 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 12 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Who's Next?"]

[Text] The cadres revolution at Ukraine's Ministry of Defense is gaining momentum after the chief of personnel, the quite well known Major General Volodymyr Mulyava, was dismissed from the post of chief of the Sociopsychological Administration. As reported by the Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, during a meeting with the personnel of the administration, Minister of Defense Colonel General Vitaliy Radetskyy stated that first deputy commanders (for political affairs?) must be responsible for the sociopsychological services. Regarding this, the minister has issued an order on reorganizing the Sociopsychological Service into the Main Administration for Educational and Sociopsychological work and appointed Major General Anatoliy Kobzar, who previously served together with V. Radetskyy in Odessa, as its chief.

According to the same Press Service of the Ministry of Defense, Major General V. Mulyava was appointed as the defense minister's assistant for ties with the public, parties, and movements.

Kravchuk Signs Edict Replacing Economic Adviser

AU1611110493 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 13 Nov 93 p 1

["Ukrainian Presidential Edict on the Ukrainian Presidential Adviser on Questions of the Market Economy" issued in Kiev on 11 Nov]

[Text] Yuriy Heorhiyovych Baskakov is appointed Ukrainian presidential adviser on issues of market economy and Ihor Romanovych Markulov is dismissed from this post owing to his transfer to another position.

[Signed] Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk
[Dated] Kiev 11 November 1993

Rukh Rejects Presidential Elections in Crimea

LD1511190793 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1610 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 15 Nov—The ,Popular Movement of Ukraine [Rukh] has made public a statement on the occasion of the presidential elections in the Republic of Crimea and the refusal to register the regional Rukh organization on the peninsula. In its statement, Rukh called on the democratic forces and all the residents of Crimea not to participate in the illegal presidential elections. The statement stressed that holding them will harm Ukraine's authority as a territorially undivided state. Protests against the presidential elections as an expression of separatism were also expressed by the all-Crimean Congress of Ukrainians, the Majles of the Crimean Tatar people and the Crimea Civic Congress.

Civil Congress Urges United Election Effort

WS1611115993 Kiev KIEVSKIE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Ukrainian Civil Congress Calls on Republican, Socialist Parties of Ukraine To Unite Efforts in Struggle for Mixed Elections"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Civil Congress has come out with the proposal of holding a "roundtable" that would allow representatives of different parties to express their opinions about the new electoral system. Since the legislature is delaying this issue, and the majority of parties speak out for a mixed system, representatives of the Ukrainian Civil Congress propose that all of them—from the Ukrainian Socialist Party to the Ukrainian Republican Party—unite in a common effort. According to A. Luzan, member of the Civil Congress Presidium, this would be a step toward social accord.

Opting for a mixed system, the Ukrainian Civil Congress is against a preliminary collection of signatures for party lists. The congress considers it necessary to establish a 3-percent barrier for parties.

Organization Outlines Nuclear Position

AU1611075693 Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU in Ukrainian 6 Nov 93 p 2

[Statement by the "Ukrainian People's Embassy": "A Nuclear Ukraine in a Nuclear-Free World Only"]

[Text] **The All-Ukrainian Fund for promoting international relations and called "The Ukrainian People's Embassy" has disseminated a statement on questions of Ukraine's nuclear weapons. The statement reads, in particular, the following:**

The Ukrainian People's Embassy puts forward a demand that the President, Supreme Council, and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian state be guided by the principle "There is no policy that is correct or incorrect. There is a policy in the interests of Ukraine" when it comes to the question of Ukraine's nuclear weapons. This does not mean that leaders of our state must renounce their statements on the expediency of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Our state must agree to fully eliminate its nuclear arsenal, provided that all nuclear powers of the world totally eliminate their nuclear weapons. "A nuclear-free state in a nuclear-free world"—the Ukrainian People's Embassy recommends that Ukrainian politicians recognize this principle as fundamental to Ukraine's external political and military doctrine. Its proclamation will give Ukraine such a considerable moral advantage that it will make it possible to enlist the support of the world community.

Ukraine has more than enough reasons to amend its policy and to incorporate in it the principle "A nuclear-free Ukraine in a nuclear-free world." Such new realities of today as officially proclaimed territorial claims upon Ukraine on the part of Russia point to this first and foremost. Ignoring the condemnation adopted by the UN Security Council, the Russian parliament has not canceled its decision on severing Sevastopol from Ukraine. Who can offer our fatherland a guarantee that territorial claims upon it will not end at this? The Ukrainian People's Embassy is convinced that the Ukrainian nuclear shield is the only guarantor of Ukraine's sovereignty and the only constraint against the encroachments on the part of the neighboring and other nuclear powers. It will be possible to disregard a disarmed and economically weak Ukraine. This is what NATO and Russia, united in their plans to destroy the Ukrainian nuclear shield with the help of their policy of threats and bribery, are striving to achieve. Natural questions arise: Why are not the present Ukrainian leaders alerted by the circumstance that the United States and Russia, while making particularly great efforts to rid Ukraine of its factual nuclear status, at the same time steadily modernize their own nuclear weapons and declare, with increasing vigor, their geopolitical interests in all parts of the globe? Why didn't Ukraine take part in the negotiations between the United States and Russia when they decided, on their own, the fate of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory? Why does Great Britain, even though it is protected by the nuclear shield of the United States, refuse to get rid of its nuclear weapons referring to them as an important factor of deterrence? Who can guarantee that, in the near future, nuclear powers will not start defending their geopolitical interests on Ukrainian land with the help of blatant pressure and weapons, like, for example, in Iraq, Tajikistan, and so on? It is known that, in such cases, it does not take long to find an excuse. Therefore, proceeding from the geopolitical interests of the present and future generations of our people, the Ukrainian People's Embassy finds it expedient for the Ukrainian state to remain within the club of nuclear powers until the last day of this club's existence.

Having stated its position regarding the problem of Ukraine's nuclear status, the Ukrainian People's Embassy, at the same time, believes that the people themselves, and not politicians, must ultimately decide whether the Ukrainian nuclear shield must exist or not. In this connection, the Ukrainian People's Embassy is turning to Ukraine's Supreme Council and president with an initiative to offer the following question for a nationwide referendum: "Do you find it expedient for Ukraine to have nuclear weapons sufficient for its defense until all nuclear powers of the world totally eliminate nuclear weapons? Yes. No."

The statement by the Ukrainian People's Embassy is open for signing by political parties, public organizations, state and public activists, and collectives of Ukrainian citizens.

Slavic Unity Party Leader Interviewed

PM1511140993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 6

[Interview with V. Petrenko, a leader of the Slavic Unity Party, by Boris Sverdlov under the "New Neighboring Countries" rubric; place and date not given: "Ukraine: Slavs Cannot Live Apart"]

[Text] Ukraine has gained yet another public organization—the Slavic Unity Party. The event has had a big impact. Many people see its program as containing seeds of rationality which will, as they grow, not only help the young state unite its people but also promote the rapprochement of Slavs of the former Union, which is a most urgent necessity today, according to V. Petrenko, one of the party's leaders, at which point our conversation begins.

[Petrenko] The people have grown tired of the appeals and slogans of the extremists, who go so far as to issue threats now. In Lvov, for example, Ukrainian nationalists have virtually demanded that the "Russkies" clear off home. I have often been in the western oblasts. The overwhelming majority of the people do not support the frenzied anti-Russian propaganda, they cherish our common history.

Recently the Ivano-Frankovsk Council of Great Patriotic War Veterans decided to hold wreath-laying ceremonies at monuments to our dead servicemen. The nationalists, supported by the local press, tried to prevent this. They eventually managed, only after scouring the whole oblast, to round up about 30 louts to break up the gathering of old men.

Or take the headline-grabbing trip to the Crimea by Stepan Khmara, well known for his nationalistic views. No saboteurs could have done as much harm to the integrity of Ukraine. After all, the first shot fired on nationalist grounds will sound Ukraine's death knell. One of our party's tasks is to publicize via the mass media all the good things that have united the Slavic peoples throughout their centuries-long history.

[Sverdlov] I noticed when I read the party's program that it disagrees with Ukraine being monolingual.

[Petrenko] True, the party favors the immediate introduction of bilingualism. Otherwise, there will be no peace and harmony in the republic. President Snegur recently acknowledged that the building of a monolingual state has been too costly for Moldova. It is surely clear that Ukraine, where a large part of the population communicates in Russian, is threatened by the same calamity.

[Sverdlov] Yet Rukh's leader V. Chornovil claims that Ukrainian will stagnate if Russian is granted the status of the second state language. The majority will take the path of least resistance and will continue to communicate in Russian.

[Petrenko] The Ukrainian language did not stagnate even when the empire and, later on, the Union, held sway over the republic. Today the likelihood of its being pensioned off is even more remote, if for no other reason but that an abundance of Ukrainian-language newspapers and magazines have appeared on the newstands...

What is more, the collapse of the Union dealt a painful blow to the Slavs' whole spiritual ethos. Today, for example, great Russian classic authors have disappeared from school literature textbooks. New history textbooks contain much defamatory material too. Could the Slavic Unity Party fail to notice that? We consequently have a lot of scope for activity here.

[Sverdlov] The presidential and parliamentary elections are approaching. Does the party intend to put its own candidates forward?

[Petrenko] We have resolved to form a bloc with parties which are close to us in terms of their goals and tasks such as the Civic Congress of Ukraine and the Labor Party. We will be supporting their candidates.

Labor Party Appeals for Centrist Bloc

WS1611120393 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 4 Nov 93 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Another Idea of Electoral Bloc Has Matured in Labor Party"]

[Text] The All-Ukrainian Labor Party has issued a preelection appeal to political parties, trade unions, and social organizations. The appeal states that forces of a centrist orientation, that is, those who base their policies on the interests of working people, must find a common language. These policies are the following: "Workers and teachers, farmers and businessmen, ordinary employees and superiors—all those who create material and spiritual values for Ukraine—must have equal opportunities to implement their skills and earn as much as possible with their labor. We speak out against a wild and predatory market and for a socially oriented market economy."

The Labor Party calls on all those who share similar goals to unite into a centrist "Labor" [trud] bloc.

'New Ukraine' Association Adopts Program

LD1511162293 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1415 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] On 13 November at a meeting of the larger council of the New Ukraine Association, representatives of its regional organizations supported the theses of the "Democratic Center's" election platform and called on those who formed the "Democratic Center" and were involved with "New Ukraine" to speed up work in connection with the approaching parliamentary elections. The draft of "New Ukraine's" election program was adopted. It will be sent into the regions to be reworked and supplemented. It was decided to hold the scheduled third congress of "New Ukraine" on 18-19 December.

Volodymyr Hrynyov, chairman of the association's coordinating council, stated that the association's experts are approaching the end of monitoring the government's activities, and that it was now clear that the actions of Leonid Kravchuk's cabinet have an anti- market nature.

Belarus

Kebich Addresses Supreme Soviet on Economy

WS1511150093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0932 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Speech by Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich at the 13th Supreme Soviet session in Minsk—live, in Russian]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies: Not sharing some of the views expressed in previous addresses, but following the expressed desire to pull the cart of the economy not according to the principle of Krylov's fable, I would like to voice the position of the government on certain issues.

Over the last two days, deputy prime ministers and ministers have addressed deputies at joint meetings of Supreme Soviet committees, and reported in detail about the key trends of government activities in the economic sphere. This spares me the need to expound on separate issues and allows me to focus on the most pressing problems.

The government assesses the current economic and social situation in the Republic quite realistically and shrewdly. This situation is extremely difficult indeed. To better understand it, we must realize that this is not some local crisis, but that the crisis of the old state, political, and economic system is continuing. The current difficulties facing the Belarusian people are an unavoidable result of the transition to a qualitatively new economy. We have stated clearly and unequivocally about our course to the formation of a market economy of full value as a measure of ensuring a decent standard of living for the Belarusian people. We are trying to implement this course steadily. At the same time, we must take into account the fact that more than half of all problems originate beyond the borders of our Republic. It would be wrong for Belarus to draw on the experience of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and other countries. We have our own way.

Implementing the program of the transition toward a market economy through evolution, the government has not lost its control over the economy, and it has prevented the chaos and collapse in the economy, agriculture, and other industries.

We have managed to create a social security system, even though being at the limit of our financial possibilities. Over a short time, the Republic has managed to integrate with international financial structures and obtain the first foreign credits. We have resolved the problem of foreign debt—the legacy of the old Soviet Union. As you all remember, the Belarusian foreign debt accounted for $4.3 billion. Had this debt fallen on our shoulders, Belarus would have had to pay tens of millions of dollars a month beginning in January 1992. Owing to our persistent efforts, however, Russia met our requirements and agreed to the zero option. At the same time, many large problems still remain. They concern practically all spheres of the economy. The government knows and sees them, and has its own position on how to get out of the crisis.

The government intends to implement the following measures to overcome the crisis in the sphere of budget and taxes:

—to preserve the budget deficit on the level of the current year, which is possible only under an efficient tax system and a strict and restricting approach to state financing;

—to reduce considerably and gradually remove subsidies for producers and direct them to consumers immediately;

—to strengthen the state's support rendered to definite social groups; funds must go to those people who need them most of all; we should abandon the practice of revising personal incomes by increasing the minimum wages;

—to reduce preferential bank credits to the minimum by allotting budget money for the lowering of bank interest rates on credits for priority industries;

—to renounce the formation of the state currency fund through administrative measures; to set a unified exchange rate for state needs, and to exempt currency revenues from taxes;

—to make separate social institutions self-supporting;

—to reduce the number of enterprises supported by the state. A producer who cannot ensure the effectiveness of his or her enterprise without financial injections of the state must either restructure the business or cease functioning, as the bankruptcy law requires.

The economic situation in the republic and the increase in prices for imported energy resources to the world level brings us to the objective conclusion that there must be a duty on deliveries of oil and gas to the territory of Belarus, as well as on their rail, air, and road transit.

To sustain the excessive deficit and finance all expenditures it includes, we had to maintain pretty high taxes. However, the government's present strategy today is to gradually reduce them. Everyone understands that lower taxes encourage more production. On the other hand, this can lead to a gap in the budget, and it is not easy to maintain a balance. The government has already submitted to the present Supreme Soviet session a proposal on altering the tax system. In particular, we propose that the value-added tax be reduced from 25 to 20 percent, the fuel tax from 20 to 10 percent, and the extraordinary Chernobyl tax from 18 to 12 percent. In addition, we proposed to completely remove the tax on hard currency revenues and mandatory payments to the fund of rear regulation [tylovoye regulirovaniye]. As a result, the overall share of income tax payments will be reduced from 18.7 percent to 14.4 percent next year. To get out of the crisis, one has to revise certain laws and annul provisions regulating financial allocations by economic branches.

In the credit policy, we support the line of the National Bank to toughen credit policies. Together with the National Bank, we will ensure credits for the priority branches, first of all, for the conversion program and for agriculture. I will not go into further details as the National Bank chairman will take the floor on this issue.

The credit and finance system depends on the situation in the payment balance. According to preliminary estimates, its deficit amounts to $250 million. At the same time, Ukraine's debt to our enterprises is 44 billion rubles [R], Moldova R2 billion, Uzbekistan R4.2 billion, Estonia R1.5 billion, Azerbaijan and Turkmenia R1.2 billion each, which under the conditions of currency inconvertibility, damages our economy. The collapse of the ruble zone prevents us from paying Russia normally for its energy sources. The above-mentioned reasons and our negative trade balance force us to resort to external financing. To change the current situation, the government has already undertaken a number of practical measures. It reduced export taxes to a minimum. All customs duties in trading with the Russian Federation have been lifted. There are no more licenses and quotas. The measures that we adopted eased our account-settlement with Russia and provided the minimum energy supplies for Belarus. This problem, however, was not resolved completely, and it remains one of the government's top priorities.

We solve it in two ways. First, by directing to Russia a portion of goods that Belarus exports to other Republics, with which it has a positive trade balance. Second, by reestablishing links with Russia on a new market basis. Relevant documents were given to the deputies for approval. You can ask me how the government will act if unsurpassable obstacles to monetary unification arise—even though I received information that no such obstacles should be expected. The answer is natural: We will have to introduce our national currency, even with all the negative consequences this might cause. The negative payment balance and lack of a stabilization fund will immediately trigger devaluation of the national currency and a new spiral of inflation. Given the fact that Russia will remain our main energy source and the major marketplace for our enterprises for a long time,the government will seek to create a comprehensive economic and financial union with Russia. Until the financial and economic unification is accomplished our state will coordinate its activities with Russia. But before we take any practical steps toward the highest form of integration, we all should realize that Russia is a friendly but independent state, and vice versa.

We are a state with our own judicial, finance, and tax systems, price and customs policies, and social protection measures. This is why it would be naive to think that unification will take place automatically and yield one-sided and instant benefits. One should keep in mind that we are left with less leeway for correcting already adopted decisions. The advantage is that both states having unconvertible currencies seek to make them more stable, coordinating their budget and deficit limits. Based on the resources of their National Banks, they would jointly determine the amounts of credit allocations, coordinating their tax policies without applying discriminating prices. They would also execute customs control. The problems of mutual settlements disappear.

In the opinion of the government, these moves promote the faster and simpler unification of capital through stock holding companies and corporations. However, this does not mean that our social support of the population will equal or even be less than in Russia. It is easier to stabilize the economy and the financial system of Belarus through joint efforts. Moreover, Russia gives us this chance. In case we do not use it, we will lose an immense Russian market, as well as time. I want to stress once again: Until the monetary systems are united, our government is going to pursue a tough economic policy in coordination with the Russian Government.

The economically developed states and international credit and money organizations agree that it is easier to alleviate a predicament through joint efforts. They share our approach toward the preservation of the Eastern markets. It is evident that the partner should be reliable. The following factors will guarantee the reliability of our Eastern partners:

—An independent tough monetary policy and the political willpower in implementing economic restructuring;

—Liberalization of trade and export;

—Lifting restrictions on imported goods;

—Introduction of favorable taxes on imported goods;

—Privatization;

—Wide scale stock holding of the state property with the participation of foreign capital.

In this case, Belarus will obtain foreign investments both for repairing the balance of payment deficit and for payment for energy resources.

Energy Resources

Currently, this issue is most acute for the Republic. Almost daily, the government is forced to deal with this issue. We have almost managed to overcome the obstacles in the deliveries of energy resources—oil, gas, fuel oil, and gasoline—to Belarus. That is, the issue of the delivery of energy resources has been solved. Currently, the issue of payments is most pressing for the Republic. As market relations have not yet been introduced in the fuel-energy complex and almost all the deliveries have been performed through state structures, the government and the National Bank had to fulfill all the payments for energy resources with Russian suppliers. At the same time, our Belarusian consumers are isolated from the energy suppliers and this problem has to be resolved by the government. It is all too easy to express one's dissatisfaction! However, nobody wants to find a solution! Anyway, they will have to as they must pay for oil, gas, and electricity in the currency demanded by the suppliers. In this case, I mean Russian rubles or dollars. In the near future, the government will adopt a decision on a six-month state currency loan for paying for energy deliveries.

For the winter, we have to obtain 1 million tonnes of fuel oil. Currently, we have about 0.5 tonnes of it. We require 5 billion cubic meters of gas, 3.5 billion kW/hours of electricity. We will have to pay $600 million or R750 billion. The greatest part of this sum will be paid from the sale of Belarusian goods in the Russian market. If we do not get credit from Russia, the remaining debt will be paid from the Republican currency resources. Along with this, payments for energy resources and the price increase on them still remain the most painful issues. We expect that, according to our previous agreements, some commercial structures will pay for oil and gas in Russian currency and the government will repay them in Belarusian currency.

Next, we have started to implement new forms of direct cooperation with Russian oil and gas extracting companies. We have signed an agreement on the creation of two stock holding companies including Belarusian Belatransgaz and Russian Gazprom, Mozyr oil processing plant and Russian Mionneftegaz. Energy resources affect not only the production sphere. The climbing prices on energy resources are constantly twisting the inflation spiral. Sharp increases in prices of energy resources account for some 70 percent of inflation in the Republic. Thus, the government has adopted the following measures:

1. The introduction of tough norms on the use of energy resources;

2. The implementation of economic sanctions against economic entities using greater quantities of energy resources;

3. A cut in the production of energy consuming and raw materials consuming goods.

These moves will prevent the rise of production costs and plummet a monthly inflation from 25 to 10 percent in 1994. The accelerated tempo of the reforms will also curb inflation. We have the required legal basis for the implementation of the reforms. The market infrastructure is being developed, state property is being transformed. At the same time, the laws on privatization and vouchers were adopted only in the summer of 1993. As of 12 November, 28,000 small enterprises, cooperatives, and limited liability companies, some 240 stock holding companies, over 1,000 joint ventures with foreign capital, some 2,600 individual farms have been set up in Belarus. The nonstate forms of ownership account for 15 percent of the industrial output. In order to more quickly create a competitive sphere, to promote production, the government is making specific moves toward the implementation of a privatization program adopted by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet. We can even exceed the supposed level of privatization in 1994—foreseen by the program—in the sphere of consumer services privatization.

The more active conducting of auctions will allow us to privatize no less than 50 percent of all enterprises in the first six months of next year. The government will put particular emphasis on transforming state property into joint-stock companies, with participation of foreign capital from countries near and far. Unless we privatize our enterprises and establish joint-venture enterprises with foreign countries our Republic will not be recognized around the world, and we will not be able to overcome the crisis anytime soon. Otherwise, our republic will not become attractive to those who are willing to invest in the Belarusian economy, and we will never outweigh our trade balance and finances. It is necessary to deal carefully with these issues, however not conservatively. By the way, international financial organizations consider the government's guidelines of the economic policy appropriate at the present stage. This position was expressed at a late-October meeting of an international consulting-financial group designed for Belarusian issues. It was admitted that Belarus is proceeding on the path of market reforms, however, the privatization process remains sluggish. According to international experts' estimates, if our Republic continues on the present course, certain growth in production will be possible as early as 1995. These estimates fall in line with the government's reckoning. During this meeting, representatives of a large group of European countries, the United States, Japan, and international financial organizations, voted in favor of a hefty package of financial aid to Belarus. The IMF has already granted Belarus $98 million as the first portion of a credit for economic reform, and another sum of approximately the same amount is expected to arrive this year.

At this time, our debt, not including the Russian debt, amounts to $506 million. This way, the government complies entirely with the $710-million debt limit that was set by the Supreme Soviet. The $385-million Russian debt will be paid by 2003. The limit set by the Supreme Soviet is R500 billion. I am saying this to put things straight once again: The credits we receive from foreign partners are convenient for us. One must not stir up hysteria around this issue, as some are already doing, saying that we are selling ourselves into bondage, squandering the nation's property, and that our grandchildren will have to pay for this. Because of that, I would like to state that we are not squandering anything. The majority of credits is in hard currency, at low interest rates, and granted on preferential terms. After all, it must be taken into consideration that there is such a term as credit security in the international practice, and the government's policy fully complies with it. The IMF and the World Bank believe that a foreign debt should not exceed 50 percent of a nation's gross domestic product. As of today, our debt is below that level.

The strategy for market reform demands a principal change in the course of industrial policy. The government has worked out a special program for structural reconstruction of industry. Completion of this program will allow for the reconstruction, first of all, of the manufacturing branches, making them competitive in the next five or seven years. Nevertheless, only crucial and promising branches can count on government help. The following are the branches that have been recognized as priority ones: the tank- building industry, electronics, equipment-building industry, computer manufacturing, communication equipment, pharmaceutical industry, as well as polymer and construction materials industry. A more friendly tax and credit regime is to be introduced for these branches.

In 1994, all key projects for the structural reconstruction will be implemented, including such massive projects as Belelectronics, Belcomputer, and Beltelevision, as well as the production of modern metal-processing machine tools, new construction materials, medicines, and diagnostic equipment. In 1994, the conversion of the military complex will be conducted by modernizing and broadening the scope of products and services, including the introduction of civilian-use technology. This will allow us not only to preserve the scientific potential of these enterprises, but also to establish foundations necessary to adapt modern computer science and machine-building technologies in other branches of the economy. We have in mind not only changing the profile of the military industry, but also development of the service sector which, thanks to its specific economic nature, is able to become a source of additional investments in a relatively short period of time.

In this regard, new economic structures will be introduced more widely in the nonstate sector. In the next year, an array of projects will be launched aimed at meeting demands of the domestic consumer market, as well as at development of the import of alternative products and the infrastructure for production. The most important among these is the construction of an oil-processing complex by utilizing Western technologies, attracting foreign credits, producing diesel engines, and other means. Measures for stimulating enterprises' investment activities and extending their export possibilities should be backed by active reconstructing of state-owned enterprises, adapting them to market conditions, as well as increasing incentives and responsibility for the results of work. Partially, it relates to the commercialization of large industrial enterprises, which provides for their conversion into state-joint- stock companies of market nature. Our industry, except the chemical and oil-processing branches, begins to gradually extricate from the crisis caused by the collapse of economic structures, and to adjust itself to the rules and demands of the market economy. Not everybody has been equally successful in doing this, due to relatively justified reasons. The government sees its responsibility of supporting them and helping overcome such a complex situation. These are not only the enterprises being currently converted. The investment-purpose branches are also experiencing great difficulties, which are connected with the possibilities of their traditional consumers. First of all, it relates to the tank-building, heavy machine-building, and construction materials industries. It is very important to help these branches live through the hard times. It is obvious that in a year or two, their investment activity will increase and boost production. Undoubtedly, their competitiveness will also rise. In this regard, the government will take advantage of budget funds and credits. This does not mean that government support will be provided for everyone.

We will no longer finance bankruptcies. There was enough time for adapting—we let the managers know beforehand about it, and for this reason we had to dismiss many of them. Assistance will be given only to those, who work boldly and effectively, who, on the basis of serious marketing, implement deep restructuring of an enterprise for the production that meets the world market's demands. We want to direct the state financial resources to specific programs and business plans. We reject the indiscriminate approach categorically.

Provision of Food, Rural Questions

In implementing economic reform, the government gives much attention to the development of agro-industrial complex which suffers from many acute problems caused by a general economic crisis. Many of them were discussed by people's deputies and reviewed in the preceding speech. It is a problem of prices and payments, of provision of energy resources, of material and technical supply. No matter how great the difficulties, the government took measures to compensate additional costs caused by the liberalization of prices in industry and by natural disasters. During the past period the agro-industrial complex received 460 billion rubles from the state budget and from a nonbudget fund for regulation of retail prices, comprising one-fourth of all Republican expenditures, and over 700 billion rubles in credits. This is three-fourths of the centralized credit resources in the national economy. The question of payments for sold output was resolved, though with a delay. Notwithstanding the gloomy prognoses of our opponents concerning the [word indistinct] sowing and harvest, all agricultural work was, though with great difficulties, supplied with finances and resources. It helped the rural workers raise and harvest the crop.

The situation in animal husbandry is also changing for the better. The work was done, and its results allow us to state that the supply of basic food for the internal market will not decrease this winter. Along with it, we do not simplify the situation. Many collective farms are in dire financial straits. Capital stock replacement is slowed down, maintenance of the social sphere is becoming totally complicated. Since in the market economy the principal source of broadened production is income, the government will implement a way to free purchase prices for all agricultural production that allows for a parity of prices between industry and agriculture. Of course, this will affect retail prices too. The mentioned measures are dictated not only by our internal situation. If the prices for food in neighboring countries are free, and our borders are transparent, there is no other way.

Budget support for the agro-industrial complex will continue. The budget provides about 2.5 trillion rubles for this purpose, that is, 24 percent of its input. These measures will be directed to implementing specific Republican programs —grain, sugar, vegetable oil, financing of agrarian science, construction of the most important objects. Currently, R200 billion is provided for covering the purchase price surcharges, but we are changing the payment order radically. I ask you to understand me properly. The payments will go directly to the suppliers of production bypassing the multistage bureaucracy system from ministry to rayon administration.

[Words indistinct] decreasing financial burden of kolkhozes and sovkhozes in the maintenance and social sphere, the work will be continued in order to transfer the balance to local soviets. Now the question of financing these matters is worked out.

Understanding that agrarian reform implementation is an issue of great political and social importance, I would like to underscore the government viewpoint once more. We will not jeopardize food supplies for the population to satisfy someone's striving for speed, breaking, or whipping up tensions. Everything should proceed according to the law and common sense. In compliance with the Law on Land Ownership, the government adopted necessary normative acts allowing 2.5 million people to privately own land. However, it is the collective farms that turn out, and will do so in the future, most of the production. This is why methods for their transformation will be balanced and not forced. The government will continue to reform ownership relations, actively support private farms, establish joint-stock companies, turning them into a competitive sector of agriculture.

Social Policy

The government will continue to support the mechanisms for social protection that cushion the population's economic hardships. Since thus far we did not succeed in curbing prices for food staples, we have concluded that our approach should be radically revised. A draft program providing residential aid [adresnaya pomoshch] by the state is being developed. Its idea is to provide aid only to those who badly need it, instead of distributing a little to everyone. Apparently, the system of benefits should be sorted out. Look what is happening now. Overall benefits regarding public transportation, housing, public utilities, communications, fuels, healthcare, etc. reach more than R100 million per year—about the same amount paid in pensions and welfare benefits from the Social Protection Fund. Our position on this issue is as follows: Only socially insecure citizens should receive state benefits.

The government will continue to keep the Chernobyl problem at the center of its attention. In spite of lowering the proposed Chernobyl tax for next year, we will spend R1.5 trillion on this. As for the economically productive part of the population, the main source of its well-being should become wages put in direct proportion to productive contributions. However, the state has virtually lost control over this sphere. It is completely obvious that increasing wages unsupported by production undermines our economy, triggers inflation, and lowers the standard of living. Empty money, not backed by goods, is worthless. The government is determined to put an end to this. We again propose to the Supreme Soviet that the wage scale become mandatory and not just a recommendation. Also, the State Labor and Social Protection Committee should be given powers to curtail excessive funds allocated for wages, and perhaps even introduce a tax on excessive income. This would be one of the anticrisis measures.

The resolution of the housing problem has always been, and still is, one of the most important thrusts of our social protection policy. However, the policy itself has undergone serious changes. With the appearance of a housing market and the ability of many people to build houses on their own, the government has focused on the socially insecure in its social protection programs. Private housing construction remains at a very high level.

Esteemed People's Deputies! The above-mentioned system of anticrisis measures, which the government is resolute to carry out, forms a foundation for the economic program and the budget for the next year submitted to the Supreme Soviet. One more thing, we have proposals on reforming the Cabinet of Ministers and its administration. This will be reported to the Supreme Soviet separately when personnel issues are discussed. The implementation of measures is expected to halt the dwindling production. We expect gross national product, national income, and industrial production to drop about 4 percent, which is three times less than this year. In agriculture, it is possible to achieve growth of 1.5-2 percent. The same figure is expected for consumer products. With half as much inflation, this will allow for the gap between rising wages and consumer prices to be held in check. If we manage to do this, without exceeding the budget deficit, this could mean that the most difficult period of reform is sustained with the least loss. The potential of our economy and society is far from exhausted. It can lift us out of the difficult situation where we all have found ourselves. Our task is to make the most of this potential.

Shushkevich Addresses Supreme Soviet on Economy

WS1211153093 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0740 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Speech by Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich at the regular 13th Supreme Soviet session in Minsk—live]

[Text] The subject of my report is how Belarus is going to alleviate its predicament in the social-economic sphere. Even the Belarusian Government states that the Republic has found itself amid an economic carnage. Before I begin, I would like to say that I am going to use the expression market economy a lot. I am a strong supporter of the market economy, and I would like to explain my position to all the deputies. The issue is that there are objective figures showing how the state exists and how its people live. For example, the average life expectancy, the mortality rate for children; well, I can enumerate even more factors, like the annual profit per capita. The ideologists of the erstwhile USSR stated that in a capitalist society, a small group of the rich reigns while the remaining population works. Therefore, the average annual profit per capita is very low. At any rate, if you analyze the statistics of the most developed capitalist countries, these figures are very high. That was why the whole of mankind has concluded that this means of economic development is the best. We can be sure that economic changes are irreversible when the economy is stable and the effective market reforms have been implemented. The principal features of the market economy are:

1. The majority of the population are private owners. Everyone can engage in any kind of enterprise.

2. The economic relations in society are subordinated to existing laws and not to the wishes of the authorities. The laws are simple and explicit. Implementation of the laws can be easily controlled.

3. The state promotes free enterprise, protects the interests of the entrepreneurs, creates equal conditions for all the economic entities, helps them win foreign markets, and obtain resources.

All of us know the strategy of shifting to the market economy. It is being implemented in dozens of countries—from Vietnam to Hungary and [former] East Germany. Considering the differences in approaches, the way to the market economy consists of four stages:

1. Steadfast privatization and creation of a layer of owners.

2. Creation of a stable national financial infrastructure.

3. Integration into the world economy, or a step-by-step liberalization of foreign economic relations.

4. Creation of a proper system of social protection of the population.

The legal basis for restructuring the economy has been created. The Belarusian Supreme Soviet has adopted and enacted laws on foreign investments, on ownership, on free enterprise, on state enterprises, on the right to land ownership, on demonopolization and privatization of state property, on vouchers, on stock holding companies, on limited liability companies, on demonopolization, on securities, on stock markets, on commodity exchanges, on the Belarusian National Bank, on bank activities, on insolvency, on bankruptcy, on customs, and so on. I cannot say that these laws are ideal. However, they outline the principal line in the economic development of the Republic—the direction toward the social- economic sovereignty, the consecutive and decisive introduction of market relations and the stabilization and rise of the effectiveness of the national economy. I want to stress that all the government's proposals on economic restructuring that had been submitted for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet, including the 1991 Republican program for transferring to market relations, the 1991 state program for the stabilization of the economy and social protection of the population, and the Republican state privatization program, have been discussed and adopted.

Should We Blame the Economic Reforms for the Economic Crisis?

So, the Government had the laws and a state program to transfer to the market economy. Therefore, the Republic could go the way of economic reforms, the way of Hungary, Poland, and other countries that have provided economic growth to their countries. I want to stress that the initial conditions for the implementation of economic reforms in Belarus were not worse, but even better than in some other countries. Belarus had to begin implementation of the reforms on 13 October 1990 when the Supreme Soviet adopted the state program on the shift to the market economy. This program was not flawed. It declared that Belarus was building an independent national economy. Some four years have passed. The same Government and the same Supreme Soviet. However, no changes in the economy, no results. Who is responsible? Sure, there were objective conditions and various difficulties. At the last Supreme Soviet session, I analyzed them in my speech and proposed a way out of this situation. However, the attention of the deputies was diverted from the sore economic issues through a discussion on the collective security treaty. The government and the majority of the deputies were convinced that the adoption of the decision on Belarus' joining the collective security treaty would be a political solution that could change the dire economic situation in the Republic. The collective security treaty has been signed. However, the economic expectations have remained just expectations. What has complicated the beginning of the reforms?

1. The inefficient use of cheap resources in the militarized economy of the former USSR has led to a devastation of resources.

2. The chronic deficit made the Republics, the regions, the oblasts, and even the enterprises conduct an independent economic policy. Therefore, as soon as the legal basis—the 1988 law on free enterprise in the USSR—appeared, the state planning system of deliveries has begun to fall apart. Gorbachev's liberalization of state foreign economic relations has caused a situation where resources went to sites where they were better used. Owners of raw materials and energy resources have started to sell them for hard currency and not for rubles. As a result, the deficit of the resources was enhanced by the opening of the borders. Next, the internal official measures for the protection of consumer interests have caused the collapse of planned state deliveries. I want to emphasize that on 25 October 1990, an antimarket law on the protection of the consumer market was adopted and we required more than two years to learn about its destructive force. Economic disintegration reached its climax when Russia introduced different prices, yes, different prices for Russian and foreign consumers. These prices and the customs duties made Belarus noncompetitive on the Russian market. Currently, when prices for raw materials are going to be more or less steady and come close to world prices, when the customs duties are lifted, it will be difficult for Belarusian producers to return to the lost positions. Belarusian industry has been greatly damaged not only by the high prices on the resources—they have been climbing for some years already—but by different prices which caused different costs. Everyone in the Republic understood the irreversibility of the implementation of economic reforms. However, the Belarusian Government has not led the economy toward economic reforms, has not launched the pragmatic policy of adaptation to the new circumstances, and has only hoped to return to the old times, to the erstwhile USSR, to enter the collective security, and the ruble zone that would bring prosperity to the Republic. You can see the results of this policy: the destruction of the economy, of the credit and money system, the climbing inflation, the fatal decrease in living conditions of the population. In the past, the national income and the industrial output in Belarus have been reduced by one fourth, the agricultural output—by 20 percent, the production of animal husbandry—by 40 percent. In 1992, industrial recession stood at 9.4 percent. For 1993, the Government has anticipated a 3-percent drop in industrial output. In fact, over the last nine months, the drop in the industrial output totaled 14.6 percent. The fuel industry has enjoyed the maximum drop standing at 44.9 percent, the oil processing industry—44.7 percent, the chemical and oil-chemical industry—19.6 percent. The Belarusian economy has a complicated fuel situation. For example, in August 1993, due to a lack of energy resources, the Republican industry has not produced the output accounting for 64.2 billion rubles [R]. The lack of oil deliveries to Belarus are explained by the fact that, until the last moment, the executive power was doing everything possible to save the state monopoly on the oil deliveries and oil processing. The government had to retreat only under the demand of the Supreme Soviet. Anyway, commercial structures no longer count on the government. The executive power bodies have not concentrated their attention on the power output ratio of the Belarusian industry. The Republic has a squandering industry. The production volume has decreased while the input of materials and power output ratio have climbed. At the same time, in Hungary, which is close to Belarus in economic indicators, oil consumption has plummeted 2.5 times. Currently, Belarusian industry has one of the highest power output ratios in the world. In 1993, we are going to import some 1.6 tonnes of oil per capita. This index exceeds the same index in Germany and in France which import 1.2 tonnes of oil per capita annually. The Belarusian economy should be more conservative as far as energy is concerned. We should learn to count the costs. The state energy program should be detailed. I regret to say, nothing has been done in the sphere of the cost-cutting policy of late. Instead, the Committee for Conservation of Energy within the Council of Ministers has been created. However, this is the domain of the Ministry for Energy. I do not understand this policy. So, what about the remaining resources? Maybe, the government is going to set up new committees for conservation of oil, metal, or rubber in order to create cozy chairs for the next group of officials? They would develop decisions on consumer tariffs, prices, and so on. It is evident that these officials would not engage in the introduction of market mechanisms as the market does not require their chairs.

How have the most important constituents of the market mechanism—which had been adopted by the Supreme Soviet and decreed in numerous Government resolutions—been implemented in Belarus?

The ungrounded government decisions on money turnover and issuing credits are most harmful to our economy. Only a stable credit and money system, and a constant battle with the climbing inflation can save the economy. Following Russia, our government has liberalized prices for the stabilization of the economy. However, in contradistinction to Russia, whose policy was combined with trade demonopolization, due to the liberalization of prices, Belarusian citizens are witnessing only price hikes. Moreover, state subsidies to the enterprises losing money increase the state deficit. For example, in 1993, the open and hidden state grants to agriculture stood at R1 trillion. However, have these grants reached the producers of the agricultural production? The government has introduced accounting checks as additional cash, which have become in fact the single national currency. Next, the government, following the example of Lithuania and Latvia, could have worked out complex measures for stabilizing the money turnover and halting hyperinflation. However, due to mistakes in credit emission, improper export and import policy, lack of control over banking structures, nonfulfillment of the state budget, the idea of introducing the national currency has failed and demonstrated our low market professionalism. In early 1993, credits issued by the Republic totaled R0.5 trillion. This sum covers half of the gross national product. So, how has the government distributed the credits? On what terms? In 1992, the government allotted 17.3 percent in credits, while the 1992 inflation stood at 4,200 percent. In 1993, the government issued 63 or 68.3 percent in credits. At the same time, some economic entities have to pay 210 percent in credits. So, who gets such favorable credits?

Who gets preferential credits? The production sphere? No. Here are some examples. The Belarusian Agricultural and Industrial Bank, Belagroprombank, extended credits not to finance field work but for champagne import-export operations worth R323 million. The Belarusian Business Bank loaned the Moscow company Vityaz R4 billion on 35 percent annual interest rate supposedly for oil purchases. In 1992, the "Belarus" Bank gave its chairman R1.5 million credit at 1 percent for 40 years; and in 1993, R10 million at 10-percent interest for five years. This evidence was provided by the Republic's general prosecutor. Let me also cite some examples of violating the Law on the State budget in 1993 established by the Revision Chamber. Over seven months in 1993, the government adopted 17 resolutions on almost R59 billion of additional expenditures. What revenues could possibly finance them? The government also provided 38 enterprises with R32 billion worth of different tax breaks, thus, forcing others to pay for this. By ensuring tax breaks, the government virtually wipes out funds from local councils, violating the Belarusian Law on Self-Government. For example, a reduction in the value-added tax for the Minsk Computer Equipment Amalgamations resulted in R338.7 million in losses for the state budget. At the same time, Sovyetskiy district of Minsk did not get R84.7 million. With this money, the district authorities could have bought dozens of computer installations for schools—even from the same amalgamation. In fact, we take the money from those working hard, and finance those who do not work at all. Our plants need not benefits but orders. One should have ordered the computers from national manufacturers instead of paying hard currency for equipment assembled elsewhere. Another example of do- goodism is the Finance Ministry, which gave R970 million in credit deferments as of this July, virtually financing bankrupt businesses. Commercial banks, which received the lion's share of R686 billion in centrally-distributed credits of the National Bank, practically gave no long- and medium-term credits to manufacturers. The National Bank itself gave enterprises only 0.6 percent of its credits, while management institutions received as much as 32 percent. The practice of repaying credits by issuing new banknotes is being continued. The Finance Ministry is delaying the issuing of securities, which could create a secondary [as heard] financial market and actively curb inflation. Instead, over the second half of this year, inflation climbed to 30 percent, with the state debt swollen to the size of the state budget.

Foreign Trade

Crisis in the financial system is aggravated by weak export-import policies. The National Bank reported that as of 1 October 1993, the country is running a general debt of more than $1 billion, including foreign credits and enterprises' debts. Of this, it owes $499.4 million to the former Soviet republics, $484.4 million to Russia, $7.4 million to Kazakhstan, and $1 million to Lithuania. Its debt to other countries amounts to $506.7 million. This is at a time when the Supreme Soviet set a limit of $710 million for 1993. The Cabinet of Ministers Presidium announced that it expects the $2 billion limit for next year. As of 1 October 1993, the country's foreign trade deficit with the CIS is $30.6 million, while in 1992, it ran a positive $209.3 million trade balance. This was caused by a 20-percent decrease in our exports. In the past two years, Belarusian exports to the CIS countries dropped by $1 billion. A considerable portion of exported goods was sold for prices much lower than the world's. One pair of exported shoes cost $7, and we buy them for $18.5. We overpay 5 cents for each kilogram of sugar. According to estimates by Deputy Alantyev, instead of buying $1.3 million worth of clothes from the West, we could have bought 566 tonnes of wool from Mongolia and manufactured at least 800,000 suits, ensuring work for our textile factories. The Revision Chamber revealed that the Belarusian Agricultural and Foreign Trade Organization, Belagrozamezhhandel, trades in a strange way. They export rope for $1 per 1 kg, and immediately import the same kind of rope for twice the price. They export beets for $45 per tonne and import pickled beets for $377 per tonne; tomatoes go to Poland for $600 per tonne and come back as ketchup for $1300 per tonne. This organization has $2.4 million in losses.

Given the present production structure and world prices, we have a negative trade balance with Russia, reaching $2 to 2.5 billion annually—$200-250 per individual. Do not be afraid of this figure. According to UN estimates, our per-capita income is $5,000. If there were a proper strategy for financing foreign trade, things would not look that bad. Our present financial and economic problems are caused by a lack of strategy for liquidating the trade disbalance. But the strategy is very simple. Mr. Lavrinovich, chairman of the Belarusian Scientific and Industrial Association, defined it as follows: One should increase our exports to Russia. Then we will get oil and gas.

Unrealistic hopes for nonmarket relations and lack of any foreign trade strategy resulted last September in attempts to repay debts at the cost of credits received from the International Monetary Fund and the Republic's hard currency reserves.

A few words about the clearing. The idea was good—to collect $1.8 billion and resources by exporting to Russia trucks, tractors, and meat worth the same. But just look at how it was implemented. By the way, Russia, by contrast to Belarus, engaged its best experts to work on this project. First of all, the prices were spun out of thin air—oil went for $128 and meat $1,400 per tonne. The simplest basic balance look good. But did someone include the costs, according to the Leontyev model, the production of clearing goods? If someone had, perhaps prices and quantities would have been different. Second, why was the gas of one side and its trasportation costs from the other not included in the clearing? Third, when an agreement is signed, an efficient mechanism is necessary to implement it. It should benefit enterprises and fit the ruble balance. And what do we have now? Fines [words indistinct] of the contract [words indistinct] $19.6 million, because we failed to [sentence indistinct]. On their part, they pay us no fines for failing to buy our entire production. This is the kind of contract we have. We could go even further in analyzing it. The contract-incurred debt is $41.9 million, while the debt of the Ministry of Resources to enterprises is R12.5 billion. Our enterprises sold quality goods on a clearing basis but have no money for them, which undermines the whole industry. In addition, R125 billion is allocated from the state budget to clear the clearing debts.

Through sweat and blood, several generations of Belarusian people created public property. I repeat—public property and not state property. As the current Belarusian Constitution states, the people are the real owners. The state only ensures and protects conditions for its accumulation. The idea of people's privatization means a free-of-charge transfer of part of the general property to the people, which was incorporated into the Main Concepts of Privatization in 1991. This idea calls for social justice, engaging all Belarusian citizens into this process, creating a large class of owners, and teaching basics of the market economy to the population. The efficiency of the free-of-charge privatization was proved by a famous American economist Milton Friedman. He wrote: "The real owner of the state enterprises is the public." We should create a public corporation, give all citizens one or more shares, and let them freely trade them on the market. Following a year and a half of debates, the Law on Privatization Certificates made out by name, laid the legal groundwork for free privatization. Along with a package of proposals on property appraisals, auctions, privatization commissions—put together by the executive branch—this law could comprise a full package of privatization documents that would ensure people's privatization quickly. However, the resolution by the Belarusian Cabinet of Ministers On the Implementation of the Law on Privatization Certificates put off check-issuing until July 1994. I believe that it is inadmissibly late. As of today, only 2.68 percent of the balance-sheet is the value of enterprises. Did they not have enough time—since 1991, when the concept of free privatization was approved—to work out privatization procedures? In this situation, we should adopt some fast-track procedures for issuing certificates. For example, let a page from the former Soviet passport be such a voucher—it is difficult to counterfeit and is no longer in use. There are other options, too. One thing is certain, when the people's privatization flounders, the underground privatization, or simple theft, forges ahead. Let me not name dozens of cases revealed by the Revision Chamber. The prosecutor general reported that a third of the property privatized in 1992-93 was sold free-of-charge and not for vouchers. The general rule is as follows: I privatize what I supervise. Perhaps this is the reason why certain bureaucrats oppose privatization so fervently. Actions conducted under the slogan "Grab What You Can" should be uprooted. Proper laws should be crafted. No one knows who owns and who disposes of national property. It was not until the demands by the Revision Chamber that the government adopted certain documents regulating state property. Flawed legislation on state enterprises and mixed-ownership enterprises provides kindling ground for abuses. For example, analysis of the present system for determining net profits at mixed enterprises testifies to ineffective and maybe even criminal handling of state property, a part of the founding fund. According to the law, the founders dispose of the profits at their discretion. The law does not forbid funnelling all of them into stocks and assets without prior agreement of all the founders. This means that the state, which invests substantial funds into a commercial bank, gets nothing. Another kind of violation occurs when a state enterprise stops being a founder. Normally, it should take back its contribution to the founding fund. In practice, it gets a portion of assets proportionate to this contribution. The third violation is a deliberate underestimation of fixed capital.

However, there are some positive results. Development of a market infrastructure is underway, with the new market mechanism of supply and demand starting to work. Small and medium business are gradually gaining strength. About 30,000 businesses, 220 joint-stock companies, and almost 4,000 cooperatives were registered. Some 1,000 joint ventures were set up, of which 185 are in the production sphere. However, it is not enough to simply privatize enterprises. One should also create conditions for the development of private initiative and market institutions. And what do we have instead? The executive branch adamantly opposes consolidation of private structures, creating favorable conditions for the nomenklatura business. First deputy chairman of the economic court, Kiselev, admitted courts' interference with the activities of non- state enterprises—even those in the production sphere. As a result, businesses requiring little qualifications and investments, such as trade and services, have better conditions for operating. However, they have little impact on the economy as a whole and do not encourage structural changes.

Management of the State Sector

Under market conditions, the state executes the efficient management of the state sector of the economy. In the transition period, it is obliged to prepare enterprises and their managers for the market, but should keep in mind that before privatization, property is controlled by the state, which should serve the entire Belarusian population, and not just make certain groups of the population rich.

It is necessary to introduce a contractual system of economy like the one functioning in China. It provides for a link between managers' salaries and the final result.

If you have profits you receive a good salary. If you fail to keep the promise that the enterprise will have profits, make room for someone else. Today, according to the State Committee for Statistics, 437 enterprises incur losses. The total amount of losses is 30 billion rubles. Even profitable enterprises are not doing this by means of increasing efficiency and profitability. These dropped threefold in 1992 alone. They increase their profits by increasing prices. The issue of investments is also serious. The nominal stocks are not properly restored. Only one-fifth of the enterprises' revenue, about R1 billion, was allocated for their replenishment. The delayed reevaluation of nominal capital also had negative consequences for enterprises. It overestimated their costs 16.4 times, while the inflation rate in 1992, according to warehouse prices, was 200 percent. The share of amortization deduction dropped from 80 percent in 1990 to 12 percent in 1992. To replenish the enterprises' initial resources, it is necessary to simplify the procedure of amortization. From the legislative point of view it is an appropriate law, but the procedures for receiving permission to apply this law are very complicated.

A substantial part of kolkhozes and sovkhoses have found themselves in a difficult financial situation. In 1992, eight of them finished the fiscal year with a negative balance, while over eight months of 1993, 65 of them operated with losses. The situation in private farming is no better. One of the reasons behind the current situation is the crisis in power resources and absence of a parity of prices for agricultural and industrial products in 1992. I could furnish a lot of data testifying to the drop in agricultural production, but I think that you know them. I will only furnish one example—if everything continues to develop according to the same scenario, our livestock will be reduced twofold in 1994 as compared to 1990. There are continuous attempts on the part of executive bodies to halt the process of granting land for farming, the construction of houses, and gardening. I must point out that the issues of implementing the land reform in the Republic that were discussed by the Supreme Soviet Presidium three times over the last couple of years, accelerated these processes in a way. As of 1 July 1993, 2,670 individual farms were functioning in Belarus, each having the average of 20 hectares of land. Individual farming has vividly demonstrated that even in 1992, which was a year of low crops, the Republic experienced no shortages of potatoes and vegetables, which were produced in private plots. Unfortunately, executive bodies at all levels do not pay necessary attention to observing laws and decrees adopted by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet with regard to land and promoting social and economic development of rural areas, the agroindustrial complex, and individual farming.

Thus, let us try to determine the principal causes of the crisis. The first cause is our technological backwardness, speaking in terms of the world economy. This was admissible under a closed economy and cheap power resources. However, under liberalization of foreign economic relations and the approaching of prices for resources to world levels, this has led to loss of competitiveness by a majority of our products and a dramatic decline in imports of resources. The process will be aggravated, because in a year or two, the Russian market will be no different from its world counterpart.

The second cause is an abrupt irreversible shrinking of military contracts and the conversion of military industries. Neither the government nor the Supreme Soviet could influence these two causes. We can only passively follow these processes. Yet, the situation is different with regard to other causes.

The third cause. The situation is being aggravated by a crisis in the financial system. This was prompted by both external factors and mistakes committed while introducing the transitional national currency. There were unsuccessful attempts to regulate mutual payments among CIS states by administrative methods. These have resulted in an outflow of soft currencies from the Republic. According to experts' assessments, a couple of billion dollars worth of capital is taken out of the Republic each year. The government has not published any data regarding these processes. Administrative appeals to declare the volumes of capital in foreign banks will not return either dollars or rubles to Belarus. We must create market conditions to return the capital back to the Republic.

The fourth cause for the crisis is the government's failure to resolve the issues of production, and poor control over state property and profits received from its use. The government seems to have been too preoccupied with drafting theoretical programs of reshaping industries, introducing conversion, and developing entrepreneurship, as well as with political declarations saying: When we have a union [with Russia] we will have heating in our apartments. I want to say that the program of economic development drafted by the government forecasts the development of events until the year 2000. The fact that none of the processes forecasted by the program ever occurred in 1993 does not bother its authors. I would like to know who writes these things. A majority of these documents is detached from producers' problems. The Council of Ministers formed a number of superministerial structures and limited the powers of ministers, entitled to these powers by the Supreme Soviet. This liquidated personal responsibility and created favorable conditions for bureaucrats' violations. The road to market relations became longer, while corruption has been given a free hand. We must point out that things could have been worse had the Belarusian Scientific-Industrial Association not assumed the burden of economic coordination and regulation of economic processes at the level of enterprises. The result is depressing. In fact, not a single provision of the state program on stabilizing the Belarusian economy and protecting the social interests of the population has been carried out. We have failed to overcome the main negative trends in the Republic's social and economic development. The government has found neither strength nor resoluteness to follow the path of market reforms. Today, the economy has approached a limit, after which there is a dramatic decrease in production, mass unemployment, and hyperinflation. The government has lacked resoluteness to head for the market and concentrated all its efforts on restoring the ruined ties. First of all, these were the ties other than economic. This policy hampered the reform and prolonged the shock of a price treatment that was not supported by the forming of the market of small producers.

Industries underwent no treatment at all. The government's irresoluteness, bewilderment, slowness, I would even say sluggishness have discredited the very idea of reform. It was not the path of reform that has resulted in a total destruction of the economy; it was a complete lack of reform. Now, with an economy driven to an all-out disaster, the feverish implementation of measures dictated by the IMF may lead to a national catastrophe. This is why I believe that we need serious personnel changes within the government and responsibility for the economic reform. Today in Belarus, we have professionals in the economic field among managers, entrepreneurs, and lawmakers. These people are capable of implementing cardinal market reform. The Supreme Soviet Presidium and its chairman are also to blame for the fact that these changes have not yet been introduced. We cannot explain this by the existence of a pro-government lobby within the Supreme Soviet. We should have acted more resolutely to strengthen control over the government's activity, while observing the Constitution. We should have found mechanisms for influencing the government's economic policy and personal composition.

Part two. Resolute reform and overcoming the crisis

Urgent measures on reforming the economy must become the basis for an economic program and a budget for 1994. I would like to place emphasis on the following aspects.

First: Accelerating the processes of forming a private sector of the economy by immediate privatization.

Second: Preserving the largest industrial enterprises. Under no conditions we should ruin what has been Belarus' pride.

Third: Creating an efficient and stable financial and credit system, including convertibility of all the monetary units of the former USSR.

Fourth: Active exports policy and creation of a wide customs union.

Fifth: Creating a system of social security and an infrastructure of employment, including public works.

Let me try to determine priorities in each of these directions.

National privatization. Aims of privatization. All citizens must be made active owners which must result in better labor motivation, higher labor productivity, and as a result of these, the enhancement of the efficiency of the economy. Privatization in Belarus is totally different from the similar process in France, England, or Austria. State-run enterprises in those countries had always functioned under market conditions. The aim of privatization in Belarus is, for one thing, creating a foundation for the market, and, for another thing, creating a strata of owners. Svyatoslav Fedorov was right when he said: Unless we have a million owners, there will be no changes in the economy. According to the state privatization program adopted by the Supreme Soviet, two-thirds of the national property must be returned to the people. In 1993, we must privatize 10 percent and in 1994, 20 percent of this property. In fact, we have only privatized one thirty-eighth, or 2.68 percent. The decision to divide a part of the property free of charge between the people should be implemented immediately and popular privatization should be carried out along with other forms of privatization.

Why was the decision made to sell some property? Enterprises are in need of modernization and have nobody to turn to for investments. I am sure that if local residents were given a chance to purchase valuable property for dollars as well as for rubles, the state's stabilization fund would receive dollars brought by our residents from Poland, Turkey, and other states. The Supreme Soviet must give reliable guarantees that the state will not deceive the people. The use of privatization money for mending holes in the budget is inadmissible. This would mean wasting this money and supporting bureaucrats. Selling assets for covering running debts means burdening our children and grandchildren with our own problems.

This decision will receive support from the people if the Supreme Soviet is able to strictly control the inflow of privatization funds and their further use for structural reform of the economy. This will yield dividends also for those who received their share free of charge. Thus, we will have a chance to invest free capital and halt the inflation. If we direct the means obtained from selling fixed capital for implementing the plan of curing the economy, we will create new jobs and support the construction of housing.

It is important to avoid cases of understating the purchasing price. IMF experts examined privatization procedures in two Belarusian enterprises and came to the conclusion that their price was greatly deflated. Thus, the motorcycle and bicycle factory's yearly income will cover expenditures on its purchase. Embezzlements during privatization discredited the idea of privatization. That is why the initial stage of popular privatization must be rapid and efficient. On the one hand, just like France, which has begun a new stage by privatizing world famous companies—Bull, Thomson, Renault, and Banque National de Paris—we must begin large-scale privatization by selling shares of stock of large enterprises for both cash and vouchers. These are the tractor, the refrigerator, the motor vehicle, and the television plants. By the way, managers themselves wish the stock of their enterprises to be shared. We must support them on this issue. Our task is to preserve the main plants of the Republic and find resources for their modernization. Then, these enterprises will become the leaders of our economy. In our attempts to safeguard competition in the Republic and to observe the Antimonopoly Law, we must not cause the fragmentation of giant plants. Their primary task is to preserve the ability to compete in the foreign market. Along with this, we are obliged to create small enterprises which will later compete for receiving contracts from large enterprises. The experience of developed European countries demonstrates that small companies provide 70 percent of jobs. Specifically, small firms account for 70 percent of the workplaces. On the other hand, it is necessary to immediately begin small privatization on a broad scale following Nizhni Novgorod's example—Yevlinski and Nemcov's model of reforms from below—especially as there exists a Belarusian analogue in Molodechno, about which, I hope, the authors will tell us.

The main goal of small privatization is to create competition by parcelling business stock in municipal enterprises and trade. This can be effectively carried out provided that every object is privatized according to an individual plan with due regard for the specificity of the object. In certain cases, priority should be given to workers, to working staffs; in others, to active investors who will be able to make use of property to the peoples' advantage; in another, to foreign investors, for example, from Russia or Germany, which offer raw product supplies and new technology or [word indistinct] approaches to open and secure new markets.

I will tell you: many times I had interesting talks with managers of big enterprises. We ourselves give cause for Russia to lock us out of its market. We often forbid Russian capital, private capital, from buying shares of our enterprises, for example, of the Minsk tractor factory. There, as a result of variable prices, they have created conditions for us to be noncompetitive, and for them, as a result of conversion, to establish their own tractor factory; and we will lose the market and have to ruin our factory. Look, nobody has the profit from it, neither Russia nor us. Because they have to invest capital in enterprises that need serious reorganization, while we have one that works beautifully. So, it is a very advantageous condition within the framework of the commonwealth. I can give you many other examples, but, you know, we do not need a single approach to privatization. A shop can be privatized by selling its shares to neighboring residents; the next one can be leased by someone from abroad. Everything should be approached with an individual plan, an individual project. The main thing is, we need to create the critical mass of entrepreneurs, which was created in Poland long before reform existed, and which will improve the living conditions for the population and provide a democratic electorate for elections. There is no ideal model for privatization. Every model will raise objections in one group of the population or another. It is necessary to choose a version which with regard to effectiveness, with regard to collective interest, with regard to social justice, is just acceptable, just acceptable. I was even going to say the most acceptable, but later I was afraid. If there is a version just acceptable for all, we must follow it. We should not allow the establishment of a small group of rich men and the pauperization of the majority of population. The experience of privatization in neighboring countries commits us to be prepared for resolving many difficult problems:

1. Agreement between the enterprise staff and all the other citizens.

2. Prohibition against assigning some part of ownership rights to outside persons, in particular, to holders of privatization checks payable to specific persons.

The administration will struggle with other big investors for the right of control over enterprises. It will be hard for the administration to realize that some people possess some power due only to the fact that they bring some checks here. Apart from this, within the framework of one enterprise, different groups, seeing the prospect for enterprise in different ways, will struggle with the help of checks to control the enterprise. Many enterprises will not avoid significant staff reductions. Possibly, it is expedient to grant credits to the managers of effectively working staffs in order to buy some number of shares for them. At the other enterprises, according to Balladur's model, the change of management will be unavoidable. It is worth noting that national privatization checks benefit working staffs in the first place because they get a 20-percent reduction. However, there is a danger in distributing shares only among the members of working staff—a trend for immediate consumption at the expense of income may prevail.

To develop the enterprise, there must be a boss, an owner of controlling interest, personally committed to long-term productivity and not striving to skim the cream off the purchased enterprise, pumping the capital abroad and, possibly, finding himself there.

The second problem: Corruption and speculation in stocks and bonds in the absence of experience on the part of privatization vouchers' owners. So, it is expedient to sell shares both for rubles and vouchers. It will give a chance to accomplish an objective quotation of shares and determine the real value of privatization vouchers. Investment funds, even those licensed by the state, will not guarantee action holders confidence in the future. There were, as you know, problems in Russia, in St. Petersburg; it was broadcast by our television, so everything is well known. It is necessary to pass a resolution obliging these structures to check their annual reports by independent auditors. We have made some preparations toward this, so now we can follow such a way. The problem is not only with the bodies that will implement privatization—commissions for state property, executive committees, branch ministries—but also in who will hold control the privatization process. Both in presidential France and parliamentary England that controlling function is performed by the parliament. Uncontrollable privatization must stop. We have possible versions here: First, like in Estonia, where the privatization body consists of members of parliament and ministers for finance and economy; second, when commissions for privatization only prepare an enterprise for privatization, and selling is accomplished by a property fund, controlled by the Supreme Soviet. Any of these versions should be implemented through market methods of privatization, that is, by competition, auction; shares should not be sold at stock exchanges controlled by a small group of private persons. We should underscore the role of the press in forming positive attitudes toward privatization among the population and setting of barriers against offenses against ownership during privatization. The third problem is the possibility of acquiring privatizations checks and, in this way, ownership by big banks and investments funds with a big share of the state property. As a result, we will have a new collective economy, that is, new monopolists will attach to currently existing ones. The formation of such collective economies on the basis of ministries under liquidation, with the old directing apparatus, may compromise the idea of privatization. A way out is establishing private holding companies securing all cycles of production, including science. The holding founders can be found among managers of enterprises, the sphere of state property, specialists from the ministries. This model works well in Russia in regard to privatization of enterprises in the military complex. The fourth problem is regulation of the foreign capital contribution to privatization. At the current rates of exchange this problem is very difficult. We need some limitations here in order to secure the interests of the Belarusian population while selling shares to citizens abroad both near and far. For instance, the government may leave the gold share for itself in order to secure strategic control over some enterprises. Foreign capitals should be directed in the first place to formation of new economical objects, including the ones not finished and under liquidation. The foundation of reform is in people. Everything is done by them and for them. Our task is convincing everybody that he can and should be an owner, a proprietor. The entire civilized world is supported by the middle class of entrepreneurs. Privatization is also a way to reduce state expenses for the administering apparatus. The majority of specialists in ministries, departments, and state design bureaus should transfer from state offices to a private holding. However, we should avoid a situation when a man is paid for his state office, and in reality he works for a private firm. Urgent measures for stabilization of the currency system are needed. It is clear, that in part they depend on the alternative we will choose at this session while joining the ruble union—are we adopting the Russian ruble or are we going to introduce our national currency?

Issuing a credit and financial system has a political facet. Provision 5 in the Belarusian Declaration on Sovereignty states that the Belarusian Republic will establish its own credit and finance system. This is the reason why this issue should be resolved by a constitutional majority. But let us return to the economic aspects. For the time being, our side has assumed an obligation to keep the state budget deficit to 10 percent of the gross national product [GNP] and the crediting of the budget to 9 percent in the next year. At the same time, Russia has assumed no obligations so far. It is up to us only to take on obligations. Its officials, such as the finance minister and his deputy, circulate contradictory information, including exchange rates, at one times saying it should be one to one, and at other times one to four. It seems that it takes negotiations with President Yeltsin to sort this out. I think that they also could sort out the oil issue. In the opinion of top Russian experts, Russia should not set world oil prices in its trade with us. One should conduct very careful and well-thought out negotiations involving the most experienced experts on both sides. It is possible that Russia will not set world prices, because it is not interested in considering a number of our enterprises as belonging to different directions [as heard].

Before entering the ruble zone, one should accelerate reforms and reduce inflation to keep pace with Russia so that our entrepreneurs can speak on par with their Russian partners. Unless we ratify the agreements and work out an efficient mechanism for the ruble zone, there will be nothing left for us to do but to follow the example of the Baltic countries and hasten measures to transfer to the national currency as the only legal tender throughout Belarus. The purpose of these measures is to stabilize the national currency. As is known, monetary reform alone cannot curb inflation. We have a burdening legacy—an unproportionally developed means of production and a large share of industry that worked for the military. Those employed in those branches not only fail to offer products on the market, but on the contrary, consume those products and resources that are already available. Only market-oriented measures can provide relevant proportions between means of production and consumer products. The credit and financial system can only be cured when we learn how to sparingly use material and energy resources, when every business will operate thanks to its activities. Only a strong economy makes strong money.

In banking policy, we should seek full independence of the National Bank from the government and powers for the Supreme Soviet to control the issuing of currency. One should resolutely stop the practice of issuing new money into circulation, introduce limits on the direct credits given by the National Bank to the government without relevant permission of the Supreme Soviet, and the transfer of all the country's currency reserves to the National Bank. It is unbelievable that all the reserves are in the disposal of the commercial Vneshekonombank.

One should note that it took a long time to prepare agreements on the economic union and the ruble zone. Although there have been a lot of talks, it turned out that there are many differences concerning details on the unification of both monetary systems. And again, the horse was placed ahead of the cart. The final agreement will probably not be reached until after the elections in Russia in June next year. Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov declared that—I quote—ratification of the agreements does not require urgent unification of the monetary systems and does not rule out introduction of national currencies. Whatever unification option will be chosen, it would be naive to expect benefits for one's own side only. One should understand that all problems will be resolved on a market basis, and people in Moscow can count very well. Under the first option, introducing Russian rubles in Minsk, the advantage would be the convenience of running accounts in one currency and the fact that Moscow will take care of many of our problems. Under the second option, we will have a little more freedom—and responsibilities, too—in managing our finances. The return to the ruble may prove quite different for us—wages, pensions, and student stipends are different in our countries. No one knows how to prevent triggering inflation after converting all assets and liabilities into rubles. However, the most important thing is that Russia pressed ahead a lot farther with its reforms. They even introduced private ownership on land with the right to sell it. The Russian private sector is substantial. No doubt, after the unification of monetary systems, the Russian private capital will come to Belarus and will certainly change the situation, including the political one. At the same time one should keep in mind that before the unification, when our currency is removed, we should determine with the Russian Central Bank the social, currency, customs, and financial and credit policies.

We need a normal control by the National Bank over commercial banks, as is done all over the world. The banking system must be immediately improved; all sorts of payments must be subordinated, and appropriate resolutions on conversion should be changed.

Second, the credit policy. Preferential credits should be granted at the budget's expense. Material responsibility should be introduced for inadequate spending of preferential credits. There should be very strict penalties. Further on, credits should become the responsibility of commercial banks, as it is in the world. The Belarusian Investment Bank, along with its local branches, should be established to finance credits for investments. It should accumulate in its accounts funds obtained from privatization. I emphasize, only for investments, these funds should not be earmarked for other purposes. The financing of great projects by banks should be controlled by the Supreme Soviet. To finance small businesses, it is necessary to establish a semi-state infrastructure able to support these businesses and assume a part of the financial risk. Preferential credits for unprofitable enterprises should be suspended, and following Russia's example, a debt stock exchange should be introduced. This should have been done long ago. Only in this case, we will be able to reform unprofitable and useless enterprises that only drain subsidies. The exchange of debts will make such procedures very simple. It is necessary to mark down the subsidies for retail prices and increase the number of credit auctions. Over the nine moths of this year, R686.3 billion in credits were sold by commercial banks, only R4.1 billion were sold at auctions. What kind of market is this?

Third, the tax policy. One of the reasons behind this year's production decline is our tax policy. Our hope is vested in the professionalism of the Committee for Budget and Planning and its experts. From one perspective, it is necessary to lower the taxes for industry. According to estimates by the Ministry of Finance, they amounted to 45.9 percent of the gross national product in 1993; while in 1992 the figure was 40.8 percent. On the other hand, it is necessary to liquidate the majority of tax and other preferences, since there are over 50 kinds of them today. It is this way: One enterprise pays for the other's preferences and vice versa. The simpler the tax policy, the better, meaning that there should be minimum legislation and no possibility for exemptions. The number of taxes must be reduced; particularly those which are included in production costs should be disregarded. First of all, assets and profits should be taxed. The tax policy should stimulate production and exports of domestic products. This is the opinion of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Federation of Trade Unions. The tax policy should boost production in priority branches as well as safeguard modernization of production and improvement of its quality. It should help create new jobs and inspire small businesses. At the same time, a strict tax regime is necessary for commercial trade and brokerage. It is important to impose taxes on all incomes. The financial situation is badly affected by the shadow economy. According to certain estimates, the trade balance of the private sector has exceeded R100 billion, not mentioning millions of dollars. Today, commercial stores work without cash registers. I believe this should be prohibited immediately. You cannot find it in any civilized country. Tax policy should be harmonized with other CIS countries, first of all, with Russia, regardless of the introduction of the national currency. The taxes in Russia have always been lower, and now they are being lowered even more—20-percent added value tax, 11-14 per cent for the central authorities' revenue, and a few percent for local authorities. We should consider establishing a tax code.

The fourth is the budget policy. Excessive taxes are a result of excessive expenditures. They are allocated not only to education, health care, and defense, but also to state subsidies, including the clearing operations debt, agriculture, and preferential credits. Is it really worth lengthy consideration? The central fund revenues should be cut down and transferred to local funds. This way, local authorities would be more interested in developing regional industries. We cannot manage to collect the existing money from the people. It should be accomplished by imposing reasonable interest rates for citizens in saving banks.

You should agree with me that the Belarusian Supreme Soviet has been, to a certain extent, unable to control the fulfillment of the state budget. One more detail. In the last six months, we could witness the eruption of the new government structures which have not been followed by the reduction of the old structures. For example, the staff of the Ministry of Finances has been increased to 300 officers. The staff of the State Economic Planning Committee has not been increased despite the fact that the Department for Economy within the Cabinet of Ministers has been set up. The decisive staff cut in the bodies of the state power is required. Eventually, do we need all these structures?

Price policy

In order to promote the development of market relations and to regulate the money and credit system as well as to ensure the fundamental improvement of the social-economic situation in the Republic, the government should release all the prices. The tax policy should not encourage the increase in prices. Currently, I can understand quite well the saying: Sausages contain more taxes than meat.

Integration into the world economy

This policy includes the development of mutually advantageous economic relations with Russia, the other CIS states, and with the rest of the world. All the foreign economic activity should be directed at the protection of the economic sovereignty of Belarus. Our foreign policy should work toward gaining resources and markets. I stress that once again. A realistic program outlining supplying Belarus with resources and stimulating the development of the export potential should be drafted. It should become the nucleus of our foreign policy conception. When economic competitiveness has replaced ideological battles, diplomacy can preserve and widen our markets, can implement our national trade program and protect national economic interests. Other special services should also protect the national economic security of the Republic of Belarus. We are striving to build an open type of economy and to integrate into the world economic community. However, our tactics should be reasonable. Foreign market relations should serve national interests. Hard currency profits should be returned to the state, and customs tariffs should stimulate the import of technology and equipment. Belarus should not use dumping prices in its foreign trade. Currently, Belarus should not buy articles of luxury; we can do without them. The priority directions for spending the state hard currency should be formulated. For example, the structure of our import looks as follows: Technology and equipment account for 17 percent; chemical industry products, 12.5 percent; food industry articles, 7.2 percent; articles of vegetable origin, 44 percent. I do not believe that we are exporting such immense quantities of vegetable oil.

The Creation of a Just System of Social Protection

Industrial recession means the regular decrease of the consumption volume, the deterioration of health protection, education, and so on. The social stratification of society is deepening. I regret to say, currently, a person cannot live a better life even if he is a better worker. As earlier, those who sign various documents, issue licenses and permissions have the highest incomes.

Our health protection is in a critical situation. Both hospitals and pharmacies lack medicines. According to the data provided by the State Committee for Statistics, in the first six months of 1993, the death toll due to various reasons rose by 11.4 percent in comparison with the same period in 1992. In my opinion, these figures can worry all of us. The 1992 recession in the pharmaceutical and microbiological industry stood at 31.8 percent. High taxes and customs tariffs have completely done away with production of vitally important medicines. The prices of other medicines exceed the costs of imported analogues. It is essential to support this branch of our industry, or otherwise, it will go bankrupt. The Fund for Social Protection of Population should be under constant control of the government. This Fund should efficiently distribute financial assistance among the population. Moreover, we should create a special reserve for this Fund so that there should be no delays in payments.

This is a threat for those who have no other means of existence. I want to say that if we decide to unite our structures with Russian ones, this will lead to further complications, and the sum envisioned in the new budget draft will not be sufficient for alleviating the situation for those depending totally on social security for subsistence.

Popular privatization and the creation of a large group of owners will create a middle class that we will not have to support from social sources. The entire social program then, will be oriented solely toward pensioners, the unemployed, and the young. In this case, this program will no longer hamper reform—it will accelerate it. This is why social issues must be resolved along with economic ones. Saving money on children's health or education may lead to higher expenditures in fighting crime in the future.

I believe that if these measures are taken we will achieve structural changes in the economy, an increase in production output and efficiency, as well as in enterprises' competitiveness, stable prices, wages, and pensions. The Supreme Soviet, the government, and the bank should not fight for the right to steer an economy resembling a swan, a shrimp, and a pike trying to pull one cart.

Under the current critical situation we must attain real close cooperation in all structures of power. Nobody should abuse his right to sign an international economic agreement whose futility could be predicted from the start. One of the forms of cooperation are joint sessions of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. We must decrease the number of representatives of both the government and the Supreme Soviet and invite representatives of trade unions, entrepreneurs, and managers corps. We must establish something named the Supreme Economic Security Council, which probably is more important than the Security Council that currently exists. The threat to our statehood and our well-being exists at the economic level. By the way, this organ will be constitutional, because it will not make decisions, only issue recommendations. On the basis of these recommendations, the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Presidium will adopt their resolutions. I believe that this organ must be formed.

Due to this, we will not be able to manage without introducing new people to the government, people with market thinking. Read Belarusian market newspapers and see how some of our managers and local administrators have adjusted to the market, not to mention entrepreneurs. You will realize where high-class modern leaders are.

Instead of an epilogue, I want to say that when I was preparing for today's speech I read in a newspaper that the Minsk City Soviet was going to ration foodstuffs in 1994. The Soviet cannot do anything else. I think that our resoluteness may help us find other solutions. We need renovation.

Minsk Approves CIS Charter 'With Amendments'

LD1511190993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1738 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Minsk November 15 TASS—The government of Belarus has approved with amendments the charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States which was adopted in Moscow on January 22, 1993.

The charter has now to be ratified by the republican parliament.

An amendment to the section "Collective Security and Military Political Cooperation" says that the use of the Belarusian Armed Forces in other CIS states, as well as the deployment or use of the armed forces of other CIS states in Belarus should be sanctioned by the Belarusian Parliament.

In article 16 of the section "Prevention of Conflicts and Settlement of Disputes" the phrase "all possible measures" is understood by Belarus as all possible non-military measures. The republic proceeds from the fact that disputes indicated in articles 17 and 18 of the CIS charter should be resolved in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, the government said.

Belarus believes that provisions of articles 28 and 29 concerning the coordinating consultative committee and the secretariat and article 30 concerning the main command of the unified armed forces do not fully correspond to the present-day realities and need correction. The latter should be made in the form of amendments to the CIS charter as envisaged by its article 42.

Moldova

Snegur: Ready for 'Compromise' on Dniester

LD1211221193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1449 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] The Moldovan leadership is ready to make reasonable compromises which would facilitate a final solution to the Dniester conflict, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur declared during his meeting with ambassadors from Switzerland, The Netherlands, Cuba, and South Korea on Friday in Chisinau. The ambassadors are on a "get acquainted" visit to Chisinau as they are based permanently in Kiev.

Snegur sees compromise as the granting to the Dniester region the status of a free economic zone and a high level of self-management, and revision of the law on languages for residents of the Dniester's Left Bank.

According to Snegur, dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol would be more constructive if representatives of Russia and various international organizations are present at the negotiations. The Moldovan president believes that Russia has strong influence on Dniester authorities and must use this influence to stabilize the situation in the region.

Speaking on economic reform in Moldova, Snegur reaffirmed that the republic would strictly follow recommendations of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank which support Chisinau's new economic course and introduction of a national currency.

Delegation Head to Moscow Talks Wants Troop Withdrawal

AU1411163493 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1050 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 12/11/1993—"This conditioning is a breach of the obligations assumed by the Russian delegation in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe," said in an interview Ambassador Anatol Taranu, head of the delegation of the Republic of Moldova participating in the seventh round of Moldovan-Russian negotiations on an accord concerning the status and the withdrawal schedule of the Russian Federation's troops temporarily stationing in the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The Moldovan ambassador was referring to the Russian Federation's claim of linking the timing of the withdrawal of its 14th Army to the elaboration of the juristic status of Dniester.

"The presence of the 14th Army will affect the situation in Moldova, including the political field," added Anatol

Taranu and further underlined that as long as the 14th Army was stationing in Moldova, "the Dniester leaders feel supported and do their best to make the political settlement of the conflict fail."

Moldova remains firm on its position with regard to the July 1, 1994, term for the withdrawal of the 14th Russian Army, said Anatol Taranu in an interview with the Bucharest daily ADEVARUL. The Moldovan ambassador reminded the position of the Moldovan delegation expressed in CSCE and NATO meetings, claiming an unconditional withdrawal of the Russian troops stationed in its national territory.

The Moldovan party in the negotiations in Moscow asked on Thursday, November 11, material compensations for Moldova for the Russian Army's stationing in Moldovan territory, said Moldova's ambassador to Moscow Anatol Taranu who, according to political commentators has many chances to be appointed head of the Moldovan diplomacy, after outgoing Nicolae Tau, recently appointed ambassador to the United States.

Anatol Taranu told daily ADEVARUL that he had reminded on Thursday [11 November] to the Russian delegation that "democracy in Russia cannot be instated without a democratic foreign policy" because "a pro-empire foreign policy would produce consequences in the interior."

The self-proclaimed Moldovan Republic of Dniester has been created within the territory of the independent Republic of Moldova in 1991 by a group of Russian-speaking separatists who started afterwards a merciless persecution against Romanian ethnics. The leaders of the self-proclaimed Dniester Republic supported the rebels during the October 4 events in Moscow. About 64 percent of the total population of the Republic of Moldova, that is about 4.3 million people, are Romanians, the remaining part being formed mainly by Russians and Ukrainians.

Lebed: No Plans To Become Deputy in Russian Duma

AU1511132293 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the Russian 14th Army, has denied a report by Tiraspol radio that he has accepted the proposal of the Ecologist Movement to run for the position of deputy in the State Duma of the Russian Federation. General Lebed told the local news agency correspondent that he did not empower any of the political blocs with such a mission and, generally speaking, he does not intend to become a deputy.

From unofficial sources, however, the MOLDOVA PRESS correspondent has learned that General Lebed received proposals to this effect from three parties and movements in Russia, but that he did not accept them.

Tsiu Denies Resignation Due to Anti-Russian Remarks

LD1211201593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1116 GMT 12 nOV 93

[Text] The Moldovan ambassador to the United States, Moldova's former foreign minister Nicolay Tsiu, has denied rumors that his resignation from the ministerial post was linked to his anti-Russian statement at the United Nations on October 8. Speaking Friday morning on national TV, he said that his appointment as ambassador to the United States had been coordinated with the U.S. Administration since the spring of this year. By mere coincidence, Moldova received agreement on his appointment as the ambassador right after Nicolay Tsiu made his statement at the UN.

He said that his statement demanding an immediate withdrawal of the 14th Russian army from the republic was a well thought-out step expressing the republic's official position.

"The presence of a foreign army on our territory is a damaging and destabilizing factor, and we cannot tolerate it," he said. "The United Nations is the most opportune means of conveying one's point of view to the world community. And we used it."

Party Leaders Comment on Solving Dniester Problem

AU1411211793 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1908 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 13/11/1993—To solve the problem in the Dniester region we should abandon the idea of national state, stated Aurel Talmatchi, deputy chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moldovan Democratic-Agrarian Party, to the weekly DELOVAYA GAZETA (BUSINESS PAPER). The crisis in eastern and southern regions was created basically by extremists from the right bank, who have thrown the apple of discord between Tiraspol and Chisinau. They forced the approval of the law on language, which did not take into account particularities of the left bank. The Democratic-Agrarian Party is for granting a special status to regions on Dniester's left bank, said Talmatchi. Oazu Nantoi, chairman of the Moldovan Social- Democratic Party, stated that this problem could be solved if the problem of Moldova's independence was clarified. "Movements which fight against the independence of the republic should be forbidden and their press media closed. What is published by TARA (THE COUNTRY) is nothing but criminal demagogy, which only hinders the others," stated Nantoi. According to him, Tiraspol's confidence in the Moldovan authorities can be restored only by forbidding the activity of those demagogues. The social democrats support the idea of a referendum that would reflect the range of opinions in the Moldovan society. "We expect a wiser parliament and that unionist movements will lose their influence on people," stated Nantoi.

Official Views IMF, World Bank Credits Programs

AU1311203993 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 2034 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Chisinau, BASAPRESS 11/11/1993—Lilla Burunchuk, head of the Foreign Currency Directorate of the Moldovan National Bank, gave an interview to the newspaper NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA (Independent Moldova). She states that the conditions of credits granted to Moldova by the International Monetary Fund stipulates "the observance of the government program of structural transformations of the Moldovan economy until 1 July 1994 and of the 'stand-by' credit program, whose main goal is to decrease the inflation rate in Moldova by limiting the total quantity of money in circulation and reducing the budget deficit." The IMF granted $32,000,000 to support the program of economic and financial stabilization of Moldova, said Burunchuk. The IMF could also grant the same sum if the Moldovan Government followed the IMF recommendations. If Moldova has significant successes in implementing the market economy mechanisms, a 'stand-by' credit totaling $125,000,000 will be granted to stabilize the balance of payments. According to Burunchuk, the World Bank will grant Moldova $60,000,000 from which $55,000,000 will be used to buy from abroad necessary goods for the population, including fuel and raw materials. The other $5,000,000 are planned to be sold on the currency market; this is supposed to consolidate the national currency.

Kazakhstan

Instructions Issued on New Currency

LD1511153793 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Instructions No. 002 of the Kazakhstan National Bank issued 12 November]

[Text] [no dateline as received] On the work of enterprises and organizations during the period of exchange of the treasury notes and banknotes of the state bank of the USSR and the bank of Russia of the 1961-93 issue for the national currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

1. In conformity with the resolution of the state commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the procedures and conditions of introduction of the national currency of the Republic of Kazakhstan" of 12 November 1993 No 1 from 0800 on 15 November 1993 the new currency—the tenge—is introduced on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

2. By the beginning of the first day of the exchange all enterprises, organizations, and establishments (hereinafter referred to as enterprises) functioning on the territory of the republic and irrespective of their form of ownership are obliged to make reports on the amount of their cash on hand in the form of the 1961-93 issue banknotes and coins, and hand over the first copy of the report, which should be correctly formulated (that is, signed by the first leader, accountant, and teller), declaring it as cash deposit to the relevant branch of the bank not later than 14.00 on 15th November 1993 in order to be installed on their current account in conformity with Provision 4 of the resolution of the state commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the introduction of the national currency "On the procedures and conditions of introduction of the national currency of the republic of Kazakhstan."

3. Enterprises without easy access to a bank branch should hand the certified actual cash balances over to a post counter alongside the first copy of the report not later than 1400 on 15 November 1993 to be accepted in the order stated in Provision 4 of the resolution of the state commission of the republic of Kazakhstan "On the procedures and conditions of introduction of the national currency of the republic of Kazakhstan."

4. The banknotes of the 1961-93 issue from legal entities other than enterprises of retail trade and enterprises providing paid-for services, are accepted as a one-time transaction which is registered by the servicing bank or post counter on the title-page of the original copy of the Rules of the given legal entity or a document which substitutes for the Rules.

[Signed] Chairman of the National Bank of the republic of Kazakhstan Galym Baynazarov.

Nazarbayev Decree on Introduction of Currency

LD1511160993 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Decree issued by President Nazarbayev in Almaty on 12 November]

[Text] [no dateline as received] The decree of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the terms of completion of the circulation of the treasury notes and banknotes of the State Bank of the USSR and Bank of Russia of the 1961-1993 issue on the territory of Kazakhstan and their replacement by the national currency.

In connection with the introduction into circulation on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the national currency—the tenge—I decree:

1. To complete the exchange of the treasury and bank notes of the state bank of the USSR and the Bank of Russia of the 1961-1993 issue for the tenge by 18.00 (local time) on 20 November 1993.

To prohibit from 08.00 (local time) on 15 November the circulation on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan of the treasury and bank notes of the state bank of the USSR and Bank of Russia of the 1961-1993 issue of R1,3,5,10,25,50,100,200 and 500 [ruble] denomination.

2. The State Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the introduction of the national currency, heads of local administrations and law enforcement bodies should provide for the implementation of the given decree.

[Signed] Kazakhstan President N. Nazarbayev

[Dated] Almaty, 12 November 1993

Nazarbayev Decree on Currency Commission

LD1511175993 Almaty KAZTAG in Russian 1200 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Decree issued by President Nazarbayev in Almaty on the State Commission for the Introduction of the National Currency]

[Text] [no dateline as received] 1. In order to lead the work in introducing the national currency, I decree the establishment of a State Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Introduction of the National Currency (hereinafter referred to as the State Commission) with the following members:

Chairman: Tereshchenko S.A.—prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan;
Members: Asanbayev Ye.M.—vice president of the Republic of Kazakhstan;
Sembayev D.Kh.—first deputy prime minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan;
Baynazarov G.B.—chairman of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

Derbisov Ye.Zh.—minister of finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan;
Izteleuov B.I.—minister of economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

2. The following responsibilities are to be placed on the State Commission:

— Determination of the machinery for the introduction of the national currency, including the main principles, procedures, and conditions for the exchange of money;

— Organization and direct management of state and other structures involved in the preparation and implementation of measures for introducing the national currency, and implementation of relevant measures for the currency's functioning;

— Implementation of control over the monetary and financial situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan during the period of introducing the national currency;

— Appointment of plenipotentiary representatives of the State Commission in the provinces and determination of their functions, objectives, and scope of authority.

3. In order to achieve the objectives set for the State Commission, the following rights are authorized for it:

— To adopt resolutions on issues relating to the national currency's introduction, which are binding for execution by the organs of state management, local bodies of state executive power, banking establishments, enterprises, and organizations, irrespective of their form of ownership, as well as by the population on the whole territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan;

— To determine the periods and conditions for the exchange of treasury and bank notes of the USSR State Bank and the Bank of Russia of the 1961-1993 issue for the national currency, including the technical procedures for the exchange of cash, and recomputation of the means on accounts and deposits of legal and physical entities, payment documents, state and other liabilities, securities, guarantees, interests, and other ruble liabilities;

— To regulate issues concerning the formation of the exchange rate of the national currency to the Russian Federation ruble and the currencies of other countries;

— To create working organs in order to implement measures connected with the introduction of the national currency;

— To relieve any person of his post for activities that impede the introduction of the national currency;

— To take other exceptional measures aimed at the implementation of a complex of measures for the introduction of the national currency;

— Depending on the current situation, to make decisions on the prolongation of the period of exchange of the treasury and bank notes of the USSR State Bank and the Bank of Russia of the 1961-1993 issue for certain territories and categories of physical entities.

4. The State Commission is entitled to use the mass media for speedy dissemination of the decisions made by the commission.

5. The powers of the State Commission will be discontinued by decree of the president of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

6. This decree comes into force from the moment of signing.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev

[Dated] Almaty, 3 [as received] November 1993.

Impact of Talks Failure With Russia Assessed

PM1611105793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Nov 93 First Edition p 6

[Report by Sergey Skorokhodov and unattributed postscript: "Is It the Government or the Economy of Kazakhstan Which Dislikes the Moscow Option?"]

[Text] Almaty—Daulet Sembayev's news conference in Moscow at which he stated that the Kazakhstan delegation had broken off talks with the Russian delegation on creating a single ruble zone has had major repercussions in the republic. On the one hand, the future of the majority of the republic's enterprises which have close economic ties with Russia depended on the talks. The ban on making payments to Russia imposed by the republic's National State Bank at the start of the year, first on commercial structures and then all other structures, visited economic disaster on most of them within just six months. There are astronomical sums in many enterprises' accounts today but these are merely a record of sums which should have been received for their goods but which have not been received.

The reason for the National Bank in effect severing economic relations with Russia has not been investigated either in parliament, to which the National Bank is subordinate, or in the government, at whose order these measures were clearly taken.

There is conjecture that the seizing up of Kazakhstan's economy in recent years and the absence of real steps toward its market reform have induced directors to employ their enterprises' resources in the Russian economy, using "nonpayment" for goods supplied as a cover for these operations, which caused the National Bank to introduce "repressive measures."

Joining the single ruble zone would at a stroke have "materialized" the enormous resources in the Kazakhstan enterprises' accounts and transformed enterprises making astronomic losses into profitmaking ones, because the Russian ruble is today effectively equivalent to three Kazakhstan rubles. This was evidently perfectly well realized by Shokhin's team, which proposed, according to unofficial reports, a ruble exchange rate of at least 1 to 2.

An intelligent, market solution to the problem clearly does not suit the Kazakhstan leadership, which is bent on reviving its economy at Russia's expense, as in former times. That is why Shokhin's mission failed to produce results. And Sembayev's remarks at the press conference were merely redundant confirmation of the fact that Kazakhstan is incapable of building economic relations on foundations which take mutual interest into account.

At the same time it is perfectly clear that the economic necessity of the union will force the Kazakhstan Government to take this step. And the later this takes place, the more such a union will cost the republic's economy.

The refusal to continue the talks, as Vice Premier Sembayev's words made clear, presupposes the introduction of measures which the president of Kazakhstan broadly hinted at during the Supreme Council's first session. What this means, by all accounts, is the introduction of a national currency or some substitute for it. It is not difficult to work out what will then ensue, given that the experience of neighboring Kyrghyzstan is now perfectly clear.

Having spurned a civilized, market-based way of tackling its economic problems at a time when market reforms are being conducted in the republic very passively and are basically only for show, and when the introduction of private ownership of the means of production is being constantly delayed in the interests of corrupt management structures, Kazakhstan is condemned to a new bout of inflation from which no incantations about national sovereignty are going to save it.

The introduction of a separate national currency at a time when the bulk of goods come here from the Russian Federation will cause an unprecedented—compared with Russia—growth in prices. And it will have only itself to blame for this, not the "intractable northern neighbor," which is now blamed in the corridors of parliament and in the cabinet of ministers.

These arguments are, of course, no great secret. And if they are taken into consideration by the government of Kazakhstan, the talks with Russia will be continued very soon on some flimsy pretext or other.

Recent events seem to confirm this. First, a national currency or some substitute currency will be introduced before the end of the year, First Vice Premier Sembayev reported on returning from Moscow. Second, Premier S. Tereshchenko urgently left for Russia. It is unclear as yet what kind of proposals he brought with him. But the fact that he will be trying to find a third option to save Kazakhstan's economy from disaster is not in doubt.

Meanwhile...

A conference has been held between Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation; Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation; and leaders of Russian ministries and departments.

The conference discussed specific measures to maintain and strengthen production ties between enterprises and organizations of Russia and the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In connection with the proposed introduction of a separate currency in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Russian Federation ministries and departments are instructed to carry out work with their partners in the Republic of Kazakhstan on strengthening ties of cooperation, on the terms of payment for goods, and on improving reciprocal financial settlements. The leaders of enterprises, ministries, and departments are set the task of preventing the rupture of economic ties between the two states and of ensuring the mutually beneficial transformation of the common economic area.

Government Raises Wages for Military

LD1611104493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0931 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Fyodor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty November 16 TASS—Under the decree of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, which came into efect on October 1, salaries of Kazakh servicemen were increased by fifty per cent, of civilians employed in military establishments - by 220 per cent, payments for military ranks - grew by six times. This was the third increase of money allowances this year.

Field money and rent compensation for officers, warrant officers, naval warrant officers and men reengaging after completion of statury military service were also increased, Colonel Lev Nagay, the head of financial department of the Kazakh Defence Ministry said. Besides, this month pensions will be recalculated as from October 1.

Kyrgyzstan

Chyngyshev Assails 'Dirty' Campaign Against Cabinet

LD1511200393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1556 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Prime Minister Tursunbek Chyngyshev told the government last Saturday that the ongoing campaign against the Cabinet was a dirty game. "Since the government declared war on bribery and corruption in the supreme bodies of state authority, threats have been made against me," he said. "This shows that we have stepped on the monster's tail," he stated.

Chyngyshev believes that during the next parliamentary session on December 7, the opposition will attempt to remove him from the post of prime minister. "I will be presented as a bad guy and the government will be condemned," he said. "However, we will continue our efforts to restore order and prevent the corrupt elements from coming to power," he added. He also alleged that a group of corrupt high-ranking officials was planning to kill those who are fighting against corruption.

Opponents lay the blame for the current economic problems and for the som's falling exchange rate on Chyngyshev, who initiated the introduction of the national currency. They also predict that the financial situation will deteriorate even further after Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan introduce their own currencies.

Chyngyshev stated, however, that he would take additional measures to protect the Kyrgyz economy. He told the government on Saturday that control over the exports of goods to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan should be toughened, and that Kyrgyz enterprises should stop repaying their debts, as their bank accounts in those states had been frozen.

According to Chyngyshev, the ruble zone has never existed. "It is a mere bluff. Kyrgyzstan stated this on many occasions and was one of the first CIS countries to switch to its own national currency," he said.

He also told the government that Kyrgyzstan was ready to sign inter-governmental agreements regulating economic relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan on the basis of their national currencies.

Observers believe, however, that Chyngyshev's opponents might use these measures against him.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov: Leadership Ends Civil War, Reaches Accord

LD1611094593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0725 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By KHOVAR correspondent Negmat Ochilov for TASS]

[Text] Dushanbe November 16 TASS—"Over the period of one year the new Tajik leadership has put an end to the fratricidal war, reached national accord and ensured the return of the overwhelming majority of refugees to their native places," Tajik parliamentary speaker Imamali Rakhmanov said on national television on the occasion of the first anniversary of the session of the Tajik parliament which restored a constitutional system in Tajikistan.

Rakhmanov said that civil war and natural calamities had caused damage to the country estimated at 500 billion roubles as a result of which the republic found itself in an extremely difficult situation. The living standards of the population sharply dropped, he said.

Rakhmanov emphasised that the Tajik people would never forget the fraternal aid given by Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, other CIS countries and friendly countries of the world community in the most difficult period of Tajik history.

Today, sovereign Tajikistan has been recognised by 114 world countries, Rakhmanov said. The country is gradually coming out of the economic crisis. The Tajik leadership is prepared to cooperate with all parties and movements which seek to achieve progress in the country and improve the life of the people.

Rakhmanov declared that Tajikistan would remain in the rouble zone of a new type. "We see our future on the way to the construction of democratic secular society in close cooperation with other CIS countries," Rakhmanov said. .

Five Casualties in Attack on Military Unit

LD1511154793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1340 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 15 TASS—A Tajik military unit was attacked by unidentified gunmen on the night of November 14. The unit is located in the town of Kurgan Tyube and belongs to the coalition peace-keeping force.

As a result of the attack, two servicemen were killed and three others badly injured, Colonel Ivan Malevich, head of the press centre of the headquarters of the coalition peace-keeping force, told ITAR-TASS. Bandits have stolen weapons belonging to the victims, Malevich said.

An investigation into the incident has begun.

Russian Border Guards Shelled, Rebuffs Attack

LD1611094993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0746 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 16 TASS—On Monday [15 November] night, two rocket shells were fired on border guards of the 12th border outpost of the Moscow border guard unit, ITAR-TASS learned from the press centre of the headquarters of Russian border guards stationed in Tajikistan.

The shelling was followed by an attempt to attack the outpost from the rear by militants of the Tajik opposition who broke through the Tajik border from Afghanistan some time ago.

The attack was rebuffed and assaulters retreated suffering losses. No casualties among border guards have been reported.

On Sunday, Russian border guards prevented an attempt of an armed breakthrough from the territory of Afghanistan at the Khorog section of the Tajik-Afghan border. As a result of fire opened in retaliation by Russian border guards, one of the trespassers was killed and two others detained.

Uzbekistan

Russia's Kozyrev Arrives in Tashkent for Talks

LD1511204493 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1856 GMT 15 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Tashkent, 15 Nov—The main aim of our visit to Uzbekistan is to strengthen traditional ties between Moscow and Tashkent in accordance with "the instructions of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin on developing strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan." Journalists were told this by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev this evening at Tashkent airport. Uzbekistan is the first leg in a working tour of Central Asian countries by the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. During the four-day visit he will also visit Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

Andrey Kozyrev said that during the upcoming talks there was to be discussion of a range of bilateral relations, and efforts were to be coordinated in seeking ways of settling the situation around Tajikistan.

Replying to journalists' questions, the minister said that his arrival was "not directly connected" with the economic and financial reforms currently under way in Uzbekistan. The sphere of my activity, he remarked, is politics, but it is natural that we will also discuss issues concerning the current economic and financial state of bilateral relations.

Immediately on his arrival in Tashkent talks began between Andrey Kozyrev and Uzbek Foreign Minister Saidmukhtar Saidkasymov. Tomorrow morning the minister will meet the country's President Islam Karimov. The same day he will fly out to the capital of Kazakhstan, Almaty.

Karimov, Kozyrev Hold Talks

LD1611093893 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0754 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Tashkent, 16 Nov—The meeting between Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev began with a one-to-one conversation. The head of Russia's foreign policy department arrived in Tashkent on Monday on a brief working visit.

During the conversation, opinions were exchanged on a wide range of Russian-Uzbek relations, in particular on issues of economic-financial cooperation between the two countries and the situation regarding the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan. Discussions were held on the current situation in the CIS, issues related to a settlement of the situation in Uzbekistan, and on developing joint approaches of the CIS countries to the settlement of the Tajik problem.

We attach very great importance to the talks in Tashkent, the Russian minister said in a talk with journalists. Uzbekistan plays a central role in the region's affairs and its role and place in the international arena are, as a whole, extremely important, Kozyrev continued. Russia greatly values the efforts made personally by President Karimov in settling the region's problems.

Kozyrev is on a working visit to a number of Central Asian states. Apart from Uzbekistan, he will visit Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Discussing coordinated approaches to a settlement and normalization of the situation with regard to Tajikistan is the most important aim of his visit.

Karimov: No Violation of Russian Rights

LD1611100093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0939 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelyov]

[Text] Tashkent November 16 TASS—"There are no grounds to allege that Russians in Uzbekistan have been put under unbearable conditions and that the mass exodus of Russians from Uzbekistan is taking place," said Uzbek President Islam Karimov opening talks with a Russian delegation led by Andrey Kozyrev, who is currently in Tashkent on a working visit.

"Neither agiotage [as received], nor tension should be created around this problem," Karimov said, promising that the problem would be looked into immediately.

During one-on-one talks between Kozyrev and Karimov concerning the position of the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan, Kozyrev said that about 700 people apply to the Russian Embassy daily asking to protect their interests and receive the Russian citizenship.

Upon completion of the talks the Russian delegation will fly to Kazakhstan to subsequently visit Tajikistan to continue talks with leaders of these republics on problems of bilateral relations, the coordination of positions on the settlement of the situation around Tajikistan and the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Government Introduces New National Currency

LD1511215893 Tashkent UZBEKISTAN APN in Russian 1123 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] The sum-coupon is being introduced in Uzbekistan from Monday 15 November, in accordance with a government decision. By the end of this year it will have the status of a monetary unit along with the ruble [R] of 1961-1992 issue and the new Russian money, at a rate of one to one. Exceptions are the 5,000 and 10,000 old-issue denominations, which are being removed from circulation from 15 November. Citizens may put this money in the savings bank at a maximum of R200,000 per person with a local residence permit. Amounts over R200,000 will be put in separate non-interest-bearing accounts, which are frozen for six months. Non-cash transactions between enterprises should continue to be carried out in rubles. Bureaus will be opened in the republic for changing the sum-coupon into freely convertible currency and the new Russian money, which in effect makes the latter on a par in Uzbekistan with freely convertible currency. In some hard currency shops goods are already on sale for Russian rubles. By decision of the government, the export of new Russian money outside the borders of the republic is restricted to 150,000, while import of old-issue money is banned. The full transfer to the sum as the national currency is due to start from 1 January 1994.

Armenia

Azerbaijanis Shell Northern Areas; No Casualties

NC1511144893 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1345 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Tension rose on Armenia's Tavushskiy Rayon border yesterday evening. The Azerbaijani Army opened tank and machine gun fire from its base in Alibeyli on the defensive positions near Nerkin-Karmiragpyur between 1900 and 2015 hours. The Armenian border guards did not retaliate. There were no casualties.

ARMENPRES Reports Aliyev General Mobilization Decree

NC1511180893 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1345 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] With a special decree from Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev, a general mobilization has been declared in Azerbaijan. Even 50-year old men are conscripted into the Army.

Regardless of Azerbaijani Prime Minister Suret Guseynov's claim that the Karabakh forces' success rests in their numerical superiority, the fact remains that the Azerbaijani Army is numerically superior to Karabakh forces several times over.

Situation in Karabakh, Along Border Reviewed

NC1511191493 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, we now present a report on the latest situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The situation at the NKR's front lines has been tense during the past few days. It must be pointed out for the sake of justice that wide-scale attacks and raids did not take place. However, the deployment of reinforcements and armored vehicles in Azerbaijan's areas close to the confrontation lines indicate that Azerbaijan's leaders and reactionary circles have not abandoned their intention to solve the dispute through the use of force. According to various sources, military preparations are being made in Azerbaijan. Additional measures have been taken toward mobilization in that Republic. Men between 35 and 40 years old are being trained as soldiers. Baku Radio has reported that during the past two days they have been dispatched to the front lines after training for a short period. Foreign officers are actively taking part in the reorganization of Azerbaijan's military forces. [passage omitted]

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's military units have continued to fire on the NKR's defensive positions with various types of arms. It appears that they wish to test the durability of the Armenian fortifications. However, the Armenian units have remained committed to their pledge to unilaterally continue to observe the cease fire. Azerbaijan's military forces shelled the Armenian positions in Fizulinskiy Rayon with artillery guns on the night of 12 November. They also shelled the same positions early the following day. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's units fired on the defensive positions around [place name indistinct] in the occupied areas in Mardakertskiy Rayon.

Azerbaijan's mass media continue to distort the facts. They have claimed that the Armenian military units have occupied four towns in Beynagan Rayon. The NKR command headquarters has denied that claim and has disclosed that the NKR forces have not advanced from their positions.

A significant incident did not occur on the NKR's front lines yesterday.

The situation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been relatively peaceful for several days. The Armenian side is seriously observing the cease-fire agreement and trying not to respond to the neighboring side's provocative activities.

Ajarian Parliament Head Denies Meeting Navy Commander

NC1511213293 Yerevan SNARK in English 1430 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Tbilisi, November 15 (SNARK)—Aslo Abashidze, the chairman of Supreme Soviet of Ajaria, said that the report broadcasted by Radio "Liberty" (Svoboda) on November 14 is disinformation. It is said in the report that allegedly he had met with Eduard Baltin, the commander of the Black Sea Navy of Russia, and had to admit Abkhazia and Ajaria under the jurisdiction of Russia.

Azerbaijan

Yeltsin's Envoy, Baku Discuss Sending Troops

NC1511182693 Baku TURAN in English 0941 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 15 (TURAN)—Negotiations between Azerbaijani Government and personal representative of Russian president to the talks on Nagorno-Karabakh Vladimir Kazimirov have been going on for the three days running. The talks are held behind the closed doors.

V. Kazimirov's visit to the region followed after contacts of Azeri Government with Foreign Minister of RF [Russian Federation] A. Kozyrev in Moscow. As Moscow's correspondent of TURAN reports, in the course of these talks they discussed necessity of introducing Russian forces as peacemaking separated ones to the region. [sentence as received]

V. Kazimirov intends to visit Yerevan and Khankendi [Stepanakert] besides Baku. According to available information, he will hold talks on stage-by-stage settlement of the conflict using Armed Forces of Russia. As the ambassador of RF to Azerbaijan Valter Shonia told TURAN's correspondent we need concrete agreement of warring parties to introduce Russian peacemaking forces to the region.

In the course of Kazimirov's visit to the region, concrete mechanism connected with division of warring parties will be also discussed.

As TURAN's correspondent had been told by the embassy of RF in Baku, talks of V. Kazimirov with government of the Republic were going on but subject of the talks was unknown.

Judging by delayed visit of Kazimirov in Baku, implementation of this plan will be difficult and can be delayed.

As it is known, November 11 at Moscow briefing representative of Foreign Ministry of Russia Demurin told, November 2-8 at unofficial visit of the CSCE in Vienna, Russia forwarded to send its peacemaking forces to Nagorno-Karabakh. [sentence as received]

Six More Hostages Transported to Baku

NC1511173193 Baku AZERTAC in English 1510 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 15, (AZERTAC)—According to the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan other six Azeri hostages have been released and transported by a plane of the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] from Yerevan to Baku. Release of these old and ill people from Armenian captivity—according to the medical experts three of them are mentally ill—is a sign of free will. Released hostages, former residents of the Zangelanskiy and Kubatlinskiy districts, have been taken hostages in their native villages, with the exception of forty-year-old Rahima Vahidova, a resident of Tbilisi who was taken hostage in Georgia.

Secretary of State Leaves on Visit to Georgia

NC1511184593 Baku TURAN in English 0941 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 15 (TURAN)—This morning Azerbaijani Secretary of State Lala Gadzhiyeva left for Georgia for the consultations with Georgian Government concerned the situation of Azeri population in that country and development of bilateral relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan.

As representatives of Azeri community of eastern Georgia reported, the number of acts of terrorism had become frequent. Robber gangs from Armenian territory and insubordinate to Georgian Government armed units seize hostages.

For the last month Armenian units have taken 10 Azeri peasants hostages in neighbouring with Armenia Georgian villages. They demanded a large sum of money and fuel on exchange of the hostages.

November 9 terrorists attacked a bus with Azeris in Bolniss region, in the result of armed conflict two passengers were killed and 18 wounded.

Last week Azeris held series of rallies in Marneuli City demanding that hostages should be released and Georgian authorities should take security measures.

The course on ethnic cleansing had been declared within the period of presidential activity of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. All political regimes of Azerbaijan tried to hold talks with Georgian Government without involvement into Georgian internal affairs and this way easing the problem.

About half a million of Azeris live on the territory of Georgia, especially in its south-eastern regions. They, unlike other ethnic groups, did not make use of political situation in that country in their personal interests.

Karabakh Ready To Discuss Settlement Schedule

LD1511191693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1722 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Nagorno-Karabakh is ready to discuss the new schedule for urgent measures for the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict proposed by the Minsk Group of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), said the foreign minister of the unilaterally proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

Arkady Gukasian said on Monday at a news conference in Stepanakert, capital of the disputed enclave, that Nagorno- Karabakh had not changed its principle that all key issues—withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh troops from the Azerbaijani territories they were occupying, lifting of the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh and formulation of its future status—must be resolved simultaneously.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakah are expected to state their positions on the new CSCE schedule before November 22.

Gukasyan said Russia intended to increase its role in the efforts to settle the conflict, both within and outside the framework of the CSCE. He said Russia's position on the issue was determined by its own interests in the Transcaucasus.

CSCE in Baku To Set Schedule for Settling Conflict

LD1611123193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1132 GMT 16 Nov 93

[By unidentified ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Baku November 16 TASS—Russian roving ambassador and head of the Russian mediation mission set up to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Vladimir Kazimirov is now conducting talks here behind closed doors on a new CSCE schedule for settling the Armenian-Azeri conflict, the answer to which is to be furnished by the conflicting sides by November 22. It is common knowledge that the Azeri side had several serious objections to the Paris schedule and refused to endorse it.

According to trustworthy sources, the talks between Kazimirov and the Azeri leadership are still continuing. No agreement has so far been reached.

ITAR-TASS has learned from officials of the Azeri Foreign Ministry that the Russian diplomat, who is staying here since Saturday, has had several consultations with Azeri President Geydar Aliyev and Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov.

Deputy Justice Minister Appointed; 2 Officials Dismissed

NC1511213393 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Text] With decrees signed by the Azerbaijani president, Chingiz Dzhamshit ogly Emirov has been appointed deputy justice minister and head of the Justice Ministry's Chief Administration for the Execution of the Court Decisions.

Dashkin Feyruz ogly Aghalarov was relieved from his post as first deputy chairman of the State Committee on Fuel.

Sultan Selim ogly Eyubov was relieved of his post as first deputy president of the State Grain Products Company.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Gives Weekly Interview on Issues

LD1511133193 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0650 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Studio interview with head of state Eduard Shevardnadze by Nato Oniani—live]

[Excerpts] [Oniani] Good morning, it is Monday and as always we bring you the traditional interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian head of state and parliament chairman.

Mr. Shevardnadze, a lady from Poti said on television yesterday that she was sorry Georgia had been destroyed. Her pain is understandable. The situation in west Georgia is relatively calm. What measures are the country's authorities taking for further stabilization? And one more question, where has the rather large armed group of the former president's supporters disappeared? We know that there was quite a strong force concentrated there.

[Shevardnadze] Good morning. Definite tendencies for stabilization in west Georgia have taken shape, and the main organized resistance of the former president's supporters which were mainly made up of bandit groups and looters has been overcome. This was the key resistance. The authorities are working very actively to restore the rhythm of life. [passage omitted] The emergency committee which has been set up there is working very actively. The republic's ministries and establishments are helping. Mr. Kervalishvili and a group of ministers left for the second time already. Yesterday he visited Zugdidi and Khobi. He made quite an important decision for restoring the rhythm of life. He will go to Tsalenjikha, Chkhorotskhu and Martvili rayons. There are lots of problems to be seen to in these rayons.

As I have told you before, Mr. Patsatsia, our prime minister, is at the scene. He left for Poti yesterday and today he will visit Zugdidi and some other rayons and will stay there for as long as necessary. Our military personnel are there too. In particular, the main headquarters are functioning in Zugdidi and chief of staff Nikolaishvili is there at the moment. This, of course, helps the situation there. This is as far as the positive factors are concerned. [passage omitted] Now, where did all those unit members disappear? They could not have evaporated. One part of them is on the territory of Abkhazia, we have exact data according to which some of those units and in particular Gamsakhurdia's closest allies have practically reunited with Ardzinba's fighters and his combatants. To be more precise, their alliance had existed before but now they have been formally united, formally too as well as actually united. There is nothing to be surprised about. However strongly the North Caucasian Peoples' Confederation might deny this, the fact is that ... [pauses] we have prisoners ... [pauses] the Chechens, Abkhaz combatants, North Ossetians and other nationalities, the Cossacks and others, other mercenaries were fighting in Abkhazia. Thus, this alliance has existed for a long time.

[Oniani] And the same people were fighting in west Georgia.

[Shevardnadze] This is exactly what I am saying, they were fighting in Mingrelia and several prisoners are testifying to it. There are data as to how many of them there were and the population saw it. An investigation is under way at the moment and everything will be confirmed. I do not doubt that all this will be confirmed and our television viewers and radio listeners will hear all about it and understand everything. [passage omitted]

Additional police forces have been sent there. We would like to put the police in charge of order in towns and villages. Several thousand people have been sent there. I must say that the Interior Ministry is coping with it. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] Mr. Shevardnadze, you have just talked about the activities of the police. Our listeners know that the state troops and the police would always enter those places together but, unfortunately, instances of marauding were registered then and are still being registered. [passage omitted]

It must be felt in the country that somehow the military bodies are being built up but unfortunately it cannot be seen or felt.

[Shevardnadze] In this connection I must say, if we are talking about stability in west Georgia, I am not talking about Abkhazia of course, we must stress a very important role, a decisive role of the Defense ministry's armed units, the Mkhedrioni, internal troops, and the part of the population who supported us actively. Without all this, it would be impossible to talk about turning away the armed bandits and I think that a great work has been done in this respect. [passage omitted]

Now, as for the unfortunate, sad instances connected with marauding, I must say that those units have been accused. I myself witnessed when hundreds of marauders and looters were caught, they had no connection with combat operations and our armed formations but called themselves either members of the guard or Mkhedrioni or the internal troops.

But it is not only that, unfortunately, and, I must say, to our shame, [pauses] if they are listening to me now, the heads of these units will probably make conclusions. Some of our soldiers and officers did start looting and marauding. I have witnessed it in Zugdidi, Senaki, Abasha, and other regions, and in Poti too. What is going on?

I think that the leaders' attitude is too passive. I have often praised our Defense ministry, Mkhedrioni, and internal troops but now that the instances of marauding and looting are worrying us and first of all, the population so much, serious mistakes which have been made must be pointed out as well. I think that the Defense Ministry can do much more.

I charge the military police with this task. Special units of the military police must be activated in west Georgia at the moment, such an order has been given out and they have been so instructed.

An experienced officer, Boris Ivanov, is in charge of this. I have given him a personal task several times in the past and I must say that it did not get done the way it should have been done. The same kind of task was given to General Lanchava who was head of internal troops in those days. He did nothing. I have decided to hold both of them responsible for not having carried out the orders of the commander-in-chief.

[Oniani] And now he is sending out a new wave of discontent now.

[Shevardnadze] I shall tell you directly that there would have been much less resistance in these regions of west Georgia had there been no instances of looting. This does not apply only to Mingrelia; Samtredia did not suffer less and such instances were also registered unfortunately in Khoni and other rayons. [passage omitted]

I am not saying that a large number of our army and military formations is committing this crime. I repeat: no scribes can describe the heroism displayed by our boys but, because some of them are doing this, everything goes down the tubes. [passage omitted]

I must also say that our hopes were dashed by the military procurator's office. I often meet with Mr. Shushanashvili whenever I visit those rayons and towns but, so far, I have seen nothing done by him. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] Mr. Shevardnadze, you have mentioned that an investigation is under way and that certain facts will become known. We know that for certain reasons our population knew nothing about the results of the criminial cases relating to the former president's activities which have been solved. Probably, you will agree with me in saying that there is a large amount of pure crime in Zviadism. Has an investigation and shall we learn the specific facts and the results of their activities?

[Shevardnadze] I have told you that I was displeased with the work of the military procurator's office and I would also like to express my discontent for those employees of the procurator's office who had to investigate Gamsakhurdia's and his group's activities from the beginning to the end. Investigations have not been conducted properly. The same is true of the Interior Ministry and the security service.

I have ordered them, in the fullest sense of this word, to take on this case. They must investigate what he did to Georgia and what harm Gamsakhurdia and his entourage did to Georgia. I mean from the criminal point of view, not the political one. I must say that having seen what we have in west Georgia, Gamsakhurdia's image, whatever image of a politician he had, has disappeared altogether. He is finally impoverished and it is no longer possible to talk of Gamsakhurdia as of a politician.

I am interested in this investigation. They are common criminals, real criminals, himself and his entourage as well, all of them together, and it must not just be declared only as a word of mouth but also everything must be brought out in the daylight. I have seen what criminal offences they had committed against the Georgian people and Georgia. Work must be carried out in such a manner that every citizen knows who they used to deal with, what this former president and his group were about, the group which brought the country such pain.

A big brigade has been created, a very big brigade. The procurator general is working in west Georgia and so are quite a large group of security services and the relevant subunits of the Interior Ministry. I hope that in the immediate future, in about one or two months Georgia will learn everything about what these people did and what crimes they perpetrated against the Georgian people. I think that when we shall, in future, be talking about Gamsakhurdia, we must talk not as of a politician but a common malefactor, a malefactor and a criminal. Let everybody, both his opponents and his fanatics hear these words.

[Oniani] Mr. Shevardnadze, one question, please. You are often criticized for not having your own party, a political base and so on and so forth. Information was circulated yesterday that plans for acting jointly were made by some political parties, the Monarchists' Party, the Traditionalists' Party, the Society of Kostava and Ilia Chavchavadze, and the Khartia. These are the parties some of which, once, were not exactly friends. Has Shevardnadze been left alone? These parties are in opposition, are they not?

[Shevardnadze] I think that creation of such a bloc was to be expected. It existed in real terms but may be they were not registered as such and probably this process of registration started; I do not know how solid this bloc is going to be. Probably, it will depend on many factors but you know and I have declared many times that I will have to initiate creating some political force, a party.

Having officially declared it, it was still difficult for me to take this step because one way or another, it would heighten tensions with the opposition. I wanted to delay making this decision but now, I just have no right not to speed up this process after the decision had been made by my opponents.

I would like to say in this connection that work is nearing completion on creating the political force about which I have spoken many times. We must accept the challenge now and a political body, a mechanism must be created, the one which I used to talk about.

I met last night with others who agree with me on this; we have worked recently on these issues, we shall probably speed up this process. It is difficult for me to give it a name today or say what the program or the declaration will be like but I am deeply sure that it will be the leading political force in Georgia, the key political force. Let my opponents be angry with me, but none of the opposition party blocs will compare with it as it will be a very powerful political force.

[Oniani] Will it be a powerful political force just because of Shevardnadze's presence there or due to its composition?

[Shevardnadze] Mainly because of its composition and the aims pursued by this political force and, maybe not the least factor for it being Shevardnadze's membership there, although I would like to declare in this connection beforehand that my colleagues working on these issues at the moment and myself are ready to cooperate with all intelligent and normal politicians and political forces. I repeat, intelligent and normal political forces after this political force has been registered. This is what I can tell you in response to this event.

[Oniani] Thank you. Mr. Shevardnadze, you have recently declared that we shall reclaim Abkhazia either by military or political means. The situaton is quite complex. You know that Gamsakhurdia's supporters are on the territory of Abkhazia, anyway, according to our official information they are. Ardzinba has recently made statements similar to those made at the beginning of this war. How will events develop? What is to be expected?

[Shevardnadze] Since the beginning of the war and long before that, if we look back at the old times, everything used to go according to a definite scenario and it was not written by Ardzinba alone. One must have a notion of the fact that the authors of this scenario used to be mighty and very influential people, not only in Abkhazia but in another country. I think that his recent speeches which I have been following and analyzing prove that Ardzinba's collaborators are nowhere to be seen now.

[Oniani] Have they left him to his own devices?

[Shevardnadze] Some of them may have been put where they had to be placed after the events of 3-4 October and others do not feel like cooperating with him lest they should end up in the same boat with Khasbulatov, Rutskoy and others, Makashov and others. So, if you pay attention and closely analyze his speeches, you will notice that the force that used to boost him up before and after the beginning of the war is gone; but it does not make our aims simpler.

I repeat that none of the Georgians and the citizens of Georgia will be reconciled to losing Abkhazia and its secession from Georgia, they will not be reconciled to it and, by the way, neither will Russia. The new draft constitution ... [pauses] Ardzinba is keeping up appearances as if he is not aware of it, there is no right to secede and sovereignty is defined differently.

[Oniani] Not only is there no mention of the mechanism but there is no mention of the right to it either.

[Shevardnadze] There is no mention of the right. We used to be told before, why do you not follow the example. We shall follow the example and we know what to do. Not a single citizen of Georgia shall be reconciled to it. Ardzinba and those who are at one with him must be aware of this but I would also like to say that we shall use every way, every way to restore justice and Georgia's territorial integrity and unity. We are not refusing the political solution. There will be a meeting in Geneva and our very authoritative delegation will be sent there, we shall use this too, but we shall not stop seeking other ways.

In this connection, I would like to confirm that our return to Abkhazia and the return of tens of thousands of refugees to Abkhazia, does not mean that we shall retaliate the Abkhazians in the same way as Ardzinba's gangs treated the Georgian population. We shall not do it. [passage omitted]

We are not going to take revenge on the Abkhaz people, this will not happen. Despite all the pain and tribulations, the Abkhaz people will remnain friends with the Georgians. We do not want Ardzinba's crimes to be spread on all Abkhaz people and I would like my voice to reach every Abkhazian so that if the Georgians return to Abkhazia—and they will—they will continue living in the new epoch, side by side, like relatives and friends and well-wishers.

I think that Ardzinba's speeches are full of nervousness and they lack logic. One can detect that we are dealing with a man who had committed the heaviest crime not only before the Georgians but the whole of mankind. So he is seeing an apparition of what is called justice, that justice shall prevail.

[Oniani] Mr. Shevardnadze, an Azerbaijani state delegation led by the state secretary, Lala Gajiyeva, arrives in Georgia later today. We have signed a comprehensive treaty with Azerbaijan; it is our neighboring country and probably this visit will be of importance to us.

[Shevardnadze] First, I would like to say that I invited this delegation here. I recently held a very friendly telephone conversation with Mr. Geydar Aliyev. We agreed that there were some issues of practical importance which required a working visit by such a group. The delegation includes several ministers and other officials from Azerbaijani governmental structures. Madam Gajiyeva herself is a famous activist. I have known her since the times of my activities for democracy in Moscow. She was once an active member of the Movement for Democracy; now she is the state secretary and is an honored person in Azerbaijan. I treat with seriousness her and her colleagues' visit. They will visit Tbilisi, different establishments, and maybe they will also visit Marneuli. We have already created every opportunity for this visit, and I think that it will take place. We have definite interests, you know, for the citizens of Azerbaijan living in the neighboring country.

[Oniani] And it is included in the comprehensive agreement.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, it is. It is in our mutual interest. But the main goal is that our relations with our neighbors, I mean Azerbaijan of course, and Armenia, cannot be static, they must develop day by day. The Armenian prime minister's visit to Georgia is expected in the immediate future. The more frequent these contacts, the better. I welcome this delegation.

[Oniani] Thank you very much for the interview.

Shevardnadze Gives Reasons for Joining CIS

AU1511164193 Vienna PROFIL in German 15 Nov 93 p 69

[Interview with President Eduard Shevardnadze by Misha Glenny in Abasha; date not given]

[Text] [Glenny] Mr. Shevardnadze, how could you cope with switch from being a world politician to being the president of a country at civil war?

[Shevardnadze] It is a nightmare, a tragedy. When I became Soviet foreign minister, the situation smelt of a hot war, even of nuclear war. I did the best I could to prevent the Cold War from becoming a hot war and to get back Soviet troops from East Germany and Eastern Europe. If they had stayed, a new world war would have threatened. Now I am in the middle of meaningless, petty wars that I can hardly influence at all; but I do my best.

[Glenny] How can we achieve a new, more peaceful world order?

[Shevardnadze] The wars in Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and in other places have to be stopped. This requires the participation of all states. We must start by reforming the United Nations, the only organization that can control all these processes. We need the creative participation of the West. We must try to achieve a higher degree of economic cooperation, and more security by joining NATO. This will have to happen soon.

[Glenny] By capturing the city of Zugdidi you broke the rebellion of former President Gamsakhurdia. What is the next step? Are you going to win the separated Republic of Abkazia back?

[Shevardnadze] I cannot tell yet what comes after Zugdidi. Of course, we must win Abkazia back, both politically and militarily. The political negotiations with the Abkazians are going to be difficult; they have committed awful atrocities—ethnic cleansings, even genocide. Such crimes cannot even be forgiven by God, far less so by ordinary mortals. If the negotiations fail, we will consider taking military measures. The Abkazians that are supported by Rutskoy have been weakened by Yeltsin's victory on 3 and 4 October in Moscow. I have always said that the Russians backing the Abkhazians are only part of the Russian spectrum.

[Glenny] When you had to withdraw from the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi, you accused Russia of treason. A few days later you announced Georgia's joining the CIS. Why did you change your mind?

[Shevardnadze] We cannot say Russian imperialism is dead. Anti-democratic forces are still strong in Russia. I had no illusions when we joined the CIS after the events in October. After the fall of Abkhazia, I did not really feel like joining, but it has been my policy to be open toward all sides. The only way this seemed possible was to join the CIS, otherwise we could not have improved relations with the Russians. We would not be able to exist without Russia. The Georgian economy is disrupted. The only way out is to reestablish our ties with Russia. Basically, all former socialist countries are beggars today.

[Glenny] Are you still in contact with Mikhail Gorbachev?

[Shevardnadze] Yes, mostly by satellite telephone. But I would like to meet him again soon. I also speak on the phone with my friends in the West, like James Baker and George Shultz.

[Glenny] Mr. Gorbachev now travels the world and gets paid $25,000 per lecture. Are you at all sorry that you have decided to become president of Georgia instead of earning sums like that?

[Shevardnadze] I did not know it is that much. When I resigned, people all over the world wanted to hear me talk for money. But I have not regretted my decision. If you can call life in this country happy, then I am happy. When we seized Senaki, everybody hugged me. This means more to me than dollars. But dollars are not bad, either!

[Glenny] You spent much of the civil war at the front. Why?

[Shevardnadze] Because it was worst for the people at the front. In my home province of Mingrelia, the war was lost before I got there. Perhaps my leadership and my presence at the front helped us win it back. Let me remind you that we do not have a regular army. There is no discipline and no professionalism in our armed forces. They are patriots and have a good morale; I am proud of that. When we attacked Senaki, a lack of discipline became apparent. But when I come to see them, they show respect. Our troops wanted to conquer Zugdidi one day earlier, they were excitedly waiting for the fight. I said no. If they had done it, we would have paid a high price for our actions, because they wanted to take revenge on the Gamsakhurdia followers for their treacherous role in the Abkhaz war.

State Troops Reportedly Regroup Along Inguri River

LD1511153993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1356 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] The Georgian troops which assumed positions along the river Inguri following the defeat of the Zviadists are re-grouping personnel and equipment, the Abkhazian Defense Ministry reports. One of the Georgian units is located near the Inguri hydro-power plant. The same source reports that armed Georgian citizens are crossing the Georgian-Abkhazian border. The Abkhazian posts disarm them and send them home.

The Georgian troops are planning to use artillery in Abkhazia's Kodorsky Ravine, which may cause avalanches to go down, says the Abkhazian Defense Ministry. It also alleges that refugees from Mingrelia who want to get to Abkhazia, have got concentrated on the Georgian side of the border. Tbilisi observers fear lest combat operations might be resumed between Georgia and Abkhazia soon.

Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze told Georgian radio on Monday that "not a single Georgian will put up with the loss of Abkhazia" and that "Abkhazia will be re-joined to Georgia by all means." Shevardnadze does not rule out the possibility of resorting to non-political measures.

Last Friday, Chairman of the Abkhazian parliament Vladislav Ardzinba urged President Yeltsin to consider the possibility of sending peace-keeping forces and military observers to the Abkhazian-Georgian border along the river Inguri. Moscow is still to respond.

Tbilisi Issues Ultimatum to Zviadist Rebels

LD1511212293 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1956 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Officials of the Georgian Defense and Interior Ministries engaged in talks with rebels loyal to deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia have made an ultimatum to members of the opposition groups to surrender weapons and return to a peaceful life, the Interior Ministry's press office told INTERFAX. The government offered security guarantees to those who were not involved in crimes, it said.

In the meantime, things are going back to normal in Zugdidi, whose residents patrol city streets together with members of police and security forces, a ministry spokesman said.

The chief of the city administration on Sunday dismissed seven local officials on charges of sabotage.

However, there is still no electricity supply to the republic from the Inguri hydroelectric station because the main grid at rebel-held Saberio village of Abkhazia's Gali Region remains switched off. Government troops, however, are in control of the dam and the station itself.

Georgian Security Minister Igor Giorgadze said the government was having talks with the rebels of deposed President Zviad Gamsakhurdia in western Georgia in a bid to make them surrender arms.

In a television program on Monday, Giorgadze said rebels who had laid down arms and had not been involved in the pillaging would be set free.

Their leaders, however, would be arrested but their lives would not be in danger if they gave up their weapons voluntarily.

Black Sea Fleet Commander: Soldiers Remain in Place

LD1511210393 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1700 15 Nov 93

[Text] Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, has denied reports alleging that servicemen of the Black Sea Fleet guarding transport routes in the west Georgian zone have left the area of their deployment.

In accordance with an agreement between the Black Sea Fleet command and the leadership of the Republic of Georgia, the contingent of the Black Sea Fleet will be patrolling the routes until the situation in the region is finally stabilized. In Admiral Baltin's opinion, Georgia itself will be able to undertake the guard duties in the future, since it has a significant military contingent.

Ukrainian Marines Withdrawn From War Zone

LD1611124993 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Marines of the Black Sea Fleet who are citizens of Ukraine have left Georgia where they were carrying out a humanitarian mission to guard transport communications as part of a fleet task force. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told that they were withdrawn from Poti to Sevastopol on a landing craft on the instructions of Admiral Eduard Baltin, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

The admiral made the decision to evacuate them after Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetskyy appealed to him to take steps to exclude the participation of soldiers of Ukrainian citizenship in armed actions in Poti and that they be immediately withdrawn from the danger zone.

Nadareishvili Assails Caucasian Congress Convention

LD1511215193 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Republic of Georgia Vice Premier Tamaz Nadareishvili made a statement today, which says that convening the congress of delegates of the Caucasian People's Confederation in Sukhumi is a flagrant interference in the internal affairs of sovereign and independent Georgia and impedes the restoration of good-neighborly relations between the Georgian people and the peoples of North Caucasia. "The ties among these peoples should promote the strengthening of peace and improvement of the situation in Caucasia," the statement says.

Azerbaijani State Secretary Arrives on Visit

LD1511202493 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1700 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Lala Gajiyeva, secretary of state of the Republic of Azerbaijan, arrived in Tbilisi on 15 November for a one-day official visit. The guest made a trip to Marneuli rayon, which is mainly inhabited by ethnic Azeris.

After that, a ceremony of submitting a friendship and cooperation treaty between Georgia and Azerbaijan for further ratification was held in the Georgian Parliament building. Mrs Gajiyeva and the leadership of the republic participated in the ceremony.

Later, a meeting was held between Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze and the Azerbaijani secretary of state. A number of issues were discussed, including prospects for the development of relations between the two friendly neighboring states.

Tbilisi Institutes Power Rationing

LD1511193493 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0600 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Summary] Due to the current difficult situation in the supply of power sources in the republic, at the demand of the department of the cabinet of ministers in charge of power supply, in order to secure the minimum necessary level in units of vital importance such as transport, hospitals, bakeries, water supply and so on, the electricity board of Tbilisi is introducing electric power rationing from 16 November. From 0900 to 1300, electric power will be disconnected for almost the whole town. Tbilisi has been divided into two sections, and each will be without electric power from 1700 to 1900 and from 1900 to 2100 on alternate days. Power supply to an area near the airport will be disconnected from 1500 to 2100 daily.

Estonia

Riigikogu No Confidence Vote in Prime Minister Fails

LD1511140293 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1400 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Excerpts] The Riigikogu did not pass a vote of no confidence in the prime minister. [passage omitted]

After a brief break, the Riigikogu speaker put the draft resolution on no confidence in the Republic of Estonia's prime minister to a vote. There were 21 deputies in favor of no confidence, and 45 against, and 10 abstentions. The vote of no confidence did not gain the support of the required 51 deputies.

Laar Comments on Rejection

WS1611110293 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1712 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, November 15—The Estonian parliament on Monday [15 November] rejected a vote of no-confidence against Prime Minister Mart Laar by 45 votes to 21 with 10 abstentions.

Laar told a news conference following the motion he was grateful to the parliament and the ruling coalition for their support.

"There is much space for improvement in our work and confidence in us will make us work harder," he said while adding that a top priority was improving relations between the government and coalition. Closer co-operation with the parliament and the opposition was also necessary, Laar said while refusing to comment upon possible "renovation" of the government saying it depended on negotiations with the ruling coalition.

Laar also said that while listening to the speeches at the parliament he had noticed the opposition was splitting and a constructive wing was developing securing possibilities for fruitful co-operation in national security and several other issues.

The government will analyse the no-confidence motion at its session on Thursday, Laar said.

The opposition had initiated the no-confidence motion last Thursday.

Parliament Adopts Law on Security Services

LD1111115793 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Excerpt] The Riigikogu [parliament] today adopted a law on security services with 64 votes in favor. The law on security services bans policemen and servicemen offering security services or becoming involved in any commercial activity. [passage omitted]

Russians Question Plan for Roundtable

WS1211133393 Tallinn BNS in English 1117 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] TALLINN, Nov 12, BNS—The Russian Embassy in Estonia sharply questioned President Lennart Meri's proposal to hold a session of his roundtable talks in Russian territory.

The idea just is not expedient, said Russian Press Attache Andrey Yakushev.

The statement followed repeated reports that one of the conference's meetings was scheduled for the Pechorsky district of Russia. The conference is supposed to focus on the status of a Finno-Ugric branch, the Setu, which settled in the area. The disputed border between Russia and Estonia runs through the middle of their settlement.

Estonia contends that Russia has violated the rights of the Setu remaining on its territory. Estonian Population Minister Peter Olesk says that the Russian Setu are deprived of a chance to see Estonian doctors, while their children have to illegally cross the barbed-wired border to get to an Estonian school.

Yakushev accused Estonia of artificially raising the Russian Setu's problems to the political area. This is unlikely to bring any good to anyone, he said. Instead, he said, Russia and Estonia should sign an agreement on the exchange of residents of neighboring regions. The treaty has been already prepared, but he said Estonia has been dodging it for some time.

People's Front Votes To Disband

LD1511133293 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1800 GMT 13 Nov 93

[Excerpts] The Estonian People's Front ended its activity today. The fifth congress of the People's Front took place in the trade union building and decided to wind up the (?movement's) activity. This decision was justified in various ways in speeches. It was also said that the People's Front should have folded a year ago.

There were also different opinions which said that disbanding would amount to—I quote—mass stupidity which must be stopped and that those in favor of disbanding the People's Front are near enough enemies of the people because the front is necessary precisely now, to oppose this Estonian madhouse. [passage omitted]

The ovewhelming majority of the delegates [words indistinct] voted in favor of the resolution to end activity. Seven votes were against and there were two abstentions. [passage omitted]

Bank Protests Budget Amendment

LD1211220193 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1500 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] The Estonian Bank is dissatisfied with an amendment voted in by the Riigikogu according to which the Estonian Bank will have its budget linked to the state budget. In a statement issued today, the Estonian Bank thinks that this is a regrettable occurrence due to tiredness and unexpectedness. The amendment to the law on the 1994 state budget proposed by Mihkel Parnoja was passed with 27 votes in favor, 15 against, and 7 abstentions. Forty-one Riigikogu members failed to vote and 11 were absent from the session.

The statement says that linking the Estonian Bank's budget and the state budget is unprecedented in world practice. The Estonian Bank notes that it will be the Finance Ministry which decides on any expenses necessary to fulfill the Estonian Bank's functions. The reserves at the Estonian Bank's disposal, including cover for the Estonian kroon, could be used to finance the country's running expenses. The national bank [illegible] that the amendment endangers the Estonian kro[illegible] monetary and banking systems, as well as the Est[illegible] economy.

The fact that Mihkel Parnoja's amendment was passed does not as yet mean that it will be included in the final version of the budget; deputies may reject the amendment and the whole state budget will also be put to the vote.

Latvia

Russian Troop Withdrawal Possible by Aug 94

LD1511214693 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1800 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Regular interstate talks between Latvia and Russia, on the army withdrawal from Latvia, began in Jurmala today. The Russian delegation announced that the troops might be withdrawn from Latvian territory by 31 August next year and that Russia is ready to scrap certain strategically important facilities, including a radar at Skrunda, within six years.

The third most important issue in question is the status of officers who retired from the army of the former USSR and Russia. It was noted that many of them wish to return to their homeland, but many others wish to stay and become permanent residents of Latvia.

Work continued in groups of experts this afternoon. It is planned that the Russo-Latvian talks will last for three days altogether.

Birkavs Addresses UN on Troop Withdrawal

LD1611101693 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0801 GMT 16 Nov 93

[Text] Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs addressed the UN General Assembly yesterday. (?He) read aloud a draft resolution which had been previously discussed during consultations between Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Russia. The resolution was passed without voting.

He plans to hold several meetings today, including meetings with UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali and president of this session Samuel Insanally. The head of the Latvian Government will also meet Swedish, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian ambassadors to the United Nations.

Azeri Team Arrives To Conclude Trade Accord

WS1611094993 Tallinn BNS in English 1726 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Riga, Nov 15, BNS—Azerbaijani government officials arrived at the Latvian Economics Ministry Monday to prepare and initial a 1994 trade agreement for 55 million U.S. dollars in goods.

Azerbaijan wants to buy Latvian meat products, dairy products, tinned fish, consumer goods and mini buses. In return, Azerbaijan pledges to supply Latvia with oil and oil products, including 100,000 tons of diesel fuel, 30,000 tons of black oil, 5,000 tons of diesel oil and 50,000 tons of aviation fuel.

Other Azerbaijani supplies will include tobacco, medicines and wines.

So far, the countries' trade relations were regulated by the 1992 trade agreement. Salech Alijarov [name as received], the Azerbaijani deputy economics minister, judged the previous cooperation as successful and said he hoped that it would be even more fruitful next year.

Ministry Rejects Criticism on Citizenship

LD1211225993 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1600 GMT 12 Nov 93

[Text] The Latvian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement concerning the citizenship bill being prepared for discussion in the Saeima this month. It notes that according to the principles established in international legislation, each state adopts laws for itself that determine the allocation of its citizenship. Refusal to register an individual's application for citizenship is not a violation of human rights. The registration, to be conducted by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Latvia, is an internal administrative procedure. International legislation also declares that a country has no obligation to assign citizenship to everyone who wants it. Therefore, in the view of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, reports of some alleged violations permitted in the work of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration are not a basis for the Helsinki Watch group to conclude that human rights are violated in Latvia.

Helsinki Watch favors the zero option for allocating citizenship. Moreover, the Foreign Ministry points out, the announcement recently put out by Helsinki Watch has many imprecise points and is misleading in places. The Latvian Government has undertaken to survey the the actions of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in order to correct the violations allowed in the past and avert any such in the future.

Saeima Establishes National Security Council

LD1111155293 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 11 Nov 93

[Text] Today, the state's Saeima adopted a law establishing a Latvian National Security Council. Included in the council will be the president of the Republic of Latvia, the chairman of the Saeima, the prime minister, the chairman of the Saeima Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, the chairman of the Saeima National security Commission, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs. The National Security council will be headed by the state president. The task of the council is to predict and to detect internal and external threats to state security, to protect the inhabitants, and to determine the means for preventing and neutralizing these threats. The council already assembled for the first time on 4 October when the attempted coup d'etat occurred in Russia.

Lithuania

Slezevicius on Visit of Russian Premier

LD1511181693 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 15 Nov 93

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius gave an address on Lithuanian Radio this morning.

Speaking on a [word indistinct] radio program, the prime minister said that the allegation that the capital accumulated in Lithuania from foreign credits will be squandered for nothing had no realistic basis. The pursued foreign policy is, first of all, aimed at protecting Lithuania's interests. The prime minister said that the fact that the Russian Cabinet of Ministers leader is arriving in Lithuania on Thursday [18 November] indicates that a dialogue between equal in rights parties is in progress.

A packet of nine agreements has been prepared for the meeting with Viktor Chernomyrdin. The most important of these singled out by Adolfas Slezevicius were: Agreements on the most favorable trade regime, transport, military and general legal affairs, cooperation between the Ministries of Internal Affairs, and an agreement on military transit.

Adolfas Slezevicius said that the agreement on military transit with the Kaliningrad region was still in preparation. A foreign expert has also been invited to assist in this work.

Lithuania's biggest partner in construction and economic cooperation is Russia. Out of 2700 joint enterprises with foreign companies, 421 joint enterprises have been set up with Russia.

At the same time, the prime minister pointed out that the trade balance with Russia was negative. We import more from Russia than export into it.

According to the prime minister, an agreement on most favorable trade regime is to be signed [words indistinct].

Adolfas Slezevicius stressed that Lithuania owes Russia 196 million litas, whereas Russia owes Lithuania 219 million litas. However, according to the prime minister, Russia pays its debts to us rather more promptly than we do.

He also stressed that yet another pressing issue for the people would not be touched upon at the meeting. This issue is the contribution of Lithuanian [word indistinct], the unpaid state loan bonds, and the [word indistinct] of people's savings.

Jurgelis: New Communist Party Not Dangerous

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[Text] Jurgis Jurgelis, director of the Lithuanian National Security Service, claims that attempts to revive the Communist Party are being exerted in Lithuania. Thus far, they have not posed any danger to state security. On 7-10 November, however, Lithuanian neocommunists, who are currently operating underground, planned to circulate leaflets in Vilnius urging discontented people to change the government and fight for their rights more actively. There were no leaflets because, according to J. Jurgelis, the National Security Service applied certain "preventive measures" and checked on the plans of some printing houses in Vilnius.

It is interesting to note that reactionary forces in Moscow also decided to prolong the "great October holiday" until 10 November. One may assume that Lithuanian communists are coordinating their actions with those forces.

The emerging Lithuanian neocommunists are trying to restore their party structures and are rallying in small groups of five. They are coordinating a new ideology and holding "seminars." According to J. Jurgelis, many of these people are former "Yedinstvo" [pro-Soviet organization that acted against the restoration of Lithuanian independence] activists and Russian speakers.